Rudolf Exp. Co. v. Bibb

• Decision Date: 18 September 1958
• Docket Number: No. 34819,34819
• Citation: 15 Ill.2d 76,153 N.E.2d 820
• Parties: The RUDOLF EXPRESS CO. et al., Appellees, v. Joseph D. BIBB, Director of Public Safety, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 820

153 N.E.2d 820

15 Ill.2d 76

The RUDOLF EXPRESS CO. et al., Appellees, v. Joseph D. BIBB, Director of Public Safety, et al., Appellants.

No. 34819.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 18, 1958.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 24, 1958.

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen. (Richard W. Husted, Springfield, of counsel), for appellants.

Deboice, Greening & Cronson, Springfield, for appellees.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

In People v. Warren, 11 Ill.2d 420, 143 N.E.2d 28, we sustained the validity of section 121.02 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, as amended in 1955. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, chap. 95 1/2, par. 218b.) That section required that the rear wheels of motor vehicles of the second division-those designed and used for pulling or carrying freight or for carrying more than seven passengers-be equipped with contour splash guards while being operated on State highways outside of the limits of cities, villages and incorporated towns. In 1957 the section was again amended, principally by exempting certain vehicles from its requirements. The validity of the section as amended is challenged in this case.

The plaintiffs are common and contract motor carriers of general commodities, household goods and livestock in intrastate and interstate commerce. Their complaint sought to restrain the defendants, who are public officials, from enforcing the statute. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' motion was supported by affidavits; the defendants' was not. The circuit court of Sangamon County held the exemption provisions of the amendment invalid, and held also that their invalidity rendered the entire section invalid. It entered a decree for the plaintiffs, and the defendants appeal directly to this court.

As it stood when the Warren case was before this court, section 121.02 required that the vehicles to which it applied be equipped with rear-fender splash guards that would contour the wheel in such manner that the relationship of the inside surface of the splash guard to the tread surface of the tire or wheel would be relatively parallel, both laterally and across the wheel, at least throughout the top ninety degrees of the rear 180 degrees of the wheel's surface. The curved surface was required to extend downward to ten inches from the ground. The splash guards were required to be wide enough to cover the full tread or treads of the tires and to be installed close enough to the tread surface of the tire or wheel to control the side-throw or wash of the bulk of the thrown material and keep it within a tangent not to exceed 15 degrees measured from a base line formed by the top height of the wheel. The splash guards could be constructed of flexible material, but they were required to be so attached that regardless of movement of the guards or the vehicles, the guards would retain their general parallel relationship to the tread surface of the tire under ordinary operating conditions.

Certain minor changes in the design of the required contour guard were made by the 1957 amendment. Their purpose appears to have been to make compliance easier in some particulars. In any event, they do not concern us here because the circuit court held that these changes did not affect the validity of the section and the plaintiffs did not cross-appeal from that ruling.

The main controversy centers upon the validity of the following paragraph which was added to section 121.02 by amendment in 1957: 'This Section shall not apply to motor vehicles which do not have more than 2 axles and which are used primarily in agricultural pursuits, nor to pole trailers, dump trucks, 'ready-mix' type of cement trucks, nor to trucks used primarily for transporting grain which are dumped or unloaded by use of hoists or lifts, nor to vehicles operated principally off the highways of this state and used primarily in public construction or for purposes associated with or in aid of drilling, mining or otherwise severing of natural resources from their natural depository nor to motor vehicles operated principally within the corporate limits of a city, village or incorporated town or within a short radius thereof; provided, the Department of Public Safety may, in order to promote greater safety on the highways of this State and accomplish the purposes of this Section, adopt and promulgate reasonable rules and regulations establishing specifications or designs for splash guards, other than the contour type of splash guard hereinbefore specified, to be used on the vehicles mentioned in this paragraph while said vehicles are operated on the highways of this State. In adopting or promulgating any such rules or regulations, the Department of Public Safety shall consider, among other things, the type of vehicle, the design or construction of the vehicle, the purpose or purposes for which the vehicle is used, the conditions or circumstances under which the vehicle operates and the distance the vehicle travels upon the highways of this State.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 95 1/2, par. 218b.

The principal question to be determined is whether this added paragraph sets up arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable classifications, in violation of section 22 of article IV and section 14 of article II of our constitution, S.H.A., and the 14th amendment to the Federal constitution. Defendants maintain that the classification is reasonable and does not offend constitutional guarantees. Plaintiffs contend that the classification is discriminatory and is unrelated to the purpose of the statute, and therefore unconstitutional. No question is raised under the commerce clause of the Federal constitution.

Section 22 of article IV prohibits the General Assembly from passing any local or special law granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever. This provision, like the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to the Federal constitution, is designed to prevent arbitrary discrimination. Hansen v. Raleigh, 391 Ill. 536, 63 N.E.2d 851, 163 A.L.R. 1425; Michigan Millers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonough, ...