Ruffin v. Dist. of Columbia
| Decision Date | 17 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-2341 (JEB) |
| Parties | NALENE RUFFIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiffs Nalene Ruffin, Irene Jordan, Demetria Harris, and Darlene Mungin are all current or former employees of the District of Columbia Department of Public Works. Together, they bring a litany of claims against the District, alleging discrimination by their employer on the basis of race, age and sex. According to them, supervisors at DPW engaged in a coordinated effort to remove middle-aged Black women from the Department through harassment, disparate treatment, and unfair evaluations of their work performance. Defendants now move to dismiss, arguing that various of Plaintiffs' claims are untimely, unexhausted, or unsubstantiated. The Court will grant the Motion for the most part.
The Court draws the following facts from the operative Complaint and accepts them as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). As additional facts relevant to Plaintiffs' specific claims are discussed later in this Opinion, the Court provides here only an overview of each Plaintiff's employment with DPW and her allegations of discrimination by its management.
Plaintiffs collectively describe themselves as “experienced staff who vocally opposed what they perceived to be DPW management bias, and preferential treatment in favor of male and younger colleagues.” ECF No. 9-1 (Amend. Compl.), ¶ 1.1. Specifically, they allege that former (and now deceased) DPW Deputy Director for Fleet Management and Administration Daniel Harrison and current Interim DPW Director Michael Carter harbored “ageist and sexist attitudes” and that the two “used their power to discriminate, marginalize, displace, harass, and harm the Plaintiffs,” based on their age, race, and sex, “by culling out middle-aged Black women from DPW [while simultaneously] manipulating its investigative process to protect male employees accused of misconduct.” Id. These issues of discrimination, they contend, permeated “every DPW division, at a volume that placed Defendants on clear notice that there was a problem, . . . yet nothing was done to protect older female workers” from the alleged discrimination and bias they experienced. Id.
Each Plaintiff is a Black woman over the age of 40 and brings to the Complaint her own accusations of discrimination and bias on the part of DPW and its management. Plaintiff Ruffin, for example, currently serves as a heavy-mobile-equipment mechanic at DPW, where she has worked for the past five years. Id., ¶ 2.1-2.1.2. She alleges that she was written up for pretextual reasons, transferred to an alternate and more physically demanding position, and replaced in her previous role by a male colleague who was unable to adequately complete the responsibilities of that position. Id., ¶ 2.1.11-2.1.13. During a mediation between the Agency and Ruffin's union, all of her supervisors with the exception of Daniel Harrison found that she had executed her previous job properly and she was eventually returned to her old position. Id., ¶ 2.1.15.
Plaintiff Jordan was, prior to her termination, the Director of Maintenance and Repair Manager at DPW. Id., ¶ 2.2.1-2.2.3. She alleges that, beginning in September 2019, former Deputy Director Harrison began discriminating against her by excluding her from meetings for managers and supervisors, giving her low performance-appraisal scores, and, eventually, terminating her. Id., ¶ 2.2.4-2.2.16. She claims that, while other male employees were given the benefit of being placed on a performance-improvement plan prior to receiving low ratings or reprimands, this courtesy was not extended to her or any of the other female supervisors at DPW. Id., ¶ 2.2.6. She also recalls that, after Jordan engaged the Agency's EEOC counselor about her concerns, Harrison told a group of employees at a meeting that “Ms. Jordan was putting the EEOC on him.” Id., ¶¶ 2.2.8, 2.2.10. Jordan was eventually placed on an abbreviated 30-day PIP and terminated four weeks later. Id., ¶ 2.2.15-2.2.16.
Plaintiff Harris is currently a Special Events Coordinator at DPW. Id., ¶ 2.3. In addition to alleging similar discriminatory acts as the previous Plaintiffs - such as being excluded from meetings, having her duties reassigned, and receiving low performance appraisals - Harris also alleges being subject to sexual harassment in the workplace. Id., ¶ 2.3.2. On multiple occasions, she describes receiving explicit photos sent to her government email address, see id., ¶ 2.3.5, 2.3.10, which she reported to DPW, and she requested that her phone number and email address be changed - all to no avail. See id., ¶ 2.3.11. On another occasion, Harris details receiving repeated harassing advances from a male colleague - Joshua Tucker - which she also reported to her supervisors. See id., ¶ 2.3.6. Despite her reports, she was still assigned to work directly with Tucker and continued receiving inappropriate advances. Id., ¶¶ 2.3.7-2.3.8. DCHR later terminated Tucker, but DPW did not respond to Harrison's complaints. Id., ¶ 2.3.9.
Finally, Plaintiff Mungin was a Fleet Advisory Service Manager for DPW prior to her termination in February 2020. Id., ¶ 2.4.3. Mungin was fired for insubordination after she enrolled in a Mayor's Executive Leadership Program at George Washington University. Id., ¶¶ 2.4.1, 2.4.3. This was despite her allegedly receiving the permission of her supervisors, including Deputy Director Carter, to enroll in such program and disenrolling once she was ordered to do so. Id., ¶¶ 2.4.4, 2.4.6. As a result, she argues that her termination was without basis and discriminatory. Id., ¶¶ 2.4.3-2.4.6.
Each Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the D.C. Office of Human Rights addressing the conduct they experienced, see id., ¶¶ 2.1.18, 2.2.18, 2.3.18, 2.4.7, and they allege that “[o]lder black female employees” routinely complained about the discriminatory attitudes of Harrison and Carter both internally and to the D.C. OHR, the EEOC, the Mayor's Office, and to the D.C. City Council. See id., ¶¶ 2.1.48, 2.4.41. Plaintiffs then filed this suit in August 2022. The operative Complaint alleges six counts of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment based on age, race, and sex in violation of Title VII (Count I), the D.C. Human Rights Act (Counts II and V), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count III), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (Count IV), and the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act (Count VI). It last alleges the common-law tort of negligent supervision (Count VII). See id., ¶¶ 5-8. Plaintiff Jordan alone additionally raises a claim for wrongful termination (Count VIII). Id., ¶ 6.7. Defendants now move to dismiss. See ECF No. 12 (MTD).
Defendants first argue that this Court should dismiss the majority of Plaintiffs' claims for failure “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In evaluating Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Court must “treat the complaint's factual allegations as true . . . and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'” Sparrow v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (citation omitted). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must put forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The court need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). For a plaintiff to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the facts alleged in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
For Plaintiffs' DCHRA claims, Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). A plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear her claims. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A court has an “affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority.” Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001). For this reason, “‘the [p]laintiff's factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion' than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Id. at 13-14 (quoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Practice & Procedure § 1350 (2d ed. 1987)). Additionally, unlike with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Fed. Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Defendants raise numerous arguments in their Motion to Dismiss,...
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