Ruddy-Lamarca v. Dalton Gardens Irrigation Dist.

• Decision Date: 20 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 39217.,39217.
• Citation: 153 Idaho 754,291 P.3d 437
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Dianne RUDDY–LAMARCA, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. DALTON GARDENS IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Defendant–Appellant.

153 Idaho 754

291 P.3d 437

Dianne RUDDY–LAMARCA, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.DALTON GARDENS IRRIGATION DISTRICT, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 39217.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Moscow, September 2012 Term.

Dec. 20, 2012.

Malcolm Dymkoski, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant. Malcolm Dymkoski argued.

James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Susan Weeks argued.

HORTON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a district court's order defining the width of an easement for an irrigation pipeline. Dalton Gardens Irrigation District (the District) owns the pipeline and intends to replace the existing four-inch pipe with a ten-inch pipe. A portion of the pipeline crosses Diane Ruddy–Lamarca's property. The parties agree that an easement of some kind exists in favor of the District. However, they disagree regarding the nature and width of that easement. The district court held that the District had an express easement and an easement by prescription that are identical in location and sixteen feet wide. The District appeals, claiming that the district court erred by restricting its easement to sixteen feet in width and requiring it to make every effort to preserve trees and a drain field on Ruddy–Lamarca's property. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ruddy–Lamarca has owned a five-acre tract of land in Kootenai County since 1990. The District owns and operates an irrigation pipeline that crosses Ruddy–Lamarca's property. The pipeline was originally installed in 1954 and consisted of a four-inch buried pipe. Eight years later, a new four-inch pipeline was installed on the property in the same location. The district court found that the machinery, supplies for the pipeline, and the space required for the excavated soil required thirty to forty feet in width in 1962.

The District intends to replace the existing pipe with a ten-inch pipe. Rather than remove the old pipe, the District plans to lay the new pipe alongside the old one. To accomplish this, the District intends to use a tracked excavator and two rubber-tired backhoes. These machines would be used to dig the trench, place the pipe, and backfill the trench. The District's proposed method will require between thirty and forty feet of total width.

There are two maple trees that are between forty and fifty years old on Ruddy–Lamarca's property located within the area that the District asserts is necessary for it to dig the trench and lay the new pipe. Ruddy–Lamarca installed a new drain field for her septic system in 1996. The drain field also lies within the area the District contends is needed to replace the pipeline. The District's proposed manner of constructing the new pipeline may kill the two maple trees and cause Ruddy–Lamarca's septic system to fail.

Ruddy–Lamarca presented testimony from an expert as to an alternative method of installing the new pipeline. This method would use one tracked excavator, a small Bobcat tractor, and a hand compactor. It would require only sixteen feet of total width and would preserve the trees and the drain field. Although Ruddy–Lamarca's proposed method of installing the pipeline would be slower,¹ there was no evidence presented as to the relative cost of the two proposals.

The District has an express easement across Ruddy–Lamarca's property. It gives the District a "right-of-way for the construction, enlargement and maintenance of all canals, flumes and water tanks of the vendor, heretofore constructed or hereafter to be constructed, over and across said lands for the irrigation of other lands." The document granting the easement was executed in 1911 and is silent as to the easement's width and location.

At trial, the court found that the District had both an express and a prescriptive easement that were "identical in location and width."² The trial court determined the easement to be sixteen feet in width, with its centerline at the location of the present pipeline. The trial court also found that the District had acquiesced in the location of the trees and drain field and ordered the District to "make every effort" to preserve them when repairing, maintaining or replacing the pipeline. The District timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We recently described our standard of review in Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Const. and Trucking:

We review a district court's bench trial decisions to determine whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. This Court will set aside findings of fact only when clearly erroneous. We will not disturb findings supported by substantial and competent evidence even if the evidence is conflicting. It is the province of the district court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. We, therefore, liberally construe a trial court's findings in favor of the judgment entered. When it comes to matters of law, however, we are not bound by the trial court's conclusions; this Court is free to draw its own conclusions from the facts presented.

