Ruffin v. Casino
| Decision Date | 07 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–1444.,14–1444. |
| Parties | Angelia RUFFIN, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. MOTORCITY CASINO, d/b/a Detroit Entertainment, L.L.C., Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
775 F.3d 807
Angelia RUFFIN, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants
v.
MOTORCITY CASINO, d/b/a Detroit Entertainment, L.L.C., Defendant–Appellee.
No. 14–1444.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued: Dec. 5, 2014.
Decided and Filed: Jan. 7, 2015.
ARGUED:Christopher P. Desmond, Johnson Law, PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellants. Eric J. Pelton, Kienbaum Opperwall Hardy & Pelton, P.L.C., Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Christopher P. Desmond, Johnson Law, PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellants. Eric J. Pelton, Thomas G. Kienbaum, Thomas J. Davis, Kienbaum Opperwall Hardy & Pelton, P.L.C., Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellee.
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge; CARR, District Judge.*
OPINION
CARR, District Judge.
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., an employee's meal period is compensable if the employee spends that time predominantly for her employer's benefit. Hill v. United States, 751 F.2d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1984). The question here is whether MotorCity Casino's security guards, who must remain on casino property during meal periods, monitor two-way radios, and respond to emergencies if called to do so, spend their meal time predominantly for their own benefit or that of the casino. Because we agree with the district court that no reasonable jury could find that the meal periods predominantly benefitted the casino, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to MotorCity.
I.
The plaintiffs are current and former security guards at the MotorCity Casino in Detroit, Michigan. MotorCity assigned the guards to work five, eight-hour shifts per week. While on duty, the guards were responsible for escorting large amounts of cash, monitoring the casino floor, and listening to their two-way radios. The casino also required guards to attend a fifteen-minute roll-call meeting before the start of every shift, but it did not pay the guards for doing so. Both sides agree that the roll-call meetings are compensable.
Under the parties' collective bargaining agreement, a guard working an eight-hour shift was entitled to a paid, thirty-minute meal period. The parties stipulated in the district court that guards were “free, during their breaks, to eat, drink, socialize
with other MotorCity employees, use their cell phones, utilize the internet, watch the TVs installed in the cafeteria and various break rooms, read, use the company provided computers in the cafeteria, [and] play cards and other games[.]”
At the same time, MotorCity restricted how guards could spend their meal periods. Guards could not leave casino property, have food delivered to the casino, or receive visitors. The guards therefore spent meal periods in either a large cafeteria, where free food and drinks were available, or one of the smaller break rooms—all of which could be crowded and noisy. A smoking area was also available, and guards could walk along an outdoor path surrounding the casino.
Central to this appeal is MotorCity's requirement that the guards monitor their radios during meal periods. The guards were responsible for listening to their radios and, if they heard a dispatcher call the appropriate code, responding to an emergency in the casino (a fight, for example, or a patron experiencing a health problem). A guard who did not respond to a mid-meal emergency call was subject to discipline.
Aside from monitoring the radio, the guards performed no job duties during meal periods.
According to the parties' stipulation, “a meal period may occasionally be interrupted due to an emergency call.” Security guards who lost meal time responding to an emergency were entitled to have the time made up. Guards could file a grievance if MotorCity failed to provide make-up time, but there is no evidence that a guard ever filed such a grievance.
Plaintiffs Sharise Webb and Latrina Kirby, who worked as dispatchers at the casino, testified that emergencies rarely interrupted their meal periods. Asked how often an emergency interrupted her meal periods, Webb responded, “[I]t doesn't happen very often.” For her part, Kirby estimated missing fewer than ten meal periods during her eight-year tenure at the casino. Plaintiff Philip Tibbs, who had worked as a security guard for more than ten years, recalled missing only one meal period.
Although guards rarely dealt with emergencies during meal breaks, monitoring the radio exposed them to constant, work-related chatter on the radio. Kirby and Webb testified that they had to focus on this chatter, because only then would they know if an emergency required their attention. Kirby also testified that she did not block out the chatter, but paid close attention to it.
Nevertheless, Kirby and Webb agreed that they were able to eat, socialize with coworkers, and use their phones while monitoring their radios. Webb generally spent meal periods eating and talking to coworkers, though she also used her smartphone to make calls, send text messages, and surf the Internet. Kirby, too, socialized and conducted personal business on her phone, though she testified she could not make long calls while listening to the radio. Tibbs read the Bible and monitored his radio at the same time.
In 2012, plaintiffs sued MotorCity for violating the FLSA's overtime provision, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). They alleged that MotorCity required them to work at least 41.25 hours per week—five eight-hour shifts, and a fifteen-minute roll-call meeting before each shift began—but paid them for only forty hours' work. The crux of this claim was plaintiffs' contention that their half-hour meal periods constituted working time—and were thus compensable—because guards spent that time predominantly for MotorCity's benefit.
On MotorCity's motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the undisputed evidence showed that the meal periods were non-compensable. Based on the parties' stipulation, the court determined that monitoring the radio was a de minimis activity, not a substantial job duty. The district court also noted that guards had many freedoms during meal periods, including the ability to eat, read, make phone calls, use the Internet, and watch television. And while the court accepted that the work-related radio chatter was constant, it found no evidence in the record supporting plaintiffs' claim that monitoring the radio regularly disrupted their meal periods.
Because the meal periods were non-compensable, the court ruled that MotorCity could offset the time guards spent on paid meal breaks against the time they spent attending unpaid, but compensable roll-call meetings. The district court accordingly held that, because plaintiffs worked only 38.75 hours per week, they were not entitled to relief on their overtime claim.
II.
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Killion v. KeHE Distribs., LLC, 761 F.3d 574, 580 (6th Cir.2014). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
III.
The FLSA “obligates employers to compensate employees for hours in excess of 40 per week at a rate of 1½ times the employees' regular wages.” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2156, 2162, 183 L.Ed.2d 153 (2012) ; see 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Although the FLSA does not define “work,” the Supreme Court has held that “work” means “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.”Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598, 64 S.Ct. 698, 88 L.Ed. 949 (1944).
“Time spent predominantly for the employer's benefit during a period, although designated as a lunch period or under any other designation, nevertheless constitutes working time compensable under the [FLSA].” F.W. Stock & Sons, Inc. v. Thompson, 194 F.2d 493, 496–97 (6th Cir.1952). But “[a]s long as the employee can pursue his or her mealtime adequately and comfortably, is not engaged in the performance of any substantial duties, and does not spend time predominantly for the employer's benefit, the employee is relieved of duty and is not entitled to compensation under the FLSA.” Hill, 751 F.2d at 814.
Whether time is spent predominantly for the employer's or the employee's benefit depends on the totality of the circumstances. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133, 65 S.Ct. 165, 89 L.Ed. 118 (1944). It is the employee's burden to prove that a meal period is compensable. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686–87, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946) ; Myracle v. Gen. Elec. Co., 33 F.3d 55, at *4 (6th Cir.1994).
A.
One relevant factor in the compensability analysis is whether the employee is “engaged in the performance of any substantial duties” during the meal period. Hill, 751 F.2d at 814. Although “substantial duties need...
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