Ruddy v. Rossi

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: McREYNOLDS
• Citation: Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104, 39 S.Ct. 46, 63 L.Ed. 148, 8 A.L.R. 843 (1918)
• Decision Date: 09 December 1918
• Docket Number: No. 17,17
• Parties: RUDDY v. ROSSI

248 U.S. 104

39 S.Ct. 46

63 L.Ed. 148

RUDDY

v ROSSI.

No. 17.

Submitted Nov. 13, 1918.

Decided Dec. 9, 1918.

Messrs. Charles E. Miller and Carlton Fox, both of Wallace, Idaho, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

By 'An act to secure homesteads to actual settlers on the public domain,' approved May 20, 1862 (12 Stat. c. 75, p. 392), Congress prescribed the conditions under which citizens could acquire unappropriated public lands in tracts of not exceeding 160 acres. A manifest purpose was to induce settlement upon and cultivation of these lands by those who, five years after proper entry, would become owners in fee through issuance of patents. The great end in view was to convert waste places into permanent homes. Such occupancy and use constituted a most important consideration and were rightly expected to yield larger public benefits than the small required payment of one dollar and a quarter per acre.

Decision of this cause requires us to consider the meaning and validity of section 4 of the Act (R. S. § 2296 [Comp. St. 1916, § 4551]), which provides:

'No lands acquired under the provisions of this Act shall in any event become liable to the satisfaction of any debt or debts contracted prior to the issuing of the patent therefor.'

Plaintiff in error made preliminary homestead entry of designated land within the state of Idaho August 6, 1903; submitted final proofs October 4, 1909; obtained final receipt and certificate November 12, 1909; final patent issued August 26, 1912. In 1914 two judgments were obtained against him; the first upon indebtedness incurred prior to November 12, 1909; the second upon debts contracted subsequent to that date and prior to patent. Executions were issued and levied upon the homestead; and thereupon the original proceeding was begun to declare asserted liens invalid and a cloud upon the title. The court below held the first judgment unenforceable against the land since it represented indebtedness which accrued prior to final entry. It further held the second judgment could be so enforced as it was based upon debts contracted after final entry, at which time the homesteader became legally entitled to his patent. 28 Idaho, 376, 154 Pac. 977.

The language of section 4 is clear and we find no adequate reason for thinking that it fails precisely to express the lawmaker's intention.

Did Congress have power to restrict alienation of homestead lands after conveyance by the United States in fee simple? This question undoubtedly presents difficulties which we are not disposed to minimize. In Wright v. Morgan, 191 U. S. 55, 58, 24 Sup. Ct. 6, 48 L. Ed. 89, a similar point was suggested but not decided.

The Constitution (article 4, § 3, cl. 2) declares:

'The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.'

And it is settled that Congress has plenary power to dispose of public lands. United States v. Gratiot et al., 14 Pet. 526, 537 (10 L. Ed. 573). They may be leased, sold or given away upon such terms and conditions as the public interests require. Instead of granting fee simple titles with exemption from certain debts, long leases might have been made or conditional titles bestowed in such fashion as practically to protect homesteads from all indebtedness.

'The sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national Legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are consitutional.' McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (4 L. Ed. 579).

Acting within its discretion, Congress determined that in order promptly to dispose of public lands and bring about their permanent occupation and development it was proper to create the designated exemption; and we are unable to say that the conclusion was ill-founded or that the means were either prohibited or not appropriate to the adequate performance of the high duties which the Legislature owed to the public.

The judgment of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice HOLMES (dissenting).

This case involves a question of theory that may be important and I think it desirable to state the considerations that make me doubt. The facts needing to be mentioned are few. On August 26, 1912, the United States conveyed land in Idaho to Ruddy in fee simple, in pursuance of a homestead entry by Ruddy on August 6, 1903, final proof on October 4, 1909, and final receipt of the purchase price on November 12, 1909. In September 1912, after the conveyance, Rossi began suits against Ruddy, attaching this land, and in June, 1914, levied executions upon the same. The debts for which the suits were brought were incurred before the issue of the patent and the present proceeding is to prevent Rossi from selling the land to satisfy the judgments. The question arises under Rev. St. § 2296 (Comp. St. 1916, § 4551), providing that no lands acquired under that chapter shall in any event become liab le to the satisfaction shall in any event become liable to the satisfaction issuing of the patent therefor. The Supreme Court of Idaho narrowed the issue to the case of debts contracted after final proof, but that distinction is not important to the difficulty in my mind.

My question is this: When land has left the ownership and control of the United States and is part of the territory of a State not different from any other privately owned land within the jurisdiction and no more subject to legislation on the part of the United States than any other land, on what ground is a previous law of Congress supposed any longer to affect it in a way that a subsequent one could not? This land was levied upon not on the assertion that any lien upon it was acquired before the title passed from the United States, but merely as any other land might be attached for a debt that Rossi had a right to collect, after the United States had left the premises. I ask myself what the United States has to do with that. There is no condition, no reserved right of reentry, no reversion in the United States, saved either under the Idaho law as any private grantor might save it, or by virtue of antecedent title. All interest of the United States as owner is at an end. It is a stranger to the title. Even in case of an escheat the land would not go to it, but would go to the State. Therefore the statute must operate, if at all, purely by way of legislation, not as a qualification of the grant....