Ruble v. Kirkwood
| Decision Date | 17 April 1928 |
| Parties | RUBLE v. KIRKWOOD. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County; Walter H. Evans, Judge.
Action by L. J. Ruble against R. J. Kirkwood. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
W. O. Sims, of Portland (Emerson U. Sims, of Portland, on the brief), for appellant.
Wallace McCamant, of Portland (McCamant & Thompson, of Portland, on the brief), for respondent.
This is an action to recover damages for an alleged libel. It is predicated on a letter written by the defendant R. J Kirkwood, president and general manager of the Union Savings & Loan Association, to the state corporation commissioner of and concerning the plaintiff. The only portion of the letter set out in the complaint is the recital that the plaintiff "has now been made a defendant in a criminal action." For several years plaintiff had been employed by the Union Savings & Loan Association as a salesman of bonds and securities in the city of Portland, but such employment was terminated a few days prior to the date of this letter, December 27, 1924. On January 3, 1925, The Fidelity Reserve & Loan Company, a competitor of the Union Savings & Loan Association, made application to the corporation commissioner to have a license issued to plaintiff so that he could act as its sales agent. Before this license was issued, on January 12, 1925, The Fidelity Reserve & Loan Company rescinded plaintiff's contract of employment.
It is the theory of plaintiff that such rescission was the proximate result of the letter written by Kirkwood, and, had it not been for this wrongful act, he would have been enabled to earn a commission of $5,000 on the sale of stock in the Fidelity Reserve & Loan Company. Plaintiff complains that his reputation as a salesman and as an upright citizen has been injured by reason of this alleged defamatory letter. Judgment was demanded against both defendants for $25,000 as general damages and the sum of $5,000 as special damages. After the issues were joined on the pleadings and before trial, the action was dismissed as to the defendant Union Savings & Loan Association.
The defendant Kirkwood answered in substance, after denying that plaintiff had been damaged, that the letter written to the corporation commissioner was a qualifiedly privileged communication made in good faith and without malice, in the belief that the statements therein contained were true. It is conceded that the plaintiff had not been made a defendant in any criminal action. Verdict and judgment was had for the defendant Kirkwood. Plaintiff appeals.
The major assignment of error is that the trial court held the letter in question to be not actionable per se. It is well settled that in determining this question we must look to the letter in its entirety, and not to isolated portions thereof. Plaintiff has not seen fit to plead innuendo, but relies solely upon the allegation that defendant stated he "has now been made a defendant in a criminal action." We quote the following portion of the letter which is deemed material:
It will be observed from the words which we have italicized in the above paragraph that there is a slight variance between the allegation of the complaint and the proof.
We are of opinion that the letter is not libelous per se. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that its natural tendency would be be to bring the plaintiff into public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. It is not a clear imputation, either express or implied, of the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude.
While the authorities are conflicting in other jurisdictions, it is settled here that an action for libel cannot be based on a charge of having committed a crime unless it is one involving moral turpitude. Clark v. Morrison, 80 Or. 240, 156 P. 429, Davis v. Sladden, 17 Or. 259, 21 P. 140. The rule is thus stated in Newell on Slander & Libel (3d Ed.) § 71:
"The charge must clearly impute an offense which would subject the party charged to an indictment for a crime involving moral turpitude, or subject him to an infamous punishment, although it need not state the charge with all the precision of an indictment." We think, however, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Church
...have been damaged. Words having a doubtful meaning cannot be declared as a matter of law, to be actionable per se.' Ruble v. Kirkwood (1928), 125 Or. 316, 266 P. 252, 254. See also Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290, 39 S.Ct. 448, 63 L.Ed. 987, 989; Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio St......
-
Conduct of Chase, In re
...see also In re Piper, 271 Or. 726, 534 P.2d 159 (1975); State ex rel Ricco v. Biggs, 198 Or. 413, 255 P.2d 1055 (1953); Ruble v. Kirkwood, 125 Or. 316, 266 P. 252 (1928). The accused eleborates that the intentional or knowing violation of any law by an attorney, does not, in and of itself, ......
-
Wheeler v. Green
...to the jury in the particular case. See, e. g., Lane v. Schilling, 130 Or. 119, 279 P. 267, 65 A.L.R. 1042 (1929); Ruble v. Kirkwood, 125 Or. 316, 266 P. 252 (1928). Claims for punitive damages were held properly submitted to the jury in Glenn v. Esco Corp., 268 Or. 278, 520 P.2d 443 (1974)......
-
Memphis Pub. Co. v. Nichols
...v. Campbell, 91 Ohio App. 483, 108 N.E.2d 749 (1952); Tulas Tribune Co. v. Kight, 174 Okl. 359, 50 P.2d 350 (1935); Ruble v. Kirkwood, 125 Or. 316, 266 P. 252 (1928); Manley v. Harer, 73 Mont. 253, 235 P. 757 (1925); Dalton v. Woodward, 134 Neb. 915, 280 N.W. 215 (1938); Ellsworth v. Martin......