Rue v. Wendland

• Decision Date: 25 June 1948
• Docket Number: No. 34660.,No. 34659.,34659.,34660.
• Citation: Rue v. Wendland, 226 Minn. 449, 33 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1948)
• Parties: RUE et al. v. WENDLAND.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

33 N.W.2d 593

226 Minn. 449

RUE et al. v.WENDLAND.

No. 34659.

No. 34660.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 25, 1948.

Appeal from District Court, Redwood County; Albert H. Enersen, Judge.

Consolidated actions by William Rue and Esther Rue against Vernon Wendland, arising out of automobile collision, wherein the defendant filed a counterclaim against the plaintiffWilliam Rue.From judgments for defendant in each action and allowing defendant recovery on his counterclaim against plaintiffWilliam Rue, the plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

A. R. English, of Tracy, and P. M. Meehl, of Marshall, for appellants.

Meagher, Geer & Markham, of Minneapolis, and Paul Ter Steeg, of Redwood, Falls, for respondent.

PETERSON, Justice.

In two separate actions, one by plaintiffWilliam Rue to recover for personal injuries and property damage sustained as a result of a collision between his automobile and defendant's, and another by plaintiffEsther Rue to recover for personal injuries sustained by her as a guest passenger in William's car as a result of the collision, the verdicts were for defendant, and in the action in which William Rue was plaintiff, defendant recovered on his counterclaim against William.Plaintiffs appeal.

The questions for decision are:

(1) Whether a motorist was negligent was a question of fact where he approached at night on a paved highway at a speed of 45 to 60 miles per hour an automobile with its headlights on bright facing him standing on the shoulder to his right practically parallel to the pavement, which he first saw, as he came over a knoll about 700 feet away, approaching him in its right lane and cutting across the pavement where it stopped, and after it stopped it appeared to him to continue to approach him in its right lane, with the consequence that he was misled thereby to attempt to pass it by turning right onto the shoulder and then to his left to get back again on the pavement, but too late to avoid a collision; and

(2) Whether under the circumstances stated in the preceding question the operator of the standing automobile was negligent in permitting it to stand on the shoulder with headlights on bright was a question of fact.

Because under the doctrine of Munkel v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 202 Minn. 264, 278 N.W. 41, and similar cases, William's negligence was not imputable to Esther, decision that William was negligent would not be decisive as to her, and also because, if defendant as the approaching motorist was negligent, he was not entitled to recover against William on his counter claim, it is necessary to determine whether he was negligent.

It is practically undisputed that the accident occurred at about one o'clock in the morning of February 15, 1947; that William Rue was operating his automobile east on a paved trunk highway having a 20-foot pavement with approximately 9-foot shoulders on either side; that his wife, Esther, and their friends Mr. and Mrs. Percy Skelton were his guest passengers; that after proceeding east to a point near the driveway to the Skelton farmyard William cut across the pavement and stopped on the north (his left) shoulder, or the part of the Skelton driveway which connected with the pavement, practically parallel to the pavement; that Mr. Skelton immediately started to get out; that while he was so engaged defendant, who had come from the east over a knoll about 700 feet distant, turned to his right onto the shoulder and then turned to his left to get back onto the pavement, but before he did so hit the front of William's car.It is also undisputed that there was, as both William and defendant observed, no other traffic, vehicular or pedestrian, on the highway anywhere within view.

The testimony is conflicting as to other facts.Plaintiffs' version was that William's car had come to a full stop before defendant's car came over the knoll; that William had his headlights on bright before and when he cut across the pavement; that he dimmed them when he stopped; and that defendant for no apparent reason turned onto the shoulder and collided with William's car.

Defendant's version was that, while the night was clear, it was difficult to see the center line of the pavement and the line between the shoulder and the pavement because there was frost on the pavement and the shoulder was covered with smooth snow and ice which was flush with the pavement; that when defendant first saw William's car as he(defendant) came over the knoll it was approaching him on its right side of the road; that after William's car stopped he was blinded by its headlights, which were on bright; that William's car appeared to him to be approaching him in its right lane; that his (defendant's) lane of travel was to the right of its headlights; that he turned right onto the shoulder when he was somewhere between 100 to 150 feet away from William's car; that he did not know at first whether he was on the shoulder or the pavement because the former was so hard and smooth that he could hardly tell any difference between them; that after he had gone a short distance he discovered not only that William's car was standing, but also that it was on the shoulder to his (defendant's) right of the pavement; and that thereupon he not only put on his brakes, but also turned to his left to get back onto the pavement, but, being unable to turn sharply enough to do so without running the risk of losing control of his own car, he collided with William's car.A highway patrolman testified that marks on the shoulder showed that defendant turned onto the shoulder about 165 or 170 feet east of William's car and that defendant stated that he was going about 60 or 65 miles per hour at the time.

