Ruggles v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers

• Decision Date: 03 September 1932
• Citation: 52 S.W.2d 860,331 Mo. 20
• Parties: Thomas H. Ruggles, Appellant, v. International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

52 S.W.2d 860

331 Mo. 20

Thomas H. Ruggles, Appellant, v. International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers

Supreme Court of Missouri

September 3, 1932

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Moses N Hartmann, Judge.

Affirmed.

Frank Coffman for appellant.

The court erred in sustaining defendant's motions to quash summons and sheriff's return and in rendering final judgment of dismissal against plaintiff, because: (a) Voluntary, unincorporated labor unions, conducting an insurance business with its members and contracting with them, in the name under which it does business, and having powers and privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships, are suable entities.Clark v. Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen,43 S.W.2d 404;Syz v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union,24 S.W.2d 1080;Mayes v United Garment Workers of America,6 S.W.2d 333;Weihtuechter v. Miller,276 Mo. 322.(b) And, under such circumstances, it should be estopped from denying that it is a suable entity.Clark v. Brotherhood, etc.,43 S.W.2d 404.(c) And, of necessity, it should be so suable.United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co.,42 S.Ct. 570.(d) And Section 728,Revised Statutes 1929, is not unconstitutional in so far as it provides how such associations may be served with process and under what name they may be sued.Mayes v. United Garment Workers of America6 S.W.2d 333.

Igo, Carroll, Higgs & Keefe for respondent; Frank P. Walsh of counsel.

(1)(a) That motion and the ruling thereon could not be preserved for review except by a bill of exceptions -- Brown v. Foote,55 Mo. 178;Force v. Van Patton,149 Mo. 446, 50 S.W. 906;Marsden v. Nipp,30 S.W.2d 81 -- unless the motion amounts to a demurrer to the petition, in which case it should be treated as such and, consequently, as part of the record.Garber v. Railway Co.,210 S.W. 379;Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Mo. Power & Light Co.,39 S.W.2d 1041.(b) But motions similar to the motion to quash summons have not been treated as equivalent to demurrers, but as within the rule that motions and rulings thereon are matters of exception and not of record.Motion to quash execution -- Force v. Van Patton,149 Mo. 446, 50 S.W. 906.Motion to dismiss -- Brown v. Foote,55 Mo. 178;United States v. Gamble,10 Mo. 459.Motion for judgment on pleadings -- Interstate Ry. Co. v. Mo. River & C. R. Co.,251 Mo. 707, 158 S.W. 353;Sternberg v. Levy,159 Mo. 617, 60 S.W. 1117.(c) If the motion to quash the summons and the ruling thereon were matters of exception and not of record, then they have no place in the abstract of the record here (which neither includes any bill of exceptions nor purports to show that any such was filed) and may not be reviewed, though set out therein.Jefferson City v. Opel,67 Mo. 394;United States v. Gamble,10 Mo. 459;Nickerson v. Peery,163 Mo. 77, 63 S.W. 382;Hampe v. Versen,32 S.W.2d 797.The following points are submitted, however, for consideration in case it be determined that the merits of the rulings below may be reviewed.(2) The fact, shown on the face of the petition, that defendant is a voluntary association is fatal to maintenance of the suit unless qualified by other facts pleaded.(a) A voluntary association is not an entity and therefore is not suable.Newton County Farmers & Fruit Growers Exchange v. Railroad Co.,31 S.W.2d 803.(b) The mere conclusion, expressed in the petition, that defendant"possesses powers or privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships"(which would make it a "corporation" under the statutory definition -- R. S. 1929, sec. 4526) is without effect.Newton, etc. Exchange v. Railroad Co., supra.(c) Unless facts are pleaded to show that defendant possesses such powers or privileges, the averment that it is a "voluntary association" stands unqualified in the petition and leaves the case within the above-stated rule.(3) The only attempt made in the petition to meet the requirement last stated is found in those allegations of the petition by which it is sought to show that the defendant possesses the powers and privileges of a fraternal benefit society under the statute.In that attempt the petition falls short for these reasons: (1) It lacks averments of facts essential to bring the defendant within the class of associations defined by the statute as fraternal benefit societies, particularly facts to show that the defendant has a "lodge system" and a "representative form of government," as specifically defined in the statute.R. S. 1929, secs. 5991, 5992.(2) And even if the facts pleaded were sufficient to show that defendant is a fraternal benefit society, as defined by the statute, the petition would still fall short of its purpose because: (a) It is not the mere fact that an association comes within the statutory definition of a fraternal benefit society that gives it "powers or privileges," but the fact that it has complied with the provisions of the statute and obtained the authority of the State to do business thereunder.R. S. 1929, art. 13, ch. 37, secs. 5990-6029; particularly sections 6001,6002,6004,6005,6013,6016,6018,6020;Schmidt v. United Order of Foresters,228 Mo. 675, 129 S.W. 661;Ordelheide v. Modern Brotherhood of America,268 Mo. 339, 187 S.W. 1194;Newland v. Modern Woodmen of America,168 Mo.App. 311, 153 S.W. 1098;Harris v. Switchman's Union of North America(Mo. App.),237 S.W. 157.(b) The petition does not, either expressly or inferentially, aver that the defendant has complied with the requirements of the Fraternal Benefit Society Statute or that it has been chartered or licensed by the State of Missouri under that statute.Hence it does not show that the powers and privileges enumerated in that statute are possessed by the defendant.See cases last cited, supra;Newton County Farmers & Fruit Growers Exchange v. Railroad Co.,31 S.W.2d 805.(3) This matter is not ruled by any of the decisions cited by the appellant.Clark v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,43 S.W.2d 404;Syz v. Milkwagon Drivers' Union,24 S.W.2d 1080;Mayes v. United Garment Workers of America,6 S.W.2d 333;Wietuechter v. Miller,276 Mo. 322, 208 S.W. 39.(4) Regardless of the foregoing points the judgment of dismissal should be affirmed because the petition (which is founded upon the claim that the plaintiff's expulsion from the defendant society was wrongful) fails to state a cause of action sufficiently to give the court jurisdiction of the case.It is settled law in this State that a court will take jurisdiction of a controversy between an association and a member thereof, arising upon the member's claim that he had been wrongfully expelled, only if the membership carries with it distinct, severable property rights.State ex rel. Hyde v. Jackson County Medical Society,295 Mo. 144, 243 S.W. 341;Crutcher v. Eastern Division O. R. C.,151 Mo.App. 622, 132 S.W. 307;Hall v. Morrin, 293 S.W. 441.

