Ruffin v. United States
| Decision Date | 14 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–CO–333.,15–CO–333. |
| Citation | 135 A.3d 799 |
| Parties | Levi M. RUFFIN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Jeffrey L. Light, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for appellant.
Vincent H. Cohen, Jr., Acting United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Elizabeth Trosman, Chrisellen R. Kolb, and Ryan M. Malone, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before GLICKMAN and BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY, Associate Judges, and FARRELL, Senior Judge.
, Associate Judge:
We reversed appellant Levi Ruffin's convictions of misdemeanor assault on a police officer (“APO”) and felony threats (directed at a police car) because of insufficient evidence. See Ruffin v. United States, 76 A.3d 845, 847–48 (D.C.2013)
(“Ruffin I ”).1 Following our decision, Mr. Ruffin moved the trial court to seal his arrest records, see D.C.Code § 16–802 (2012 Repl.), issue a certificate of innocence, see D.C.Code § 2–422 (2012 Repl.) and 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2004 Supp.), and return the $250 that he was required to pay into the Violent Victims Act Fund (“VVC Fund”) for his now-reversed convictions. The trial court granted the motion in part, sealing the arrest records of Mr. Ruffin's overturned convictions except for the burglary charge on which the jury had acquitted, see supra note 1, but denying his requests for a certificate of innocence and to return his $250.
On appeal, Mr. Ruffin primarily argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to issue a certificate of innocence and demands a remand. He also renews his request for the return of the $250 that he paid into the VVC Fund.2 While we agree with Mr. Ruffin that the trial court has the authority to issue a certificate of innocence, we nonetheless affirm the trial court's decision on the alternative ground that the existing record conclusively shows that Mr. Ruffin was not entitled to such relief. We conclude that Mr. Ruffin is not entitled to a certificate of innocence under either D.C.Code § 2–422
or 28 U.S.C. § 2513 because he cannot demonstrate that he did not “by his misconduct, cause or bring about his own prosecution.” D.C.Code § 2–422. However, we agree that Mr. Ruffin is entitled to reimbursement from the VVC Fund, and we remand for the trial court to order the return of Mr. Ruffin's money.3
The facts of this case are explained in greater detail in Ruffin I. Essentially, on June 12, 2010, at approximately 5:00 a.m., the police responded to a 911 call about a possible burglary after a stranger was seen reaching his hand into the window of an apartment. Arriving four minutes later, Officer Carlos Amaya observed Mr. Ruffin, who was by himself in the alley behind the apartment building, hop over a short retaining wall and suspiciously look over his shoulder towards a police car entering the alley from the opposite side. Because Mr. Ruffin was so focused on the police car, he did not notice Officer Amaya and bumped into him. When Officer Amaya placed his hand on Mr. Ruffin's shoulder, Mr. Ruffin instinctively brushed his hand away, which culminated in Mr. Ruffin's arrest for, inter alia, burglary and APO, and later felony threats (directed at a police car) for threatening to “kick the windows out” of the police car in which he was being transported. The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Ruffin of APO (brushing Officer Amaya's hand off his shoulder) and felony threats (to kick the windows out of the police car), but it acquitted him of the first-degree burglary charge.
On direct appeal, we reversed Mr. Ruffin's APO and felony threats (directed at a police car) convictions.4 Specifically, we held that Mr. Ruffin's “ephemeral elbow jerk in response to a police officer reaching towards his shoulder did not amount to ‘resisting’ a police officer” as necessary for an APO conviction. Ruffin I, supra, 76 A.3d at 851
. We also held that the felony threats statute did not criminalize threats directed against property owned by the District of Columbia government. Id. at 859.
Following our decision, Mr. Ruffin filed a motion for the trial court to seal his arrest records, issue him a certificate of innocence under D.C.Code § 2–422
and 28 U.S.C. § 2513, and return the $250 that he paid into the VVC Fund. Without waiting for a response from the government, the trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. With regard to the arrest records, the trial court concluded that Mr. Ruffin was entitled to have the arrest records for his overturned convictions sealed based on Ruffin I.5 However, the trial court did not seal Mr. Ruffin's arrest record for burglary, even though the jury had acquitted him of that charge at trial. The court concluded that the fact that Mr. Ruffin was acquitted does not establish for purposes of sealing his arrest records that he is entitled to relief. Rather, Mr. Ruffin as the moving party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence “either that the offense did not occur or that he did not commit the offense.”6 Mr. Ruffin could not meet his burden, the trial court concluded, because the evidence at trial “proved conclusively that someone did commit the crime of burglary,” and that Mr. Ruffin was the only person in the alley behind the apartment building where the crime occurred within minutes of the 911 call, making it unlikely that Mr. Ruffin was actually innocent. With regard to Mr. Ruffin's other requests, the trial court concluded that Mr. Ruffin was not entitled to a certificate of innocence under the federal unjust imprisonment statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2513
, because it is a federal statute and, therefore, inapplicable to the present case. The trial court did not address whether it had the authority to issue Mr. Ruffin a certificate of innocence under our local unjust imprisonment statute, D.C.Code § 2–422, which Mr. Ruffin had cited in his motion as well. The trial court also concluded that there is no authority entitling Mr. Ruffin to a return of the funds that he paid into the VVC Fund.7 This appeal followed.
Mr. Ruffin's principal argument on appeal is that, contrary to the trial court's decision, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia has jurisdiction to issue a certificate of innocence, and that he is therefore entitled to a remand on the merits of his claim. The government agrees with Mr. Ruffin that the trial court is statutorily authorized to issue a certificate of innocence, but argues that Mr. Ruffin is, nonetheless, not entitled to a remand because the undisputed record shows that he cannot meet his statutory burden of proving that he is truly innocent under D.C.Code § 2–422(2)
and 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2). We agree with the government.
Both parties are in agreement that the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to grant a certificate of innocence, and we agree. “A certificate of innocence serves no purpose other than to permit its bearer to sue the government for damages” for claims of unjust conviction and imprisonment. Betts v. United States, 10 F.3d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir.1993)
. In this case, a certificate of innocence would allow Mr. Ruffin to sue the government for damages for the time that he wrongly spent in prison for his APO and felony threats convictions that were overturned. The Superior Court has the authority to issue a certificate of innocence for an unjust imprisonment claim made against the District of Columbia, see D.C.Code § 2–421 (2012 Repl.),8 if the person seeking the suit proves:
Diamen v. United States, 604 F.3d 653, 657 (D.C.Cir.2010) ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2513(b) ().10 Further, these two claims of unjust imprisonment are not intended to be mutually exclusive. See D.C. Council Committee on the Judiciary, Report on Bill 3–251, “District of Columbia Unjust Imprisonment Act” at 5 (July 9, 1980) (). Accordingly, the trial court erred when it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2513, and when it failed to even consider the applicability of D.C.Code § 2–422.
While ordinarily such error is cause for a remand, in the case at hand a remand is unnecessary because we can say “with fair assurance” that the trial court would have rejected Mr. Ruffin's...
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