Rueth Dev. Co. v. Powers-Rueth & Assocs.
| Decision Date | 06 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 45A05–1402–PL–80.,45A05–1402–PL–80. |
| Citation | 23 N.E.3d 51 (Table) |
| Parties | RUETH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an Indiana Limited Partnership, Appellant–Plaintiff, v. POWERS–RUETH & ASSOCIATES, Donald S. Powers, Margaret F. Powers, Frankie L. Fesko, Timothy Fesko, and Joe P. Williamson, Appellees–Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Ronald J. Waicukauski, Carol Nemeth Joven, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
David C. Jensen, Nicholas G. Brunette, Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP, Hammond, IN, Attorneys for Appellees Powers–Rueth & Associates, Donald S. Powers, Margaret F. Powers, Frankie L. Fesko and Timothy Fesko.
John P. Reed, Jonathan Halm, Abrahamson, Reed & Bilse, Hammond, IN, Attorneys for Appellee Joe Williamson.
On December 1, 1976, Donald S. Powers (“Powers”) and Rueth Development Company (“RDC”) formed Powers–Rueth and Associates (“PRA”) for the purpose of acquiring and developing real estate. PRA was initially created as a general partnership with both Powers and RDC serving as general partners. In 1981, PRA formed the Briar Ridge Country Club (the “BRCC”). The BRCC was wholly owned by PRA. On September 20, 1994, Powers was named the sole general partner of PRA. RDC remained a limited partner of PRA.
On April 30, 2011, PRA entered into an agreement to sell the BRCC to a group of individuals who were collectively known as the Preservation Committee, LLC (the “Preservation Committee”). On July 5, 2011, RDC filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief from PRA, seeking to enjoin the sale of the BRCC to the Preservation Committee. That same day, the trial court granted a temporary restraining order preventing the sale of the BRCC pending a hearing on RDC's motion to enjoin the sale. The trial court subsequently dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied RDC's motion to enjoin the sale of the BRCC. RDC has since made numerous attempts to block the sale of the BRCC to the Preservation Committee and to expand the scope of the underlying lawsuit to include numerous claims against numerous defendants who were allegedly connected to the sale of the BRCC in some way.
On May 3, 2013, Appellees–Defendants PRA, Powers, Margaret F. Powers (“Margaret”), Frankie L. Fesko (“Frankie”), Timothy Fesko (“Timothy”), and Joe Williamson (“Williamson”) (collectively, “the Appellees”) filed motions for summary judgment on the claims levied against them by RDC. RDC appeals following the trial court's denial of RDC's request to file a successive amended complaint, denial of RDC's request to file supplemental designated evidence, and award of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees.
RDC contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its request for leave to file a successive amended complaint and in denying its request to submit supplemental designated evidence. RDC also contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying RDC's request for leave to file a successive amended complaint or to submit supplemental designated evidence. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. As such, we affirm.
Powers is married to Margaret. Powers and Margaret are the parents of Frankie. Margaret and Frankie are limited partners in PRA. Frankie is married to Timothy. Timothy is not a member of any board relating to the BRCC, does not hold any offices in relation to the BRCC, and has no ownership interest in PRA. During the time relevant to this appeal, Williamson was an officer and director of Briar Ridge Country Club, Inc. (“BRCC, Inc.”), which is an Indiana Corporation that was formed to operate the facilities of the BRCC. Williamson was not a shareholder in BRCC, Inc., which was wholly owned by PRA.
On December 1, 1976, Powers and RDC, as general partners, formed PRA for the purpose of acquiring and developing real estate. PRA is an Indiana Limited Partnership with its principal place of business in Munster, Indiana. On September 20, 1994, pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the PRA Limited Partnership Agreement (the “PRA LPA”), Powers was designated as the sole general partner of PRA after the partners that made up RDC filed a petition to dissolve RDC. RDC remained a limited partner of PRA.
