Ruehman v. Village of Palos Park, 91 C 8355.

• Decision Date: 21 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 91 C 8355.,91 C 8355.
• Citation: 842 F. Supp. 1043
• Parties: Keith RUEHMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF PALOS PARK, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

842 F. Supp. 1043

Keith RUEHMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF PALOS PARK, et al., Defendants.

No. 91 C 8355.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

November 22, 1993.

Opinion on Reconsideration January 12, 1994.

Opinion on Reconsideration January 21, 1994.

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Thomas Gerard Morrissey, Mary Denise Cahill, Law Offices of Mary Denise Cahill, Mary Louise Boelcke, Chicago, IL, for plaintiffs Keith Ruehman, Joseph Larry, and Alan Miller, Joseph P. Brown, Dean Hyde, James A. James, Rahmin Alamin and Randy Hermansen, all individually and on behalf of a class, Sherry Ratcliffe, Michael Curtan, John Sitar.

Charles E. Hervas, James Gus Sotos, Michael William Condon, Michael D. Bersani, Hervas, Sotos & Condon, Itasca, IL, for defendant Jean Moran, in her official and individual capacity as Com'r of Public Health and Safety for Village of Palos Park.

Andrew M. Raucci, Stanley T. Kusper, Jr., Kusper & Raucci, Chartered, David Lincoln Ader, John F. Donahue, Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Cope & Bush, Vickie A. Gillio, Cahill, Einspar-Wayne & Gillio, Chicago, IL, for defendants George Pfotenhauer, in his official and individual capacity as Chief of Police of Village of Dolton, as representative of a class of defendants, and Village of Dolton, a mun. corp.

Terry L. McDonald, Connie R. Barba, Lawrence R. Stasica, Cook County State's Attys. Office, Bart Thomas Murphy, Gordon B. Nash, Jr., Mary Theresa Lynch, Gardner, Carton & Douglas, Chicago, IL, for defendant Aurelia Pucinski, his successor, in her official and individual capacity as Clerk of Circuit Court of Cook County.

Mary Ellen Coghlan, IL Atty. General's Office, Chicago, IL, for defendants Richard V. White and Terry Gainer, individually.

Stephen A. Snakard, Frank K. Neidhart, McCarthy, Duffy, Neidhart & Snakard, Chicago, IL, Mary Elizabeth Dickson, Schirott & Luetkehans, P.C., Michael William Condon, Hervas, Sotos & Condon, Itasca, IL, for defendant Village of Palos Park, a mun. corp.

Mary Elizabeth Dickson, Schirott & Luetkehans, P.C., Michael William Condon, Hervas, Sotos & Condon, Itasca, IL, for defendant William Shanley, in his official and individual capacity as its Chief of Police.

Richard T. Ryan, Mark F. Smolens, Richard L. Jones, Flynn, Murphy, Ryan & Seyring, Chicago, IL, for defendants Village of La Grange, a mun. corp., Village of Wheeling, a mun. corp., and Michael Haeger, in his official capacity as its Chief of Police.

James E. Gierach, Gierach, Schussler & Walsh, Ltd., Oak Lawn, IL, for defendants Village of Worth, and Glenn Rose, in his individual and official capacity as its Chief of Police.

Daniel Richard Formeller, James Kenneth Borcia, Jacqueline A. Criswell, Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, Chicago, IL, for defendants City of Hickory Hills and George Dulzo, its Chief of Police in his official and individual capacity.

Susan S. Sher, Kelly Raymond Welsh, Diane J. Larsen, Patrick J. Rocks, Jr., Irene M. Schild, City of Chicago, Law Dept. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, IL, for defendant City of Chicago, IL, a mun. corp.

Kelly Raymond Welsh, Diane J. Larsen, City of Chicago, Law Dept. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, IL, for defendant Leroy Martin, in his official and individual capacity as Chief of Police.

Terry L. McDonald, Lawrence R. Stasica, Cook County State's Attys., Robert D. Quinlivan, Jr., Chicago, IL, for defendant Michael Sheahan, each individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Cook County.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HART, District Judge.

Plaintiffs in this case claimed that they were named in arrest warrants that have been quashed or recalled but are still listed as active on municipal and state computer data banks. The crux of plaintiffs' federal claims are that plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment¹ or due process rights have been violated in that defendants have failed to adequately maintain the computer networks so as to prevent the arrest and detention of persons on warrants that are no longer valid. Plaintiffs originally sought to represent a class and requested both damages and injunctive relief. This case has involved at least 11 plaintiffs and 25 defendants. Following rulings on various motions, settlement of some disputes, amendments to the complaint, the withdrawal of some claims, and the withdrawal of the claim for class certification, the number of remaining parties is substantially less.² The remaining plaintiffs are Keith Ruehman, Alan Miller, Joseph Brown, Michael Curtan, Dean Hyde, and Jean Sitar. The remaining defendants are the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County (Aurelia Pucinski), the Village of Dolton, the Village of La Grange, the City of Chicago, and the Sheriff of Cook County (Michael Sheahan). Only official capacity claims remain and the remaining claims against one defendant are only for injunctive relief. Various motions are pending, most of which are motions for summary judgment.

On a motion for summary judgment, the entire record is considered with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant and all factual disputes resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Oxman v. WLSTV, 846 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1988); Jakubiec v. Cities Service Co., 844 F.2d 470, 471 (7th Cir.1988). The burden of establishing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant. Id. at 473. The nonmovant, however, must make a showing sufficient to establish any essential element for which the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant need not provide affidavits or deposition testimony showing the nonexistence of such essential elements. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Also, it is not sufficient to show evidence of purportedly disputed facts if those facts are not plausible in light of the entire record. See Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 481, 485 (7th Cir.1991); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 476-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852, 109 S.Ct. 137, 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988). As the Seventh Circuit has summarized:

The moving party bears the initial burden of directing the district court to the determinative issues and the available evidence that pertains to each. "A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case"). Then, with respect to issues that the non-moving party will bear the burden of proving at trial, the non-moving party must come forward with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions and designate specific facts which establish that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions that establish that there is a genuine triable issue. Id. The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1992).

I. CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

In Ruehman I, 1992 WL 170565 at 12-17 (*5-7), it was held that Pucinski was qualifiedly immune from any damages claim against her in her individual capacity. In Ruehman II, 1992 WL 281352 at 4-5 (*2), it was held that the official capacity damages claims against Pucinski could not be pursued because the Clerk of the Circuit Court was not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).³ Plaintiffs were not precluded from pursuing their injunctive claims against Pucinski, those claims having previously been held to involve a justiciable case or controversy for those plaintiffs who still had recalled warrants listed as active on a computer system. See Ruehman I, 1992 WL 170565 at 29-30 (*11-12).

Pucinski moves for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief because none of them currently have any recalled warrants that are incorrectly listed as active on one of the computer systems. Plaintiffs do not dispute this factual contention and concede that they no longer have standing to seek injunctive relief. Plaintiffs, however, argue that they have standing to amend their complaint and seek declaratory relief.

Just as plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief, they also lack standing to seek declaratory relief. Robinson v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 959, 967 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1012, 1035, 110 S.Ct. 708, 756, 107 L.Ed.2d 729, 773 (1990). The "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception does not apply where there is no expectation that these same plaintiffs are the ones against whom any repeated violation will be committed. Id. Also, any repeated violations will not necessarily evade review because a class potentially could be certified that would be unlikely to lose its...