Ruggles v. Patton
| Decision Date | 20 February 1906 |
| Docket Number | 1,438. |
| Citation | 143 F. 312 |
| Parties | RUGGLES et al. v. PATTON. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Knappen Kleinhaus & Knappen and Dovel & Smith (Benton Hanchett, of counsel), for appellants.
Taggart Denison & Wilson, for appellee.
Before LURTON and RICHARDS, Circuit Judges, and COCHRAN, District judge.
Under a bill filed in the circuit court by C. F. Ruggles, one of the appellants, against Edward Buckley, another of the appellants, and others, the appellee, John Patton, was duly appointed receiver. The object of the bill was to wind up an alleged partnership between Ruggles and Buckley. Before any conclusion of the litigation or disposition of the property in custodia legis, Hon. Francis J. Wing, District Judge for the Northern district of Ohio, sitting under a designation in the place of District Judge Wanty, made the following order:
'In this cause the receiver, John Patton, having served substantially one year as such receiver up to January 1 1905, and not having received or withdrawn any compensation for his services, and it appearing to the court proper that he should be permitted to receive and to pay himself each year a suitable sum on account of such compensation, it is ordered that said receiver may withdraw and pay to himself the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) for the year 1904, and at the rate of the same sum for each year or part of a year thereafter, while he remains receiver, on account of such compensation, for the whole period upon the final termination of the trust, if such further allowance be deemed proper.'
From this decree this appeal has been prosecuted by the appellants named in the caption.
The motion of the appellee to dismiss the appeal as not from a final decree presents the whole substance of the errors assigned. If the order was interlocutory, it is not appealable until a final decree shall be made in respect to the receiver's compensation. Upon the other hand, if the order that the receiver shall pay to himself out of the funds in his hands as receiver the sum of $20,000 for his services for the year 1904 is a final determination of the particular matter, it is a final decree, and appealable, although the receivership shall still continue.
The question is in narrow compass. The receiver contends that the order is not final, because he construes it as a mere payment upon account, and that the fund paid to himself under the order will continue to be subject to the order of the court, and his bond responsible for obedience to any order settling his compensation at a less sum and recalling any sum received in excess of the compensation allowed upon a final statement. If this is the correct interpretation of the order, it is plainly interlocutory, and not final, and, if not final, is not appealable. The order itself bears no such interpretation. It directs the payment of $20,000 for a definite service, the service of the receiver for the year 1904. It also directs that he be paid at the same rate for his future services. The only reservation over the subject of compensation for either past or future service is found in the direction that the order is without prejudice to the allowance of 'further compensation' upon the final termination of the receivership. In other words the court in effect says:
That this order applied to the court's receiver is no test of its finality. If the receiver presents any particular matter touching his action for the court's approval, and the court upon a proper hearing decides in favor of the receiver and approves his conduct, or discharges him from liability in respect of the particular matter, would it be said that the matter would remain open and subject to reconsideration, upon the application of any one interested or upon the court's own initiative, simply because the receivership was not then terminated? The test of the finality of a decree affecting either the conduct or the...
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Rector v. United States
...the decree involves but a part of the case, yet as respects that part it is final when it awards immediate execution." In Ruggles v. Patton, 143 F. 312 (C. C. A. 6), an order, made without notice, authorizing receiver to pay himself from funds in his hands for past services rendered. The co......
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...be interested in the fund," citing 53 C. J. 314; Seabord National Bank v. Rogers Milk Produce Co. (C. C. A.), 21 F.2d 414; Ruggles v. Patton (C. C. A.), 143 F. 312; v. Morse, 193 A.D. 732, 184 N.Y.S. 441; Boice v. Conover, 54 N.J.Eq. 531, 35 A. 402; Whalen v. Pasig Iron Works, 13 Phillipine......
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...Ariz. 278, 271 P. 25; First Nat. Bank v. Stewart Fruit Co., D.C., 17 F.2d 621; Colkett v. Hammond, 101 Wash. 416, 172 P. 548; Ruggles v. Patton, 6 Cir., 143 F. 312; 1 Clark Receivers, Second Ed., § 642(i); High on Receivers, Fourth Ed., p. 959, n. 75. In his notice of motion to vacate the o......
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...to be interested in the fund. [53 C. J. 314; Seaboard National Bank v. Rogers Milk Products Co. (C. C. A.), 21 F.2d 414; Ruggles v. Patton (C. C. A.), 143 F. 312; Martin v. Morse, 193 A.D. 732, 184 N.Y.S. 441; Boice Conover, 54 N.J.Eq. 531; 35 A. 402; Whalen v. Pasig Iron Works, 13 P. I. 41......