Rudd v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 09 August 1972
• Docket Number: No. 1271A275,1271A275
• Citation: 285 N.E.2d 836,153 Ind.App. 11
• Parties: Leonard RUDD and Kathryn Rudd, Appellants (Defendants Below), v. Gunnard ANDERSON and Karl Anderson, d/b/a G & K Anderson Construction, Appellees (Plaintiffs Below), The Hamlet State Bank, Appellee (Defendant Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 836

285 N.E.2d 836

153 Ind.App. 11

Leonard RUDD and Kathryn Rudd, Appellants (Defendants Below), v. Gunnard ANDERSON and Karl Anderson, d/b/a G & K Anderson

Construction, Appellees (Plaintiffs Below),

The Hamlet State Bank, Appellee (Defendant Below).

No. 1271A275.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.

Aug. 9, 1972.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 13, 1972.

Paul Reed, Knox, for appellants.

Richard F. Joyce, of Kizer & Neu, Plymouth, Orville W. Nichols, Jr., Knox, for appellees.

STATON, Judge.

STATEMENT ON APPEAL: Leonard Rudd and Kathryn Rudd are appealing from a judgment which awarded Gunnard Anderson and Karl Anderson, d/b/a G & K Anderson Construction, $18,802.62 upon their mechanic's lien foreclosure. The Rudds had engaged the Andersons to perform certain remodeling construction on their home located in Starke County, Indianan which is more particularly described as follows:

'A tract of land commencing on the west line of Section 35 at a point 375 feet south of the northwest corner of Section 35, Township 33 North, Range 2 West of the second principal meridian, thence east 348 feet, thence south 125 feet, thence west 348 feet, thence north 125 feet to the place of beginning.'

The modifications discussed before the remodeling work commenced totaled $35,200.00. After all remodeling had been completed which included considerable changes from the original remodeling plans, the Rudds paid Anderson $40,000.00 and stated that they 'couldn't justify' the additional charge of $17,977.92 for the time and materials claimed by the Andersons. A mechanic's lien was filed and foreclosed by the Andersons was received a judgment for $17,977.92 plus interest or $18,802.62. The trial court awarded attorney fees in the sum of $1,800.00. The motion to correct errors filed by the Rudds raises the following questions.

I. 'The first issue presented for review is whether or not the court's decision permitting the Contractors to recover for the entire project on a time and material basis was supported by sufficient evidence upon all the necessary elements of the plaintiffs complaint.'

II. 'The second issue presented for review is whether or not the notice of mechanic's lien filed by the Contractors was in compliance with the mechanic's lien statute in that it did not contain in the body thereof, the names and addresses of the Contractors.'

III. 'The third issue presented for review is whether or not the amount of Contractors' recovery was excessive.'

We affirm the trial court's judgment in the opinion which follows.

STATEMENT OF FACTS: Leonard Rudd, an automobile dealer in Knox, Indiana, and Karl Anderson, a contractor, had their first meeting in the last part of 1968 or early part of 1969. Leonard Rudd testified as follows:

'Q. How did you and he happen to get together about it?

'A. Karl stopped in one day--I suppose you would call it shopping for a new truck, and so he wanted prices and I gave him a price--

'Q. I don't hear you.

'A. He wanted a price on a new truck and I gave him a new price, and if I remember right, several days later or a few days later anyhow, he came back to further negotiate the dealings on a truck and I sold him a new truck. I believe this must have been in '68.

'Q. My question now is when did you and he get together about the house. I don't care how you happened to get together before; whether you sold him a car or didn't.

'A. I said something to him when I found out he was a contractor.

'Q. When did you do that?

'A. This was in--I don't recall whether it was in the last part of '68 or the early part of '69, but, anyhow, I told him that we had though about it, and then later Karl came back and asked if we had thought any further about re-doing the house and adding to it, so it proceeded to the place where we was pretty interested, and he said that he had a fellow that would draw some plans and meet with us if we wanted to and tell him what we desired, and he was a good draftsman and had good ideas and all that.

'Q. Did there come a time when this fellow he said he would bring over did come over?

'A. Yes.

'Q. Who did come with him?

'A. A fellow by the name of William Thayer, I believe.

'Q. That is the draftsman who came: William Thayer. Did Karl Anderson come with him?

'A. Yes.'

