Ruff v. Knickerbocker (In re Ruff)

Decision Date08 May 2012
Docket NumberNo. 28640–1–III.,28640–1–III.
Citation275 P.3d 1175
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
PartiesIn re the Parentage of Kaleigh Lyn RUFF.Jamie Lyn Ruff, Respondent, v. Dennis A. Knickerbocker, Appellant.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Dennis Charles Cronin, Law Office of DC Cronin, Spokane, WA, for Appellant.

Peter S. Lineberger, Attorney at Law, Spokane, WA, for Respondent.

SWEENEY, J.

¶ 1 Jurisdiction in interstate child custody disputes is governed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), chapter 26.27 RCW. It is detailed, specific, and mandatory. Here, a Washington superior court assumed jurisdiction of an interstate custody dispute after a Montana district court had exercised jurisdiction. The court did not have the authority to do that under the UCCJEA. We reverse the court's order and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

¶ 2 Jamie Ruff and Dennis Knickerbocker lived in Shelby, Montana, when their daughter, Kayleigh, was born in 1999. They ended their relationship soon after Kayleigh's birth. Ms. Ruff petitioned for an interim parenting plan in Toole County, Montana. The Montana Ninth Judicial District Court entered an order for interim parenting plan on October 24, 2002. It provided that Ms. Ruff maintain “temporary custody” unless she moved out of Shelby. If Ms. Ruff moved, it provided that she have primary physical custody of Kayleigh and that Mr. Knickerbocker have visitation every other weekend and whenever Ms. Ruff otherwise brought Kayleigh to Shelby.

¶ 3 Ms. Ruff moved to Spokane with Kayleigh in 2003 and the two lived in Washington from 2003 to 2006. Kayleigh lived in Montana with Mr. Knickerbocker from 2006 to 2007. Kayleigh has lived with Ms. Ruff in Spokane, Washington, since 2007. Mr. Knickerbocker continues to live in Montana.

¶ 4 Ms. Ruff petitioned for a parenting plan, a residential schedule, and child support in Spokane County Superior Court on July 17, 2008. She also moved ex parte for a restraining order and temporary orders. The request for a restraining order was prompted by fear that Mr. Knickerbocker would take Kayleigh to Montana. Mr. Knickerbocker tried to remove Kayleigh from daycare after a care provider refused to release Kayleigh to him on July 15, 2008. Mr. Knickerbocker petitioned to modify custody in Spokane County Superior Court on the same day. The cases were consolidated and the court concluded that there was “a need for Washington State to exercise emergency jurisdiction, if necessary, so child's residence remains stable pending the hearing.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 514. The court also concluded that Mr. Knickerbocker consented to jurisdiction by filing his petition. Id. A temporary visitation order provided that Ms. Ruff would maintain primary residential custody and that Mr. Knickerbocker would have scheduled visits.

¶ 5 While the Washington custody case was pending, Mr. Knickerbocker and Ms. Ruff moved to dismiss the pending Montana custody case “because the parties both agree that Washington State now has jurisdiction for entry of the final parenting plan and child support orders in this action.” Id. at 517. The Montana court dismissed the case on January 8, 2009. The Spokane County Superior Court concluded it had jurisdiction to enter a parenting plan and residential schedule on October 27, 2009:

¶ 6 This court has jurisdiction over the child for the reasons set forth below:

This state is the home state of the child because:

the child lived in Washington with a parent or person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the commencement of this proceeding.

....

The child and the parents or the child and at least one parent or person acting as a parent have significant connection with the state other than mere physical presence, and substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relationships, and

....

the child's home state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under RCW 25.27.261 or .271.

Id. at 271. The court entered a parenting plan and residential schedule that same day. Those orders gave Ms. Ruff primary residential placement and Mr. Knickerbocker regular visits. Mr. Knickerbocker appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶ 7 The only issue here on appeal is whether the Washington courts had authority, given the requirements of the UCCJEA, to enter the October 27, 2009, parenting plan and residential schedule.

¶ 8 Both Washington and Montana have adopted the UCCJEA. Chapter 26.27 RCW; Mont.Code Ann. § 40–7–101. The UCCJEA is “a pact among states limiting the circumstances under which one court may modify the [child custody] orders of another.” In re Custody of A.C, 165 Wash.2d 568, 574, 200 P.3d 689 (2009) (citing Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement ActT (UCCJEA), prefatory note, 9 pt. IA U.L.A. at 649–51 (1997)). It is “an attempt to deal with the problems of competing jurisdictions entering conflicting interstate child custody orders, forum shopping, and the drawn out and complex child custody legal proceedings often encountered by parties where multiple states are involved.” Id. (citing UCCJEA prefatory note, 9 pt. IA U.L.A. at 651; UCCJEA § 101 cmt., 9 pt. IA U.L.A. at 657). In sum, the UCCJEA aims to prevent conflicting custody orders by determining when a state can modify a custody order entered in another state. Id.