Hyde, C. Ferguson and Sturgis, CC., concur.

OPINION

HYDE

This is an action for $ 31,800 actual and $ 25,000 punitive damages for wrongfully suspending appellant from respondent organization.Appellant's petition contained the following allegations concerning the character of the respondent and his connection with it, to-wit:

"Plaintiff states that the defendant, the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, is now and was at all times hereinafter mentioned, a voluntary association(italics ours) and labor union, organized outside of the State of Missouri, but since its organization and long prior to the times hereinafter mentioned, came into the State of Missouri, and established its principal office and place of business in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, and now has, and at all times hereinafter mentioned had, its principal office and place of business in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, and doing business under the name adopted by it of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers.

"Plaintiff further states that said defendant is now, and was at all times hereinafter mentioned, and long prior thereto organized and doing business in the State of Missouri, as a fraternal benefit society, having its principal office in the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, and doing business as a fraternal benefit society; being without capital stock and organized and carried on solely for the mutual benefit of its members, and their beneficiaries, and not for profit, and having a lodge system, and ritualistic form of work and representative form of government, and at all said times made provisions for the payment of benefits to its members in case of death, and provided for old age pensions, and said defendant association and organization has, and at all the times hereinafter mentioned, had more than five hundred members, and that said defendant at all said times possessed and now possesses powers and privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships, and at all said times exercised and is now exercising such powers and privileges under the laws of the State of Missouri, and that under and by virtue of the Constitution and laws of the State of Missouri, said defendant is now and at all the times hereinafter mentioned was, a corporation, having an office and place of business in the State of Missouri.

"Plaintiff further states that for many years next before the month of September, 1924, he was a member in good standing of the defendant association, being affiliated with LocalNo. 18 of said association; that said LocalNo. 18 was one of the subordinate bodies or locals of said International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, and was business agent of said LocalNo. 18.

"Plaintiff...