Ruerat v. Stevens
| Decision Date | 09 June 1931 |
| Citation | 155 A. 219,113 Conn. 333 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | RUERAT v. STEVENS. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Allyn L. Brown, Judge.
Action by Marie Oldham Ruerat against Louis W. Stevens, to recover damage to property arising from a fire alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence, tried to the court. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.
No error.
Finding that negligence in leaving lighted cigarette on davenport caused fire, based on inferences that fire was caused by cigarette and could not have happened without negligence held authorized.
Reinhart L. Gideon, of Hartford, for appellant.
A Storrs Campbell, of Hartford, for appellee.
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.
The complaint alleged that the defendant negligently placed or left a lighted cigarette on an upholstered davenport in the plaintiff's apartment, which set fire to the davenport and that the fire spread throughout the apartment destroying furniture and furnishings of considerable value. The court found the following facts: The plaintiff occupied an apartment the living room in which was about sixteen feet long by fourteen wide, with two windows and a door to an outside porch facing west. In the living room there was a large overstuffed davenport with an upholstered arm at either end fourteen inches in width, placed against the southerly wall with its westerly end about two and a half feet from the porch door. Three or four feet from the westerly portion of the davenport and facing it was a large chair upholstered like the davenport. Between the end of the davenport and the west wall of the room there was a tip table and there was a small table on the east side of the chair. The evening of July 22, 1930, the defendant had taken the plaintiff and her two children for a ride, returned to the plaintiff's apartment about twenty-five minutes past twelve, and upon the latter's invitation entered the apartment. They came into the living room, and the plaintiff sat in the large chair while the defendant seated himself on the davenport at its westerly end opposite and facing her. Both continued so to sit and smoked cigarettes until 1:30 a. m., neither rising except that twice the defendant got up and lighted the plaintiff's cigarette with his lighter as she leaned forward. Upon seating himself the defendant took a rather flat metal ash tray which was on the tip table, placed it upon the upholstered arm of the davenport at his left, and thereafter used it as a place of deposit for his cigarette ashes and butts. The plaintiff used a small cup-shaped tray upon the table at her left for a similar purpose. At no time after she began to smoke did the plaintiff sit upon or approach within three feet of the davenport. In addition to the fire from the defendant's lighter, and that of the matches which the plaintiff used to light two of her cigarettes, which were promptly extinguished, the only fire in the room up to the time the parties left was that from the burning cigarettes and their butts. When the defendant left the plaintiff went directly to her room, and her daughter came into the living room to turn off the electric lights. She saw in the ash tray on the arm of the davenport several cigarette butts, but not all of those which the defendant had put down while he sat there. She discerned no fire or smoke in the room, and neither of the parties noticed any spark or fire in contact with the davenport or any inflammable furnishing of the room when they left it. The doors and windows of the room were left open. The covering of the davenport was upholsterer's denim which was inflammable. About two hours after the plaintiff retired she was awakened by smoke, and found the southwest corner of the living room, within two or three feet of which the left arm of the davenport was located, all ablaze. The fire burned off the left arm and end of the davenport, and the floor between it and the west wall of the room was deeply burned. Neither any of the rugs on the floor nor the chair upon which the plaintiff sat were consumed, though all were singed and blackened by fire and smoke.
The court found that the fire originated at a point in immediate proximity to the tray upon the left arm of the davenport, and that it was kindled by a burning ash from one of the cigarettes smoked by the defendant, either dropping from it as he still held it, or coming in contact with the upholstery because of his failure to deposit it on the tray, or because of his tipping it off the tray after it was deposited there. The court further found that this conduct of the defendant was negligent and caused the fire, and that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence.
There was no direct evidence that the fire was caused by the defendant's cigarette nor, if it was so caused, that...
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State v. Hayes
... ... facts they find as the result of other inferences, ... Sliwowski v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 94 Conn ... 303, 310, 108 A. 805; Ruerat v. Stevens, 113 Conn ... 333, 338, 155 A. 219; our inquiry is limited to ascertaining ... whether the inferences are so unreasonable as to be ... ...
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...duty of producing evidence sufficient to permit the trier, whether court or jury, to draw an inference of negligence. Ruerat v. Stevens, 113 Conn. 333, 337, 155 A. 219. The doctrine permits, but does not compel, such an inference. Fogarty v. M. J. Beuchler & Son, Inc., 124 Conn. 325, 330, 1......
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