Ruckman v. Riebel

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
• Writing for the Court: GEORGE C. SMITH
• Decision Date: 14 September 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:11-cv-874
• Citation: Ruckman v. Riebel, Case No. 2:11-cv-874 (S.D. Ohio Sep 14, 2012)
• Parties: Mary Ruckman, Plaintiff, v. Kathy Riebel, et al., Defendants.

Mary Ruckman, Plaintiff, v. Kathy Riebel, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:11-cv-874

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

Dated: September 14, 2012

JUDGE SMITH

Magistrate Judge Kemp

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Franklin County Sheriff Zach Scott and the Franklin County Sheriff's Department's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 20). This motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. Additionally, Plaintiff has filed an Amended Motion for Extension of Time to Amend (Doc. 35), which Defendants oppose. The Court will address this preliminary matter first and then the substantive motion. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 8, 2011, Plaintiff Mary Ruckman initiated this action against Defendants Franklin County Sheriff Zach Scott and the Franklin County Sheriff's Department (the "Franklin County Defendants"), as well as other defendants not directly pertinent to the pending motion.¹This action was removed to this Court on September 30, 2011. Plaintiff Mary Ruckman is a resident of Whitehall, Ohio. She is an elderly woman who suffers from physical handicaps and generally poor health. Plaintiff is involved in an ongoing property line dispute with her neighbors, Heidi and Joseph Wise. The Wises live next door to Plaintiff in a house owned by Charles and Kathy Reibel, the parents of Mrs. Wise. Plaintiff alleges that the Wises have made harassing and threatening statements to her. Plaintiff further alleges that she has contacted the Whitehall City Police and the Franklin County Sheriff's Office on numerous occasions when she felt threatened by her neighbors, but that neither has assisted her.

This action arose from events that took place on August 23, 2009. Plaintiff was arrested by the Whitehall Police after the Wises filed a trespass complaint against her. Plaintiff alleges that the Whitehall Police Officers abused her in the process of making the arrest and transporting her to the Franklin County Jail. Plaintiff also alleges that the Franklin County Deputies abused her, caused her humiliation by making her expose herself to a group of men, and subjected her to generally deplorable conditions in the jail. Plaintiff was ultimately released from jail on August 24, 2009. Plaintiff asserts claims of assault, false imprisonment, negligence, a violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defamation, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On December 21, 2011, the Franklin County Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings as to all claims asserted against them. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in response to the Franklin County Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or, in the alternative, moved for leave of Court to amend her Complaint to properly designate the political subdivision representing the Franklin County Sheriff's Department, and to join Franklin County as a partydefendant. The Franklin County Defendants then filed a reply memorandum in support of the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for Additional Time in which to Amend Pleadings, and the Franklin County Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to this motion. These motions are ripe for disposition.

II. MOTION TO AMEND

On April 2, 2012, counsel for Plaintiff moved for an extension of sixty days to amend the pleadings (Doc. 35). Counsel cites that he suffered a debilitating injury in January which limited his ability to work on this case and others. He further states that he is only beginning the discovery process and anticipates that he will receive information necessary for him to amend the pleadings through discovery.

Defendants oppose Plaintiff's Motion, arguing that since this lawsuit was filed on September 8, 2011, Plaintiff has not made any attempt to conduct discovery. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has failed to indicate what discovery is needed, whether she intends to name additional parties, or intends to add causes of action. Defendants assert that they have moved for judgment on the pleadings based on the statute of limitations, and that there is no reason to anticipate that discovery will yield any information that would place her action within the statute of limitations.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause in support of an extension of the time to amend the pleadings. Plaintiff has had ample time to evaluate her case to determine if there is a need to amend the pleadings. Further, there is a pending motion for judgment on the pleadings, so allowing the extension for time to amend would only delay a ruling on that motion and potentially prejudice Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion foran Extension to Amend is DENIED.

III. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." It is well-settled that the standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is the same as that used to address a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2007); Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 11 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that where a Rule 12(b)(6) defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is raised by a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must apply the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).

Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of a lawsuit for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is directed solely to the complaint and any exhibits attached to it. Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 155 (6th Cir. 1983). The merits of the claims set forth in the complaint are not at issue on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Consequently, a complaint will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only if there is no law to support the claims made, or if the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim, or if on the face of the complaint there is an insurmountable bar to relief. See Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir. 1978). Rule 12(b)(6) must be read in conjunction with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the complaint to contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]"

A court, in considering a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," accepting as true all the plaintiff's factual allegations. Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009). Although in this context all of the factual allegations in the complaint are taken as true, a court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Consequently, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Furthermore, to survive dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a claim must contain sufficient factual matter to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, at 678. While a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," its "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true." Twombly, at 555. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.' " Iqbal, at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). In the final analysis, the task of determining plausibility is "context-specific [and] requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

Accordingly, the Court will grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings if there is an absence of law to support a claim of the type made, or of facts sufficient to make a valid claim, or if on the face of the complaint there is an insurmountable bar to relief indicating that the plaintiff does not have a claim. Little v. UNUM Provident Corp., 196 F. Supp.2d 659, 662 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (Graham, J.) (citing Rauch). Stated differently, "[f]or purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

B. Discussion

The Franklin County Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings asserting that all of Plaintiff's claims against them were filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The statute of limitations analysis begins with Ohio Revised Code § 2744.04(A), which provides:

An action against a political subdivision to recover damages for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission in connection with a governmental or proprietary function, whether brought as an original action, cross-claim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or claim for subrogation, shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues, or within any applicable shorter period of time for bringing the action provided by the

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