1.By providing that in a civil action a violation of the highway traffic regulation act (M.S.A. §§ 169.01 to 169.97) shall be prima facie evidence of negligence (§ 169.96), the act adopted negligence as the basis for determining liability based on violations thereof.Flaherty v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 218 Minn. 488, 16 N.W. 2d 553.The question whether defendant was negligent is to be determined solely in the light of the duty he owed plaintiffs(Boyd v. City of Duluth, 126 Minn. 33, 147 N.W. 710) and without regard to whether William was negligent.

An essential element of negligence is the actor's knowledge, actual or imputed, of the facts out of which the alleged duty arises.Negligence involves the idea of fault, and because that is true, an act or omission is not negligent unless the actor had knowledge or notice that it involves danger to another.Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co., 226 Minn. ___, 32 N.W.2d 320;Schroepfer v. City of Sleepy Eye, 215 Minn. 525, 10 N.W.2d 398;4 Dunnell, Dig. &Supp. § 6972.Precautionary duty depends on reason to apprehend results.Hussey v. Boston & Maine R., 82 N.H. 236, 245, 133 A. 9, 15.Duty is dictated and measured by the exigencies of the occasion as they are or should be known to the actor.An act or omission from which no injury should be anticipated is not negligent.Greenwald v. Northern States Power Co.supra; The Nitroglycerine Case (Parrot v. Wells, Fargo & Co.)15 Wall. 524, 82 U. S. 524, 21 L.Ed. 206;38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 32.It follows, therefore that the circumstances of which the actor has knowledge or notice are determinative of whether he was negligent.If this were not true, as said in Stedman v. O'Neil, 82 Conn. 199, 206, 72 A. 923, 926, 22 L.R.A.,N.S., 1229:

"* * * the rule [that negligence consists of failure to exercise the same degree of care as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under similar circumstances] would be shorn of all of its fairness.Men cannot be expected to govern their actions by what to them lies in the realm of the unknown.Their actions cannot be compared to that of others — to that of the ordinarily prudent man — in respect to the degree of prudence exhibited therein, except upon the common basis of a common knowledge as to the surrounding and attending circumstances, actual or constructive.In this way only can the circumstances be made similar, and the specific man be brought under the same circumstances and conditions as the typical ordinarily prudent one who supplies the standard of comparison."(Italics supplied.)

One's perception, memory, and experience bear upon the question of whether he had knowledge.As a practical proposition, defendant's knowledge here consisted of what he perceived at the moment and his correlation thereof with his memory and experience.While a person is required to exercise his senses not only for the protection of others, but also of himself, the rule of reasonable care requires only that perception shall be reasonable under the circumstances.Reasonable perception does not require a person to perceive what is not apparent.As said in Prosser, Torts, § 36, p. 235, "* * * the individual will not be held to knowledge of risks which are not apparent to him."A party deceived by appearances calculated to deceive an ordinarily prudent person may regulate his conduct by such appearances, even though they may be contrary to actual fact.Mangan v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., 200 Iowa 597, 203 N.W. 705, 41 A.L.R. 368;Restatement, Torts, § 289, comment d;38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 190;45 C.J., Negligence, § 508.Deception of living creatures by appearance contrary to actuality is perhaps a universal phenomenon as witness how travelers are misled by mirages, and even wildfowl are deceived by lights, pavements, crude oil pools, and the like to fly to their own harm.

Automobile drivers are no exception.They too may be deceived by appearances calculated to deceive ordinarily prudent persons.Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 169 Minn. 342, 211 N.W. 580.The cited case contains a discussion of the medical and physiological effects of bright lights upon the human eye.Whether an automobile standing on or adjacent to the traveled part of a highway at night with its...