Ruffins v. Tower Loan of Mississippi, Inc. (In re Ruffins)
| Decision Date | 01 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 10–15143–NPO.,Adversary No. 10–01225–NPO. |
| Citation | 465 B.R. 115 |
| Parties | In re Marsha D. RUFFINS, Debtor.Marsha D. Ruffins, Plaintiff. v. Tower Loan Of Mississippi, Inc. and Javora Staples, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Glenn H. Williams, Cleveland, MS, for Plaintiff.
John S. Simpson, Simpson Law Firm, P.A., Ridgeland, MS, Emil Nick Crawford, Greenville, MS, for Defendants.
There came on for consideration Tower Loan of Mississippi, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Tower Loan Motion”) (Adv. Dkt. 35) 1 and Memorandum Brief in Support of Tower Loan of Mississippi, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Tower Loan Brief”) (Adv. Dkt. 36) filed by Tower Loan of Mississippi, Inc., d/b/a Tower Loan of Greenville (“Tower Loan”); Javora Staples' Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Staples Joinder”) (Adv. Dkt. 37) filed by Javora Staples (“Staples”); and Plaintiff's Response to Tower Loan of Mississippi, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Debtor Response”) (Adv. Dkt. 43) and Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Debtor Brief”) (Adv. Dkt. 44) filed by the Debtor, Marsha D. Ruffins (“Debtor”), in the above-styled adversary proceeding (the “Adversary”). Also under consideration is Tower Loan of Mississippi, Inc.'s Rebuttal to Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment (Adv. Dkt. 45) filed by Tower Loan. John S. Simpson represents Tower Loan, Nick Crawford represents Staples, and Glenn H. Williams represents the Debtor. Having reviewed the above-referenced pleadings and all the exhibits attached thereto, the Court finds for the reasons set forth below that the Tower Loan Motion and the Staples Joinder are not well taken and should be denied.2
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to this proceeding. This matter is a core proceeding as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(O). Notice of the Tower Loan Motion and the Staples Joinder was proper under the circumstances.
When deciding whether summary judgment is proper, the Court must view the evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. McPherson v. Rankin, 736 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir.1984). Applying this standard, the Court finds the following undisputed material facts:
1. On July 31, 2007, the Debtor executed a promissory note (the “Note”) in the original principal amount of $63,000, secured by two deeds of trust on separate residential properties in Leland, Mississippi, located at 705 E. Third Street (the “Debtor's Residence”) and at 63 Feltus Drive (the “Debtor's Family Residence”) (together, the “Subject Properties”). The Note was payable to Tower Loan in monthly installments of $1,050 for a term of 60 months, beginning on September 9, 2007.
2. At two separate foreclosure sales conducted by Tower Loan, the Debtor's Family Residence sold for $19,922.57 on January 14, 2008, and the Debtor's Residence sold for $26,184.64 on February 20, 2008, to Tower Loan who was the highest and best bidder. According to a memorandum written by an employee of Tower Loan during the loan application process, the fair market value of the Debtor's Family Residence was $31,000, and the fair market value of the Debtor's Residence was $64,000. (Debtor's Ex. B at Ex. 1).
3. The chart below documents the payments made by the Debtor prior to and after the foreclosure sales of the Subject Properties:
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
¦ ¦Pre–Foreclosure Payments ¦Post–Foreclosure Payments¦
+-------------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------¦
¦Subject Properties ¦$5,250 ¦$29,343.12 ¦
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
4. After the foreclosure sales, the Debtor and her family continued to occupy the Subject Properties.
5. The Debtor alleges that after the foreclosure sales, she spoke by telephone with Taris Mumford (“Mumford”), the branch manager of Tower Loan in Leland, Mississippi, and that he agreed to re-title or reconvey the Subject Properties to her upon Tower Loan's receipt of three monthly payments. The Debtor paid $2,700 to Tower Loan on December 12, 2008. (Debtor Ex. B at Ex. 2).3
6. A Lease–Purchase Agreement (the “Lease”) between Tower Loan and the Debtor was dated July 1, 2010,4 but was signed by Tower Loan and not signed by the Debtor. (Debtor Ex. A).
7. The Lease required the Debtor to pay Tower Loan $1,050 per month beginning on June 6, 2010, the same payment as in the Note. The term of the Lease was for 27 months. The Lease contained an “Option to Purchase” provision that granted the Debtor the option to purchase the Subject Properties at a price of $28,350, less the aggregate amount of any lease payments paid.
8. According to the Debtor, the Lease does not precisely set forth all of the terms of her oral agreement with Mumford at Tower Loan. (Debtor Brief at 3).
9. Despite the Lease and without the Debtor's knowledge, Tower Loan sold the properties to Staples in September, 2010, for $28,350, the combined purchase price in the Lease, prior to an adjustment for lease payments paid.
10. The Debtor received a notice to vacate the Subject Properties and was served with a summons for eviction issued by the Justice Court of Washington County, Mississippi.
11. On October 22, 2010, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 (Dkt. 1).
12. The Debtor initiated this Adversary by filing a Complaint (Adv. Dkt. 1) seeking monetary damages against Tower Loan for breach of a promise to reconvey the Subject Properties and the specific performance of that agreement. The Debtor also seeks injunctive relief prohibiting Tower Loan and Staples from evicting her from the Subject Properties. The Debtor raises four causes of action in her Complaint: (1) breach of contract, (2) wilful breach of contract/bad faith, (3) fraud, and (4) specific performance (the “Causes of Action”).
The Court must determine if the facts presented establish the existence of a dispute as to whether Tower Loan made an agreement with the Debtor regarding her continued occupancy and repurchase of the Subject Properties and if so, whether it was memorialized in writing. The resulting legal question raised in the Tower Loan Motion and the Staples Joinder is whether Mississippi's statute of frauds, Miss.Code Ann. § 15–3–1(c), bars the Causes of Action in toto.
Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure incorporates the summary judgment standard established in Rule 56 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.5 Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(a) when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Defense of a proper summary judgment motion requires more from the non-moving party than mere allegations or denials of her pleadings. Rule 56(e) provides:
If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion....
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). Thus, once the moving party has made its required showing, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions demonstrate specific facts to establish there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Ultimately, the role of this Court is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 590, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Tower Loan contends in the Tower Loan Brief that the undisputed facts show: “(1) that the parties did not, in fact, reach ... an agreement and (2) even if there had been some agreement, it was not reduced to writing and is unenforceable under the statute of frauds.” (Tower Loan Brief at 6). Tower Loan requests that this Court enter a judgment declaring that the statute of frauds bars the Causes of Action, including the Debtor's fraud claim, as a matter of law.
Generally, a contract need not be memorialized in writing to be enforceable in Mississippi. Putt v. City of Corinth, 579 So.2d 534, 538 (Miss.1991). The statute of frauds, Miss.Code Ann. § 15–3–1(c), is an exception to that general rule. Putt, 579 So.2d at 538. The portion of the statute of frauds at issue here states:
An action shall not be brought whereby to charge a defendant or other party:
* * *
(c) upon any contract for the sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or the making of any lease thereof for a longer term than one year ... unless, in each of said cases, the promise or agreement upon which such action may be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith or signed by some person by him or her thereunto lawfully authorized in writing.
Miss.Code Ann. § 15–3–1(c). In short, the statute of frauds demands that contracts for the purchase of land be evidenced “by some memorandum or note” and “be signed by the party to be charged...
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