Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co.

• Decision Date: 22 March 1966
• Citation: 420 Pa. 416,218 A.2d 333
• Parties: Clementino RUFO, Clementino Rufo and Anna Rufo, his wife, Donata Cara, David Lanni, a minor, by John F. Lanni, his guardian, and John F. Lanni, in his own right, Appellants, v. The BASTIAN-BLESSING COMPANY.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

218 A.2d 333

420 Pa. 416

Clementino RUFO, Clementino Rufo and Anna Rufo, his wife, Donata Cara, David Lanni, a minor, by John F. Lanni, his guardian, and John F. Lanni, in his own right, Appellants, v. The BASTIAN-BLESSING COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 22, 1966.

Rudolph J. DiMassa, Philadelphia, for appellants.

Philip Price, George J. Miller, Dechert, Price & Rhoads Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before BELL, C.J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

BELL, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas which sustained defendant's preliminary objections to plaintiffs' Reinstated complaint in trespass. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant supplied one of the plaintiffs, Clementino Rufo with a defectively manufactured portable cylinder containing gas and that as he was using the cylinder to melt solder in the basement of his home the cylinder was ignited by a nearby pilot light and an explosion occurred which caused property damage and severe personal injuries.

This accident occurred in December, 1957. Plaintiffs thereafter brought two actions against the defendant, one in trespass and one in assumpsit. Defendant was a foreign corporation. In both actions, service of process was made by serving the Secretary of the Commonwealth.

On January 23, 1959, plaintiff entered a default judgment against defendant in the trespass action for want of an appearance. On June 20, 1960, the lower Court, after a hearing, ordered the Default judgment in the trespass action stricken, and dismissed the complaint in the assumpsit action ^[1] on the ground, inter alia, that service of the complaint could not legally be made on the secretary of the Commonwealth.

No appeal was ever taken from the order of the lower Court which struck the default judgment in the trespass action.

On May 20, 1965, plaintiffs, as permitted by Rule 1010 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 P.S. Appendix reinstated the complaint in trespass. The lower Court sustained defendant's preliminary objections to such reinstatement, and plaintiffs thereupon took this appeal.

It is well established in Pennsylvania that '(w)here a judgment is vacated or set aside (or stricken from the record) by a valid order or judgment, it is entirely destroyed and the rights of the parties are left as though no such judgment had ever been entered.' Higbee Estate, 372 Pa. 233, 237, 93 A.2d 467, 469.

The filing of the original complaint in trespass on December 12, 1958 tolled the Statute of Limitations for the statutory period of two years, but not a day longer; and the Statute of Limitations bars the reissuance of the complaint after this period expires. Marucci v. Lippman,...