151 Idaho 761, 768, 264 P.3d 400, 407 (2011) (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

The District asserts that the district court erred when it determined that the width of its easement was sixteen feet and by directing that the District make every effort to preserve the trees and drain field. The District also takes exception to a statement in the district court's memorandum decision and asks that this Court order that a different judge be assigned upon remand. We address these issues in turn.

A. The district court did not err in determining that the width of the secondary easement is sixteen feet.

The parties do not dispute that an easement exists. The dispute surrounds the scope of that easement. Whether express or obtained by prescription, the result is the same in this case. An indefinite express easement is defined by the intent of the parties as demonstrated by the easement's initial use. Coulsen v. Aberdeen–Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 629, 277 P. 542, 545 (1929) ; see also Reynolds Irr. Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 334, 206 P.2d 774, 786 (1948). An easement by prescription is defined by the easement's "continuous and uninterrupted" use for the prescriptive period. Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 62, 190 P.3d 876, 881 (2008). Either way, the District's primary easement is limited to the physical dimensions of the pipeline itself. The first use of this easement was in 1954 as a buried irrigation pipeline. Likewise, the only continuous and uninterrupted use of the easement for the full statutory period was as a buried irrigation pipeline.

The District argues that for purposes of its express easement, "initial use" should include the method of construction, so that if forty feet of width was needed to originally construct the pipeline, then the easement is forty feet wide. However, this is not what "initial use" means. The Coulsen case relied on several out-of-state cases to establish the initial-use rule. None of those cases considered the method of construction. Rather, they limited the easement to the physical dimensions of the ditch, canal, or pipeline. See White Bros. & Crum Co. v. Watson, 64 Wash. 666, 117 P. 497, 499 (1911) ; Felsenthal v. Warring, 40 Cal.App. 119, 180 P. 67, 69–70 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1919).

The District erroneously cites Coulsen in support of its contention that the method of construction fixes the scope of the easement. To the contrary, Coulsen stands for the proposition that the easement is defined by that which is constructed. The Coulsen opinion cited Winslow v. City of Vallejo, 148 Cal. 723, 84 P. 191 (1906), which held that an easement is limited to the course or manner in which it has been used. Id. at 192. The easement in that case granted a right to enter onto the land to install a water pipe. It was indefinite as to location and scope. The act of installing a ten-inch pipeline fixed the scope of the easement to the physical dimensions and location of the pipeline. Id. at 193. The California Supreme Court held that the addition of a fourteen-inch pipeline parallel to the existing pipeline would exceed the scope of the easement. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Winslow court relied upon an earlier New York decision that held that replacing a two-inch pipeline with a four-inch pipeline impermissibly expanded the easement. Id. at 192. In short, the Winslow court only looked to what was on the land, not how it was put there, to determine the scope of the easement.

In Coulsen, this Court stated that constructing the ditch limited the easement just as an express easement would have for a ditch of "the size and location and with the precise means of conducting water as that actually constructed." Coulsen, 47 Idaho at 629, 277 P. at 545. In other words, the scope of the easement is defined by that which was constructed, rather than the means of construction. We conclude that "initial use" for purposes of an undefined express easement does not include all area occupied during the construction of the easement. For this reason, the District's primary easement is limited to the physical dimensions of the current pipeline.³

The real issue presented by this appeal is not the primary easement. Rather, it is scope of the secondary easement. "The term ‘secondary easement’ refers to the right to enter and repair and do those things necessary to the full enjoyment of the easement...." Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 271 n. 1, 985 P.2d 1127, 1133 n. 1 (1999) (citing White Bros. & Crum Co., 117 P. at 499); Caldwell v. Cometto, 151 Idaho 34, 38, 253 P.3d 708, 712 (2011). Use of the secondary easement must always be reasonable. Cometto, 151 Idaho at 38, 253 P.3d at 712.

More recently, in two cases involving secondary easements for snow removal, we have suggested that a secondary easement may have fixed dimensions. In Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212, 280 P.3d 715 (2012), we addressed a secondary easement for snow removal and storage....