Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 03 CIV. 1396(SCR).
| Citation | 386 F.Supp.2d 434 |
| Decision Date | 02 August 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 03 CIV. 1396(SCR).,03 CIV. 1396(SCR). |
| Parties | Frank RUGGIERO, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, Sheriff H. Frank Bigger, Lieutenant Williams, Sergeant Weed, Sergeant Carreri, Officer Maiorino, and Officer Losavio, in their individual capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Stephen Bergstein, Thornton, Bergstein & Ullrich, LLP, Chester, NY, for Plaintiff.
Christina Sanabria, County Atty, County of Orange, Goshen, NY, for Defendants.
The County of Orange, Sheriff H. Frank Bigger, Lieutenant Williams, Sergeant Weed, Sergeant Carreri, Officer Maiorino, and Officer Losavio, in their individual capacities, (collectively referred to as the "Defendants") jointly have filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment contending that Frank Ruggiero (the "Plaintiff") failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available to him prior to commencing the instant action on February 28, 2003. The Plaintiff alleges civil rights violations by the Defendants at the Orange County Jail from August 2000 to May 2001. The Plaintiff's claims sound in violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On February 28, 2003, it is undisputed that the Plaintiff was participating in a drug treatment program at the Willard Drug Treatment Campus ("Willard") in upstate New York. A more substantial rendition of the underlying facts in the case is unnecessary as the motion at hand centers on whether the Plaintiff must have exhausted his administrative remedies before commencing this suit.
Because the parties and this Court refer to materials outside of the pleadings and discovery is complete, the motion is decided under the summary judgment standard of review. Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); White v. ABCO Engineering Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir.2000); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party must show the absence of any issues of material fact. Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997).
Exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to claims arising out of conditions of confinement is a mandatory condition precedent to § 1983 actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Section 1997e(a) states:
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies. No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
The question presented is whether the Plaintiff was a "prisoner" under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e while at Willard. The term "prisoner" is defined in § 1997e(h) as:
(h) "Prisoner" defined. As used in this section, the term "prisoner" means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.
N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 2(20) states: "Drug treatment campus means a facility operated by the department to provide a program of intensive drug treatment services for individuals sentenced to parole supervision sentences ... or for certain parole violators." N.Y. Correc. Law § 70 adds that "[a]n institution operated by the department as a drug treatment campus as defined in subdivision twenty of section two of this chapter and used to provide intensive drug treatment services for parolees and certain parole violators, shall not be deemed to be a correctional facility." (emphasis added) It is clear that, under New York law, Willard is not defined as a correctional facility.
If Willard is not a correctional facility, then was the Plaintiff a prisoner while he was housed there? The Defendants claim the Plaintiff was remanded to Willard for violating the conditions of his parole and was detained as a prisoner. The Plaintiff initially claimed he was at Willard as a condition of his parole but later conceded that he was at Willard for a violation of parole. According to the definition in § 1997e(h), a prisoner is any person sentenced for a violation of the terms of parole or sentenced to the facility as a condition of parole. As the Plaintiff was being held at Willard for a parole violation, there is no question that the Plaintiff is deemed a prisoner under § 1997e.
This Court is faced with seemingly contradictory conclusions — the Plaintiff is a prisoner according to federal statute but was not held at a jail, prison, or correctional facility according to state statute. However, upon closer examination, it is clear that a person may be held as a prisoner at a drug treatment campus. Such a facility may not be deemed to be a correctional facility but that does not preclude a person held at the drug treatment campus from being labeled as a prisoner. All parties agree that the Plaintiff was sentenced to the facility by a judge in a criminal proceeding. The parties also agree that the Plaintiff was not free to leave. In fact, leaving the facility without prior permission can lead to further violations of a person's parole or probation conditions and even remand to a correctional facility. Indeed, the Plaintiff in this action escaped from Willard. The Plaintiff subsequently was charged under the New York State Penal Code and remanded to a correctional facility. Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff is deemed to be a prisoner held at a drug treatment facility. Therefore, the Plaintiff as a prisoner was required to exhaust his administrative remedies under § 1997e.
Inmates in state custody may file grievances formally through the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") Inmate Grievance Program, which consists of three levels:
The first is the filing of a complaint with the facility's Grievance Review Committee. The second is an appeal to the facility superintendent. The final level is an appeal to the DOCS Central Office Review Committee in Albany. A prisoner has not exhausted his administrative remedies until he goes through all three levels of the grievance procedure.
Hemphill v. New York, 198 F.Supp.2d 546, 548 (S.D.N.Y.2002) () (citations omitted) ( that merely sending a letter to prison superintendent cannot satisfy IGP). There is also a more informal, "expedited" grievance procedure for addressing harassment by DOCS staff, defined as "employee misconduct meant to annoy, intimidate, or harm an inmate." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 701.11(a).
In Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir.2004), the Second Circuit instructed district courts to conduct a...
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