Rubio v. Rubio
| Decision Date | 16 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | NUMBER 13-17-00682-CV |
| Parties | JOSE GUADALUPE RUBIO, Appellant, v. MARIA LUISA RUBIO, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On appeal from the 357th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.
Before Justices Hinojosa, Perkes, and Tijerina
In this property dispute between former spouses, appellant Jose Guadalupe Rubio submits that: (1) the judgment declaring appellee Maria Luisa Rubio as the "sole and legal owner" of the subject property was an impermissible collateral attack on the parties' divorce decree; and (2) the trial court erred by "effectively applying the doctrine of after acquired title." We affirm.
The parties married in 1976. In 1986, they began constructing a home at 8636 N. Oklahoma, Brownsville, Texas. Construction was completed in 1988, and the parties resided there with their three children until their divorce in 1990.
The divorce suit was filed in the 107th District Court, and each party was represented by counsel. The parties agreed to the terms of the decree,1 which contains the following recital: "The Court finds that the following is a just and right division of the parties' marital estate, having due regard for the rights of each property." As part of the division of their marital estate, Maria was awarded "[t]he 3.5 acres located at 8636 Oklahoma, Brownsville, Cameron County, Texas, together with any and all improvements thereon," and Jose was awarded "[t]he 10 acres located at Brownsville, Cameron County, Texas." The decree failed to provide any further description of these properties. Under the decree, each party was "divested of all right, title, interest, and claim" in the property awarded to the other party. The decree also provided that "[Jose] and [Maria] shall execute and deliver all documents, including deeds and certificates of title necessary to effect the transfer of property as ordered in this Decree."2
The parties agree that the "3.5 acres" awarded to Maria under the parties' agreed divorce decree did not accurately describe the property owned by the marital estate, but the parties disagree as to what that "3.5 acres" encompassed. Maria contends that the "3.5 acres" encompassed two contiguous tracts of land totaling 2.9865 acres, while Jose contends that the marital estate only had an interest in the tract consisting of .556 acres (Tract A). The other tract, consisting of 2.4305 acres (Tract B), which is the subject of this appeal, was deeded to Jose by his aunt Amada Martinez in 1997, seven years after the divorce. Jose argues that because neither party held legal title to Tract B at the time of the parties' divorce, the marital estate had not acquired any interest in the property; therefore, Tract B could not be subject to a division of the marital estate in 1990.
It is undisputed, however, that at the time of their divorce, neither party had acquired legal title to Tract A, Tract B, or the "10 acres" awarded to Jose. Instead, legal title to each property was held by various members of Jose's family. Jose's aunt Virginia Rubio conveyed Tract A to Maria by warranty deed within three months of the divorce, and the "10 acres" was deeded to Jose by his brothers in 2000.
It is also undisputed that the marital home currently straddles Tracts A and B, with the attached garage resting on Tract B and the remainder of the house resting on Tract A. Jose agrees that the marital home was awarded to Maria as part of Tract A but argues that the attached garage was added after the parties' divorce. Maria disputes this fact, contending that the attached garage was part of the original construction completed in 1988.
In the years leading up to the lawsuit, both parties represented to the appraisal district that they owned Tract B. In 2012, Maria filed a copy of the divorce decree in the public land records as proof of ownership. Jose filed a suit to quiet title and for declaratory judgment against Maria in 2016, and Maria countersued for the same relief. A bench trial was held in September 2017.
Jose testified that there was no agreement with his aunt to purchase Tract B during his marriage to Maria. Instead, Jose's aunt verbally agreed to convey the property to him in 1993 or 1994, several years after the parties' divorce, if Jose paid the property tax arrearages on the property. Jose provided tax receipts showing that he began paying the property taxes on Tract B in 1994, including back taxes owed for the years 1990 through 1992. Jose also testified that, after the agreement, he made numerous improvements on the property, including the construction of two small dwellings, a drainage ditch, septic tanks, and an access road. According to Jose, Maria did not make any financial contributions to these improvements.
Additionally, Jose testified that there was a fence that separated Tracts A and B that he removed in May or June of 1997, after his aunt indicated she would finally be conveying the property to him in July of 1997. He further testified that he allowed his cousin to move a trailer on to Tract B in 1999 and collected monthly rent in the amount of $250. Jose subsequently placed another trailer on Tract B and rented the trailer to another tenant. Although the two small dwellings on Tract B were originally occupied by theparties' daughters, Jose rented the dwellings to tenants after their daughters moved out. At all times, Jose, not Maria, collected the rent from the various tenants.
Jose acknowledged that the "10 acres" awarded to him as his sole and separate property in the decree was not deeded to him until 2000. During his cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:
Maria testified that before construction began on the marital home in the mid-1980s, Jose represented to her that he was purchasing Tract B from his aunt. When Maria agreed to the terms on the division of property in the decree, she believed that the parties "owned" all the real property being awarded and that she was receiving both Tracts A andB. She explained that both Tracts A and B were commonly known as 8636 N. Oklahoma at the time of the divorce and that the couple did not own any other property that fit that description; the only other property the couple "owned" was the 9.886 acres awarded to Jose.
Maria testified that construction on the marital home began in 1986 and was complete by August 1988, the month the parties' son was born. She produced receipts totaling approximately $12,000 for building materials that she says were purchased with community funds.
Maria also largely disputed Jose's testimony about when the improvements to Tract B were made. She stated that most of the improvements that he testified about were made prior to their divorce and that these improvements were made with community funds. She also testified that she paid some of the taxes on Tract B over the intervening years, as well as all the utilities.
Maria explained that she was able to obtain a deed to Tract A within months of the divorce because Virginia Rubio lived in the area. Amada Martinez, on that other hand, lived in Florida at that time, and Maria was not well acquainted with her. According to Maria, these factors prevented her from acquiring legal title to Tract B after the divorce.
One of the major points of contention at trial was the garage attached to the marital home. It is undisputed that the marital home now straddles the property line between Tracts A and B with the attached garage situated on Tract B and the remainder of the house on Tract A. The parties disagreed, however, about when the garage wasconstructed. Jose gave conflicting testimony on this point. He stated several times that it was constructed after the agreement with his aunt in the mid-1990s, but also admitted at one point that "[the garage] was already there" when the parties were divorced in 1990. Maria, on the other hand, testified unequivocally that the garage was part of the original construction completed in 1988. The following picture of the house, taken within six months of the trial, was admitted into evidence:
Image materials not available for display.
Maria testified that this picture is an accurate depiction of the house's structure in 1990, including its materials and roof line. Maria contends that this fact supports her position because, according to Maria, the parties would not have partially constructed their home on Tract B unless they had purchased the property.
At the conclusion of the trial, consistent with the relief requested in her counterpetition, Maria asked the trial court to "confirm" that the divorce decree awarded her Tract B and to declare her the owner of the property. The trial court rendered a judgment denying all the relief sought by Jose and declaring Maria "sole and legal owner" of Tract B.
Among others, the trial court issued the following findings of fact:
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