Several remodeling proposals were discussed by the Rudds and Anderson in the late spring of 1969. One proposal dated May 20, 1969 totaled $28,200.00 and a second dated June 13, 1969 totaled $35,200.00 with a fireplace and quarry tile or $32,200.00 without. Neither of these written proposals were signed by the Rudds and Anderson. When all of the remodeling construction had been completed, the actual remodeling cost, taking into account the trial court's judgment, totaled $57,977.92, which is approximately twice the amount discussed in the two above proposals. Before Anderson commenced the remodeling construction, he had a conversation with Leonard Rudd in his office at Knox, Indiana. Anderson testified:

'Q. And what kind of a conversation did you have then?

'A. He said he was sorry but he felt that it was more than he wished to spend but that he would like to do some work on the house to fix it up and renovate it and he said 'If you have some time go out and look at it.' And this is what we did.

'Q. You went out to look at the house on that particular day. What kind of a conversation did you have with the defendant Leonard Rudd there?

'A. At that time he said, 'let's start the job as it we were going to go ahead,' 'but' he said, 'we won't put on any new extensions.' There is a portion of the house that had a closed in porch. He said, 'We will remove this, fill in the roof and-- Mr. Reed: I am sorry, I didn't hear.

Witness: At that time we went to Mr. Rudd's house. He had a closedin porch and this portion of the work had to be done for the new part. It was concrete slab and some blocks, and so forth for floors, and he suggested at that time that we move that and extend the living room and pur a larger living room, and then we would go from there; if we wanted to do more to the inside room, we would. So we started with those intentions of filling out the living room.

'Q. Did you start to do the work?

'A. It was a day or so, I believe, and we started in.

'Q. Did you ever have any conversations prior to the time of starting this work about an hourly rate?

'A. Yes, we did.

'Q. When and where was that, to the best of your ability?

'A. It was at the house. It was at the house. I asked Mr. Rudd--he asked me about now much it would cost to put--

'Q. Speak up.

'A. Mr. Rudd asked me how much it would cost to fill out the living room and I said, 'Really, I can't set down a definite figure.' At that time I made an estimate. This was all. I don't even recall what is was--

'Q. Speak up.

'A. It was only a matter of a few days until other decisions had to be made, but then we talked then about four-fifty an hour for the carpentry work.

'Q. What did you tell him about the rate, if anything?

'A. I told Mr. Rudd that we would do the carpentry work on it if he wanted it that way, time and material, or we would do the original contract by the contract, or we would just work for four-fifty an hour.

'Q. What did he say then?

'A. Nothing very--really very definite. He said, 'All right, let's go ahead and start this;' inasmuch as I had suggested a price for filling out the living room he said, 'Let's go ahead and do this portion and we will see how it goes."

The remodeling construction work was commenced and there were approximately twenty-nine (29) changes from the proposals which had been previously discussed. At least fifteen (15) of these changes were substantial changes. The Rudds paid $40,000.00 to Anderson for the completed remodeling construction, but they refused to pay the additional $17,977.92 claimed by Andersons. Andersons' Exhibits 10 and 11 show that $19,705.50 of labor at the rate of $4.50 per hour had been expended to complete the remodeling construction. Andersons filed a mechanic's lien and foreclosed. The trial court awarded Andersons a judgment in the sum of $17,977.92 plus interest and attorney fees. A motion to correct errors was filed by the Rudds and the first of the three questions raised is stated below:

STATEMENT OF LAW:

I.

The first question or contention of error raised in the Rudds' motion to correct errors is:

'The first issue presented for review is whether or not the court's decision permitting the Contractors to recover for the entire project on a time and material basis was supported by sufficient evidence upon all the necessary elements of the plaintiffs complaint.'

This contention's primary premise is that there was a special contract for the remodeling construction completed, and the secondary premise is that the special contract should control extra remodeling construction on a time and material basis. The Rudds cite the following authority in support of this proposition: McKinney v. Springer (1851), 3 Ind. 59; Knab Co. v. St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. (7th Cir. 1961), 286 F.2d 854; and Rebekah Assembly I.O.O.F. v. Pulse (1910), 47 Ind.App. 466, 92 N.E. 1045, 94 N.E. 779.

Assuming arguendo that a special contract price of $35,200.00 had been agreed upon by the Rudds and Anderson for the originally planned remodeling construction, the Rudds have not persuaded us that these facts should not be controlled by those cases which hold that where there have been so many substantial changes to the special contract that it can no longer be used to determine the value of the work done, then reasonable value may be used. Cases enunciating this general rule of law have employed such terms as abandonment, identity and feasibility in relationship to the original special contract. The early cases held that there was an abandonment of the original special contract. Norton v. Browne (1883), 89 Ind. 333. Later cases relied upon being unable to identify, by special contract, the finished construction. Cleveland,...