¶ 9 Mr. Knickerbocker contends—for the first time on appeal—that the court lacked jurisdiction. He argues that Montana is Kayleigh's “home state” under the UCCJEA and therefore had continuing exclusive jurisdiction. See RCW 26.27.201(1)(a). He also argues that Washington could not have acquired jurisdiction from Montana because Montana had not declined to exercise its jurisdiction and Washington failed to properly exercise emergency jurisdiction. See RCW 26.27.231, .201(1)(b), (c), .221.

¶ 10 Ms. Ruff concedes that Washington is not Kayleigh's home state and that the court did not precisely follow the UCCJEA. Br. of Resp't at 9, 25. But she argues, nonetheless, that the court's order should not be reversed for a number of reasons. First, she urges that the question here is not whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction but instead whether Spokane was the proper venue. The difference she argues is important because if, as she argues, the Washington courts are just the wrong venue then the court's orders or judgments are not void. See Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash.2d 1, 8, 448 P.2d 490 (1968) ([W]here a court has jurisdiction ..., no error in the exercise of such jurisdiction can make the judgment void.... This is true even if there is a fundamental error of law .... Such a judgment is, under proper circumstances, voidable, but until avoided is regarded as valid”). Second, she urges that the Washington courts properly exercised emergency jurisdiction, in any event, given Mr. Knickerbocker's attempt to take the child from daycare. Third, she argues that communicating with the Montana courts (as required by the UCCJEA) would have been useless because Mr. Knickerbocker had also petitioned for custody in the Washington courts. And finally, she argues that the Montana courts effectively declined jurisdiction by entering the January 2009 order dismissing the Montana case.

¶ 11 Whether Washington courts have subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we will review de novo. In re Marriage of Kastanas, 78 Wash.App. 193, 197, 896 P.2d 726 (1995). Interpretation of a statutory scheme and application of that scheme also present questions of law that we review de novo. In re Parentage of J.M.K., 155 Wash.2d 374, 386–87, 119 P.3d 840 (2005).

I. Are the UCCJEA's requirements jurisdictional?

¶ 12 The parties disagree over whether the orders entered in violation of the UCCJEA's jurisdictional requirements are void. The answer depends on whether the UCCJEA effectively limits the court's subject matter jurisdiction or does something else. Ms. Ruff relies on a footnote in A.C.1 to suggest that the UCCJEA's jurisdictional requirements relate to venue. Br. of Resp't at 11. And she urges that Mr. Knickerbocker consented to jurisdiction because he too filed a petition in Spokane County Superior Court and he joined her motion to dismiss the Montana case. Mr. Knickerbocker counters that Ms. Ruff's reliance on a footnote in A.C. is misplaced and the UCCJEA does in fact limit subject matter jurisdiction. Reply Br. of Appellant at 1–3.

¶ 13 Subject matter jurisdiction ‘is the power and authority of the court to act.’ Dougherty v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 150 Wash.2d 310, 315, 76 P.3d 1183 (2003) (quoting 77 Am.Jur.2d Venue § 1 at 608 (1997)). It “refers to the court's authority to entertain a type of controversy, not simply lack of authority to enter a particular order.” In re Marriage of Schneider, 173 Wash.2d 353, 360, 268 P.3d 215 (2011) (citing Marley v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 125 Wash.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994)). ‘If the type of controversy is within the subject matter jurisdiction, then all other defects or errors go to something other than subject matter jurisdiction.’ Marley, 125 Wash.2d at 539, 886 P.2d 189 (quoting Robert J. Martineau, Subject Matter Jurisdiction as a New Issue on Appeal: Reining in an Unruly Horse, 1988 BYU L.Rev. 1, 28). An order entered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction is void. Skagit Surveyors & Eng'rs, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wash.2d 542, 556, 958 P.2d 962 (1998). The parties cannot consent to subject matter jurisdiction nor can they waive objection to it. Id.; Wampler v. Wampler, 25 Wash.2d 258, 267, 170 P.2d 316 (1946).

¶ 14 Superior courts in Washington have broad constitutionally based jurisdictional authority. Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wash.2d 249, 251, 692 P.2d 793 (1984). And we strictly and narrowly read efforts by the legislature to limit that jurisdiction. Id.

¶ 15 The UCCJEA is found in chapter 26.27 RCW and...

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