Rucker v. Mich. Smelting & Ref. Co.

Decision Date17 March 1942
Docket NumberNo. 4.,4.
Citation300 Mich. 668,2 N.W.2d 808
PartiesRUCKER v. MICHIGAN SMELTING & REFINING CO. et al.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal in Nature of Certiorari from Department of Labor and Industry.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Arthur Rucker, employee, opposed by the Michigan Smelting and Refining Company, Division Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, employer, and Maryland Casualty Company, insurer. From a decision of the Department of Labor and Industry awarding compensation the employer and insurer appeal in the nature of certiorari.

Award vacated and cause remanded.

Before the Entire Bench, except WIEST, J.

Mason, Davidson & Mansfield, of Detroit (Walter A. Mansfield, of Detroit, of counsel), for appellants.

Dann & Atlas, of Detroit, for appellee.

BUSHNELL, Justice.

Plaintiff, Arthur Rucker, suffered a leg injury when he was struck by a pot full of slag, which dropped on the floor, while he was in the employ of defendant, Michigan Smelting and Refining Company. He was given first-aid at defendant's plant and then sent to the office of Dr. Francis B. McMillan, located in the David Whitney Building, downtown Detroit. Doctor McMillan examined Rucker's leg, obtained X-rays which showed no bone injury, treated the leg with infra-red rays, and applied an elastic bandage. Rucker complained of the pain in his leg, so Doctor McMillan sent Rucker home in a taxicab at the expense of defendant Maryland Casualty Company, for whom he was acting.

On the way home the taxicab was involved in a collision, after which Rucker was taken to the Receiving Hospital in an unconscious condition, where he remained for three or four days. Upon his return home, he was attended by Doctor Preston, who found that his left eye was swollen and edematous. Doctor Preston sent Rucker to the St. Aubin General Hospital where he remained from June 21st to August 2nd.

As a result of the second accident Rucker lost the sight of his left eye. He brought proceedings for compensation which resulted in an award of $18 a week for 100 weeks for the specific loss of the eye. This award was affirmed on review by the Department, which held as follows:

‘The principal question before us for determination, however, is whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the specific loss of his left eye which was sustained as a result of the second accident in the taxi cab. If so, it will be unnecessary to determine the nature and extent of the plaintiff's disability, inasmuch as compensation for such disability could not begin until after the payment of 100 weeks for the specific loss of the said eye. * * *

‘This is not an ordinary case of an employee leaving his work and sustaining an injury while on his way home and while the employer has no interest in his activities. In this case the defendant had an interest in the manner and means by which the plaintiff reached his home as a part of its care of his injuries. His injuries were so severe that he was given crutches to use in walking and if he had been allowed to go home on a street car or a bus, there was a substantial risk that the injuries might become aggravated and the defendant's physician felt it advisable that he be taken home in a taxi cab at the expense of the defendant. Because of the defendant's statutory obligation of medical care this was to the distinct interest of the defendant. It follows that at the time of the taxi cab accident, which resulted in the loss of the plaintiff's left eye, the plaintiff was traveling in a method designated by the defendant as a part of its care of his injuries. In our opinion the injury which the plaintiff received, arising out of and in the course of such statutory care, is compensable and the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for 100 weeks for the specific loss of his left eye.'

Aggravation of the leg injury is argued but that question was not passed upon by the...

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17 cases
  • Dean v. Chrysler Corp.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 3 Julio 1990
    ...she was to receive treatment for a prior work-related compensable injury. Nearly half a century ago, in Rucker v. Michigan Smelting & Refining Co., 300 Mich. 668, 2 N.W.2d 808 (1942), this Court held that a subsequent injury sustained under similar circumstances was not compensable because ......
  • Daniel v. Murray Corp. of Am.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 10 Octubre 1949
    ...v. City of Lansing, 293 Mich. 211, 291 N.W. 637;Simpson v. Lee and Cady, 294 Mich. 460, 293 N.W. 718;Rucker v. Michigan Smelting & Refining Co., 300 Mich. 668, 2 N.W.2d 808;Meehan v. Marion Manor Apartments, 305 Mich. 262, 9 N.W.2d 534;Rector v. Ragnar-Benson, Inc., 313 Mich. 277, 21 N.W.2d......
  • Phillips v. Fitzhugh Motor Co.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 3 Abril 1951
    ...therefrom. See Appleford v. Kimmel, (supra); Dent v. Ford Motor Co., 275 Mich. 39, 265 N.W. 518; Rucker v. Michigan Smelting & Refining Co., 300 Mich. 668, 2 N.W.2d 808.' It is the rule that ordinarily injuries to an employee while going to or from work are not regarded as arising out of an......
  • Haggar v. Tanis
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 16 Febrero 1948
    ...v. City of Lansing, 293 Mich. 211, 291 N.W. 637;Cherewick v. Laramie & Son, Inc., 295 Mich. 570, 295 N.W. 268;Rucker v. Smelting & Refining Co., 300 Mich. 668, 2 N.W.2d 808;Meehan v. Marion Manor Apts., 305 Mich. 262, 9 N.W.2d 534; and Rector v. Ragnar-Benson, Inc., 313 Mich. 277, 21 N.W.2d......
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