Ruffin v. State

• Decision Date: 31 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 86, September Term, 2005.,86, September Term, 2005.
• Parties: James Allen RUFFIN v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

906 A.2d 360

394 Md. 355

James Allen RUFFIN v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 86, September Term, 2005.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

August 31, 2006.

Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Public Defender (Nancy S. Forester, Public Defender, Baltimore), on brief, for Petitioner.

Sarah Page Pritzlaff, Asst. Atty. General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. General, Baltimore), for Respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

In every criminal jury trial, the trial court is required to instruct the jury that the defendant is presumed innocent, that in order to convict the defendant of the charged crime the State must prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury has a duty to acquit in the absence of such proof. Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 398, 697 A.2d 432, 436 (1997). The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court's jury instruction on the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt was erroneous because it deviated from the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction (MPJI-CR) 2:02.¹ We shall hold that the trial court must closely adhere to the approved pattern instruction on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, MPJI-CR 2:02. Because we hold that the trial court is required to instruct the jury closely following MPJI-CR 2:02, we shall hold that the specific instruction given by the trial court in this case constituted reversible error.

I.

Petitioner, James Allen Ruffin, was charged with several counts of robbery with a deadly weapon and related offenses stemming from an incident in which Ruffin allegedly held William Gosnell and others at gunpoint in the Gosnell home and removed property from that home and from Mr. Gosnell's person. Ruffin was tried, along with a co-defendant, before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. The main issue at trial was the disputed identifications of Ruffin and his co-defendant by one of the alleged victims. Following the evidentiary portion of the trial, the judge instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard of proof. The court's instructions were in pertinent part as follows:

"The defendants in this case are presumed innocent, just as every defendant who is tried in every courtroom in the United States of America in a criminal charge is. And the presumption remains with the defendants throughout the trial until you believe it has been overcome and are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty.

"The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden remains on the State throughout the trial. The defendants are not required to prove their innocence; however, the State is not required to prove guilt beyond all possible doubt or a mathematical certainty, nor is the State required to negate every conceivable circumstance of innocence.

"A reasonable doubt is a doubt founded upon reason. It's not a fanciful doubt, a whimsical doubt or a capricious doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires such proof as would convince you of the truth of a fact to the extent that you would be willing to act upon such belief without reservation in an important matter in your own business or personal affairs."

Defense counsel took exception to the trial court's instruction because it deviated from MPJI-CR 2:02 significantly. Defense counsel argued that the court erred in leaving out the last sentence of that instruction, which would have informed the jury of its duty to acquit if it was not satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense counsel stated:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Well actually, Your Honor, I don't think Your Honor did it intentionally, but in the reasonable doubt instruction Your Honor left off the last sentence from the reasonable doubt instruction as it's written in the book.

THE COURT: Gave the reasonable doubt instruction I have been giving for 18 years. I don't read the one out of the book.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay. Well, I didn't bring that one with me, if I can have a second to go . . .

THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] This is in instruction 2:02 of the model instructions. The last sentence says, quote, however, if you are not satisfied of the defendant's guilt to that extent then reasonable doubt exist [sic] and the defendant must be found not guilty.

The Court overruled the objection, stating:

THE COURT: And the reason I don't give that is because it seems only fair to me that you would then continue, if you are convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt then you should find the defendant guilty. And I say that throughout the whole thing. So I don't give that intentionally because I think it's only one sided. Haven't done it in 18 years, never had a case reversed. What's next.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Thank you. I would proffer that additional sentence as to instruction 2:02.

Following the trial court's instructions, the jury left the courtroom to deliberate. After twice announcing to the court that they were deadlocked, the jurors were given a modified Allen charge.² Three hours later, the jury returned its verdict. Ruffin was acquitted on three charges, including two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon and one count of kidnapping. He was convicted on one count of robbery with a deadly weapon and of using a handgun during the commission of a felony. He was subsequently sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for the robbery conviction, and he received a five year concurrent sentence, without parole, for the handgun conviction.

Ruffin's appeal to the Court of Special Appeals presented two issues. Ruffin argued that the trial court erred in both denying his motion to suppress an out-of-court photographic identification of him and in failing to properly instruct the jury. Specifically, he argued that the judge failed to inform the jury of its duty to acquit in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed. On the issue of the jury instruction, the Court of Special Appeals held that the jury instruction "adequately conveyed the State's burden of proving appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" and that the trial court had no further duty to supplement its instruction as requested.

Ruffin then filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, contending that the trial court erred in modifying the pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence, and erred in refusing to give that portion of the instruction regarding the jury's duty to acquit in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We granted the petition. Ruffin v. State, 389 Md. 398, 885 A.2d 823 (2005).

II.

Ruffin argues that the jury instruction given by the trial judge violated his procedural rights because key portions of the pattern jury instruction, necessary for the jury to understand its duties, were omitted. In making this argument, Ruffin points to the three deviations from MPJI-CR 2:02 given by the trial court. Ruffin's principal contention is that the trial court erred in omitting the last sentence of MPJI-CR 2:02, which states: "However, if you are not satisfied of the defendant's guilt to that extent, then reasonable doubt exists and the defendant must be found not guilty." Ruffin argues, as he did at trial, that instructing the jury regarding its duty to acquit in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is critical to safeguarding his constitutional right to due process. Ruffin maintains that the trial court's justification for leaving out the last sentence of the pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt, namely, "because I think it's only one-sided," was an attempt to level the playing field which lowered the State's burden of proof.

Ruffin also complains of the trial court's statement that the presumption of innocence remains "until you believe it has been overcome and are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty." He points out that the pattern jury instruction uses the word "Funless" and not "until." Ruffin argues that the use of the word "until," instead of the approved term "unless," implies the inevitability of the burden being overcome by the State. According to Ruffin, such implication does not arise from the pattern jury instruction. Ruffin insists that the trial judge's instruction improperly characterizes the State's burden.

Lastly, Ruffin argues that the trial court erred in adding a sentence from an outdated version of the pattern jury instructions which stated: "It's not a fanciful doubt, a whimsical doubt or a capricious doubt." Ruffin points out that the Maryland State Bar Association's Standing Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions deleted that sentence in 1999 after receiving numerous complaints that the language was confusing to jurors. Thus, Ruffin argues that the use of it in the trial court's instruction confused and misled the jury to believe that a higher degree of doubt was necessary to acquit Ruffin of the charges.

The trial court's instruction involved an additional deviation from MPJI-CR 2:02, when the court added the phrase "just as every defendant who is tried in every courtroom in the United States of America in a criminal charge is" to the description of the presumption of innocence in the first paragraph. Taken together, Ruffin argues that the additions and omissions of the trial judge in his instruction to the jury on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt lowered the burden of proof necessary to convict him.

Ruffin relies upon several opinions from the United States Supreme Court and from this Court which define the concept of reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence.³ Those opinions point out that due process mandates that the standard of proof beyond a...