In 1981, PRA formed the BRCC. The BRCC was wholly owned by PRA. On April 30, 2011, Powers, as sole general partner of PRA, signed a letter of intent to sell the BRCC to a group known as the Preservation Committee for a sum of three million dollars. The Preservation Committee was made up of residents of the Briar Ridge sub-division and members of the BRCC. The sale of the BRCC closed on October 24, 2011.
On July 5, 2011, RDC filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against PRA to stop the sale of the BRCC to the Preservation Committee. The complaint also sought compensatory and punitive damages from Powers. Margaret and Frankie were also joined as defendants to the lawsuit. Also on July 5, 2011, RDC obtained a temporary restraining order preventing the sale of the BRCC. The trial court conducted a hearing on RDC's request for a preliminary injunction on July 15, 2011. Five days later, on July 20, 2011, the trial court denied RDC's motion to enjoin the sale of the BRCC and dissolved the temporary restraining order.
On August 2, 2011, RDC filed its second amended complaint against Powers and PRA. Count I of the second amended complaint requested a declaratory judgment that the letter of intent and a purchase agreement to sell the BRCC, which were executed by Powers on behalf of PRA, were void. Count II alleged that Powers breached the PRA LPA by entering into an agreement to sell the BRCC. Count III alleged that Powers breached his fiduciary duty to RDC by executing the letter of intent and/or the purchase agreement for the sale of the BRCC. Count IV alleged that PRA limited partners Margaret and Frankie breached their respective fiduciary duties to RDC. Timothy and Williamson were also joined in Count IV.
On August 26, 2011, PRA and Powers filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. RDC filed a response in opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings on September 26, 2011. On September 30, 2011, RDC filed an emergency verified motion for a temporary restraining order, in which it again sought to enjoin the sale of the BRCC. The trial court denied RDC's emergency motion on October 3, 2011.
On January 19, 2012, RDC moved for leave to file a successive amended complaint. The Appellees collectively filed a response in opposition to RDC's request on February 7, 2012. On February 8, 2012, the trial court granted Powers and PRA's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Counts I and II of RDC's second amended complaint. On February 24, 2012, the trial court denied RDC's January 19, 2012 request for leave to file a successive amended complaint.
On April 18, 2013, RDC again moved for leave to file a successive amended complaint. RDC sought to add ten new counts, eleven new individual defendants, and four new entity defendants in this successive amended complaint. On May 3, 2012, the Appellees filed their response in opposition to RDC's April 18, 2013 request for leave to file a successive amended complaint. The trial court denied RDC's April 18, 2013 request to file a successive amended compliant on June 18, 2013.
On October 11, 2013, the Appellees filed motions for summary judgment, designations of evidence, and statements of undisputed facts. RDC filed a consolidated response in opposition to the Appellees' motions for summary judgment on November 13, 2013. On December 2, 2013, the Appellees filed their respective replies in support of their motions for summary judgment. Also on December 2, 2013, the Appellees filed motions to strike certain evidence designated by RDC. On December 17, 2013, RDC filed its response to the Appellees' motions to strike and sought permission to file a supplemental designation of evidence. On December 26, 2013, the trial court conducted a hearing on the pending motions after which it denied RDC's request for file a supplemental designation of evidence, granted the Appellees' motions to strike RDC's designations of evidence, and granted the Appellees' motions for summary judgment.
On January 29, 2014, RDC filed a motion to correct error. The Appellees filed a statement in opposition to RDC's motion to correct error on February 6, 2014. On February 11, 2014, the trial court denied RDC's motion to correct error.1
RDC contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion for leave to amend its complaint and its request to submit supplemental evidence prior to the summary judgment hearing. RDC also contends that the award of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees was improper because issues of material fact remain which would preclude an award of summary judgment. For their parts, the Appellees contend that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying RDC's request to file a successive amended complaint and supplemental designated materials. The Appellees also contend that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in their favor.
Indiana courts have long held that a plaintiff does not have “an absolute right to file a supplemental complaint.” Carr v. Besse, 82 Ind.App. 124, 126, 143 N.E. 639, 640 (1924).
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right any time before a responsive pleading is served. “Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be given when justice so requires .” T.R. 15. The...
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