Ruggles v. Patton, 1,438.
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
| Citation | 143 F. 312 |
| Docket Number | 1,438. |
| Parties | RUGGLES et al. v. PATTON. |
| Decision Date | 20 February 1906 |
143 F. 312
RUGGLES et al.
v.
PATTON.
No. 1,438.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
February 20, 1906
Knappen, Kleinhaus & Knappen and Dovel & Smith (Benton Hanchett, of counsel), for appellants.
Taggart, Denison & Wilson, for appellee.
Before LURTON and RICHARDS, Circuit Judges, and COCHRAN, District judge.
LURTON, Circuit Judge.
Under a bill filed in the circuit court by C. F. Ruggles, one of the appellants, against Edward Buckley, another of the appellants, and others, the appellee, John Patton, was duly appointed receiver. The object of the bill was to wind up an alleged partnership between Ruggles and Buckley. