Rudder v. Director, New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 16 March 2022
• Docket Number: 2021-0014
• Citation: 175 N.H. 38,280 A.3d 235
• Parties: Dianna RUDDER v. DIRECTOR, NEW HAMPSHIRE DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

175 N.H. 38

280 A.3d 235

Dianna RUDDER

v.DIRECTOR, NEW HAMPSHIRE DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES

No. 2021-0014

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: September 28, 2021

Opinion Issued: March 16, 2022

DesMeules Olmstead & Ostler, of Norwich, Vermont (Cabot Teachout on the brief and orally), for the petitioner.

John M. Formella, attorney general (Emily C. Goering, assistant attorney general, on the memorandum of law and orally), for the Director, Division of Motor Vehicles.

BASSETT, J.

The petitioner, Dianna Rudder, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Bornstein, J.) upholding the administrative suspension of her driver's license by the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV). See RSA 265-A:30, :34 (2014). The petitioner's license was suspended, and that suspension was upheld, on the grounds that she was "in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the ways of this state" while intoxicated. RSA 265-A:31, II(a) (2014); see also RSA 265-A:30, :34. She argues that the trial court should have overturned the suspension of her license because the hearing examiner erred when he applied the definition of "way" contained in RSA 259:125, II (2014). We agree with the petitioner and reverse.

The following facts are supported by the record or are not in dispute. On April 19, 2020, the petitioner was sitting in her vehicle, which was parked with the engine running in a private church parking lot in Enfield. A police officer observed the petitioner exit the vehicle, retrieve a bottle of alcohol from the trunk, and return to the driver's seat. The officer approached the petitioner, who informed him that she was sober when she arrived at the church and that, before leaving, she intended to wait until she was sober or call for a ride. The officer administered a field sobriety test, which the petitioner failed. The officer arrested the petitioner for driving under the influence. The officer then asked the petitioner to take a breath test, and informed her that refusing to submit to the test or testing above the legal limit for blood alcohol concentration specified in RSA 265-A:30 would result in suspension of her license. See RSA 265-A:8 (Supp. 2020). The petitioner submitted to the breath test, which showed her blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit. The officer confiscated the petitioner's license and issued a temporary driving permit. See RSA 265-A:30, III.

The officer submitted a sworn report to the Department of Safety certifying the results of the breath test. On April 22, 2020, the department notified the petitioner that her license would be suspended for six months, effective May 19, 2020. See RSA 265-A:30, I-II. Administrative license suspension, or "ALS," is a remedial process that may proceed independently of, and precede, criminal charges for driving under the influence of drugs or liquor (DUI). See RSA 265-A:30 ; State v. Cassady, 140 N.H. 46, 49-50, 662 A.2d 955 (1995). Any person whose license has been suspended under RSA 265-A:30 may request either an administrative review or a hearing to review the suspension. RSA 265-A:31 (2014). On May 8, 2020, the petitioner challenged the suspension of her license and requested a hearing.

The hearing was held on July 16, 2020. The petitioner stipulated that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe she was intoxicated. However, the petitioner argued that the officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner was in control of a vehicle "upon the ways of this state." RSA 265-A:31, II(a). She argued that the church parking lot where she was arrested is not a "way" within the meaning of RSA 259:125. RSA 259:125 provides that "way" shall mean:

I. Except as provided in paragraph II, the entire width between the boundary lines of any public highway, street, avenue, road, alley, park or parkway, or any private way laid out under authority of statute, or any such way provided and maintained by a public institution to which state funds are appropriated for public use, or any such way which has been used for public travel thereon, other than to and from a toll bridge or ferry, for 20 years, or any public or private parking lot which is maintained primarily for the benefit of paying customers; II. For the purposes of RSA 265:71, IV, RSA 265:79, RSA 265-A:2, I, and RSA 265-A:3, any public highway, street, avenue, road, alley, park, parking lot or parkway; any private way laid out under authority of statute; ways provided and maintained by public institutions to which state funds are appropriated for public use; any privately owned and maintained way open for public use; and any private parking lots, including parking lots and other out-of-door areas of commercial establishments which are generally maintained for the benefit of the public.

