Ruffin v. Com.
Decision Date | 06 March 2001 |
Docket Number | Record No. 0063-00-2. |
Citation | 542 S.E.2d 808,35 Va. App. 79 |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Parties | Daymon RUFFIN, s/k/a Damion Ruffin v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
Mufeed W. Said, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: HUMPHREYS and CLEMENTS, JJ., and COLEMAN, Senior Judge.
The appellant, Daymon Ruffin, was convicted in his absence of driving on a suspended driver's license with prior convictions and sentenced to twelve months in jail. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in enforcing the jail sentence in his absence.
I. Background
On July 24, 1999, Officers John McClellan and William Bondenhamer, of the Petersburg Police Department, issued a summons to Ruffin for driving on a suspended license with prior convictions. Ruffin was convicted in general district court and appealed the decision to the circuit court. Ruffin executed a recognizance appeal bond which provided that if he failed to appear for trial, he could be tried and convicted in his absence, and would waive his right to a jury trial.
Ruffin's case was set for a jury trial in circuit court on December 30, 1999. Ruffin was present in court the day the trial date was set and had knowledge of the trial date. However, Ruffin did not appear for trial. Consequently, the trial court released the jury, issued a capias and tried Ruffin in his absence upon a plea of not guilty. The trial court convicted Ruffin and proceeded to sentence him. The following exchange occurred between the court and Ruffin's counsel:
The trial court then sentenced Ruffin to jail for a period of twelve months.
ll. Analysis
Ruffin argues that the trial court incorrectly sentenced him in his absence and bases his argument on Code § 19.2-237, which provides the following:
On any indictment or presentment for a misdemeanor, process shall be issued immediately. If the accused appear and plead to the charge, the trial shall proceed without delay, unless good cause for continuance be shown. If, in any misdemeanor case the accused fails to appear and plead, when required the court may either award a capias or proceed to trial in the same manner as if the accused had appeared, plead not guilty and waived trial by jury, provided, that the court shall not in any such case enforce a jail sentence.
(Emphasis added.)
Conversely, the Commonwealth argues that Code § 19.2-258 applies to Ruffin's case and permits sentencing a convicted misdemeanant in his absence. That section provides:
The Commonwealth argues that because Code § 19.2-258 addresses situations where defendants on recognizance bonds fail to appear, and states that a "court shall have and exercise all the powers and duties vested in juries by any statute relating to crime and punishments," it applies to Ruffin and provides the trial court with the authority to "punish" or enforce a jail sentence upon him in his absence, despite the language in Code § 19.2-237 barring the enforcement of a jail sentence on defendants tried in their absence on indictments or presentments for misdemeanors. We disagree.1 Statutes cannot be read in a vacuum. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that "[i]f apparently conflicting statutes can be harmonized and effect given to both of them, they will be so construed." Lake Monticello Owners' Assoc. v. Lake, 250 Va. 565, 570, 463 S.E.2d 652, 655 (1995). We do not read the statutes to be in conflict. The two statutes can be easily "harmonized."
The issue of whether Code § 19.2-258 provides trial courts with the authority to enforce a jail sentence upon defendants who have been released on recognizance bonds, or admitted to bail, but have failed to appear for trial, is easily disposed of by a close reading of Code 19.2-258. The statute does not address a court's power to enforce a jail sentence in a defendant's absence, whereas Code § 19.2-237 does. Instead, Code § 19.2-258 merely provides trial courts with the "powers" "vested in juries by any statute relating to ... punishments" when a defendant fails to appear under the appropriate circumstances. (Emphasis added.)
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Farmer v. Commonwealth
...the JDR court followed the law and did not sentence appellant to jail time in absentia. SeeCode § 19.2–237; Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 35 Va.App. 79, 84–85, 542 S.E.2d 808, 810 (2001); see also Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va.App. 165, 172 n. 3, 578 S.E.2d 88, 91 n. 3 (2003) (explaining that a “j......