Ruebush v. United States, 4608.

Decision Date03 September 1953
Docket NumberNo. 4608.,4608.
PartiesRUEBUSH v. UNITED STATES.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

James H. Keet, Springfield, Mo., for appellant.

John F. Raper, Jr., U. S. Atty. for Dist. of Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyo. (C. N. Bloomfield, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty. for Dist. of Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyo., on the brief), for appellee.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and MURRAH and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a sentence, filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.

Ruebush was charged by information with a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1708. He entered a plea of guilty to the information and was sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement for a period of four years.

A complaint was filed charging Ruebush with stealing, taking and abstracting a certain letter from a United States Post Office letter box on September 17, 1951. A warrant was issued and he was taken before a United States Commissioner. He was informed of his right to counsel, but waived a preliminary hearing and was committed to the Laramie County Jail on September 26, 1951. While in jail he consulted with a lawyer, but did not retain him because of lack of funds. On October 24, 1951, he was taken before the sentencing court on the matter of the waiver of indictment and consent to be charged by information. The court advised Ruebush that he was charged with taking and abstracting a letter addressed to Wayne Sullivan from the custody of the United States Post Office Department before it was delivered to the addressee thereof; that the charge was a felony; that he was entitled to have the matter presented to a grand jury; that if an indictment should be returned against him he could plead guilty or not guilty to the charge; that should he enter a plea of not guilty, he would be entitled to have the charge tried by a jury; and that he could consent to be charged by information and have the same rights to a trial by jury as under an indictment. He was expressly asked if he understood what had been stated to him and he answered in the affirmative. He was then asked if he desired to waive indictment and he answered in the affirmative. Thereupon, an information was filed against Ruebush, charging that on September 17, 1951, he did take and abstract a letter addressed to Wayne Sullivan from the custody of the United States Post Office Department before it was delivered to the person to whom it was directed and did embezzle the contents thereof. The information was read to Ruebush. Thereupon, the court advised him that he was entitled, under the United States Constitution, to have the assistance of counsel in determining what plea he should enter to the information and that if he did not have money to employ an attorney, the court would appoint an attorney to represent him. Ruebush was then asked if he understood what the court had stated to him and he answered in the affirmative. He was asked if he wanted a lawyer and replied in the negative. The court then asked him if he was ready to plead and he replied in the affirmative and pleaded guilty. After the plea of guilty a pre-sentence investigation was made. A pre-sentence report was made to the court. Thereafter, on November 27, 1951, the sentence was imposed.

On August 25, 1952, Ruebush filed a motion to vacate the sentence on the following grounds: That Ruebush was legally and medically insane at the time of the waiver of indictment and the arraignment and at the time of the imposition of sentence; that he was not capable of realizing "the significance of" his plea of guilty; that he was not competent to decide whether he needed the assistance of counsel at the time he stated to the court that he did not desire counsel; that the court did not sufficiently explain to Ruebush his constitutional rights or the nature of the offense with which he was charged; that at the time of the commission of the offense Ruebush was "a psychotic" and could not distinguish between right and wrong; and that after the pre-sentence report had been made and before the imposition of sentence the court failed to appoint counsel for Ruebush and failed to cause a qualified psychiatrist to examine Ruebush with respect to his mental condition and to report the result of his examination to the court.

The pre-sentence report reflected the following facts: Ruebush served in the United States Army from December 22, 1943, to May 8, 1945, and received an honorable discharge. The...

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10 cases
  • Feguer v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 16 Abril 1962
    ...could have ordered another examination even then and held still another full hearing under the statute. Compare Ruebush v. United States, 10 Cir., 1953, 206 F.2d 810, 812. The court is necessarily engaged in a search for truth. We see nothing in the holding of the supplemental hearing, duri......
  • People v. Russell
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 30 Octubre 1969
    ...the duty imposed on a trial court in cases of this kind is greater than that which was observed here. As stated in Ruebush v. United States (CA 10, 1953), 206 F.2d 810, 812, Judge Murrah dissenting: 'The trial court had actual knowledge from the probation report before it that the applicant......
  • Doe v. Harris
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 17 Diciembre 1982
    ...1, 471 F.2d 969, 994-95 (1972) (en banc); Andrews v. United States, 403 F.2d 341, 342-43 (9th Cir.1968); Ruebush v. United States, 206 F.2d 810, 812-13 (10th Cir.1953)).4 The district court also rejected Doe's subsidiary arguments that the defendants had violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e) by discl......
  • Wolcott v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 11 Marzo 1969
    ...1967). But we have not always agreed whether in a given case the judge has adequately discharged his plain duty. See Ruebush v. United States, 206 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1953). It is this seeming contrariety which prompted us to reexamine en banc the case law in light of § 4244 and apply it to......
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