RSA 259:125, I-II. The petitioner argued that the church parking lot where she was arrested does not meet the definition in paragraph I because it is private, not laid out with the use of public funds, nor maintained for the benefit of a commercial establishment. The petitioner also argued that the definition in paragraph II does not apply in ALS hearings held pursuant to RSA 265-A:31, because the ALS statute, RSA 265-A:30, is not one of the four statutes listed in paragraph II.

The hearing examiner upheld the license suspension, concluding that the State met its burden of showing that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the petitioner was on a "way" at the time of her arrest. In so ruling, the hearing examiner applied the definition of "way" found in paragraph II of RSA 259:125. The hearing examiner ruled that, despite the fact that RSA 265-A:30 is not included among the statutes listed in paragraph II, ALS "is intertwined with, and closely related to, and in fact, is based on an arrest for [DUI]." The hearing examiner therefore decided that, because paragraph II applies to DUI, it "may reasonably be inferred to apply" to an ALS hearing. Additionally, the hearing examiner cited State v. Lathrop, 164 N.H. 468, 58 A.3d 670 (2012), for the proposition that "any roadway that allows public access, even if a private road, unless access is blocked by a bar or a gate, is a public way."

The petitioner appealed to the superior court. See RSA 265-A:34, II. She argued that, because RSA 265-A:30 is not one of the four statutes listed in paragraph II of RSA 259:125, it was error for the hearing examiner to apply that definition in an ALS hearing held pursuant to RSA 265-A:31. The court upheld the hearing examiner's decision, observing that "[t]here is evidence in the record to support the hearing examiner's finding that the area in which the petitioner's vehicle was located at the time of her arrest under RSA 265-A:2, I[,] was a ‘way’ within the meaning of RSA 259:125, II." This appeal followed. On appeal, the parties address only the issue of whether it was proper for the trial court to uphold the hearing examiner's decision to apply the definition of "way" set forth in RSA 259:125, II.

In an appeal of a license suspension to the superior court, the petitioner has the burden to show that the hearing examiner's order was clearly unreasonable or unlawful. Kerouac v. Dir., N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 158 N.H. 353, 355, 965 A.2d 1111 (2009) ; RSA 265-A:34, III. The trial court is required to treat the hearing examiner's findings of fact on questions properly before the examiner as prima facie lawful and reasonable, and may not set aside or vacate the decision unless the court is satisfied, by a clear preponderance of the evidence before it, that the decision is unjust or unreasonable. Kerouac, 158 N.H. at 355, 965 A.2d 1111 ; RSA 265-A:34, III. We will uphold the trial court's decision on appeal unless the evidence does not support it or it is legally erroneous. Kerouac, 158 N.H. at 355, 965 A.2d 1111.

The petitioner argues that "[t]he plain language of the statute and rules of statutory construction are clear" that paragraph II of RSA 259:125 does not apply in ALS hearings held pursuant to RSA 265-A:31. She maintains that the legislature "specifically and intentionally restricted" application of paragraph II to four statutes, and that RSA 265-A:31 is not one of them. The State counters that the petitioner's interpretation of RSA 259:125 "defies the purpose of the statutory scheme, is contrary to the intent of the legislature, and produces an absurd result." We agree with the petitioner.

The petitioner's argument raises an issue of statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law subject to our de novo review. See Rogers v. Rogers, 171 N.H. 738, 743, 203 A.3d 85 (2019). In matters of statutory interpretation, our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature's intent in enacting them and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme. Lathrop, 164 N.H. at 469, 58 A.3d 670. We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Rogers, 171 N.H. at 743, 203 A.3d 85. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we do not look beyond it for further indications of legislative intent. Id.

In Lathrop, we explained that the application of the definition of "way" set forth in RSA 259:125, II "is specifically limited to four statutes." Lathrop, 164 N.H. at 471, 58 A.3d 670. Two of the four statutes listed in paragraph II concern DUI: RSA 265-A:2, I (2014) and RSA 265-A:3 (Supp. 2020). None pertains to ALS. See RSA 259:125, II. The State nonetheless contends that ALS and DUI are "so intertwined" and "inextricably connected as part of a statutory scheme" that because paragraph II applies to DUI, it "must be imported to apply to ALS." However, the State premises its argument on the mistaken notion that the ALS and...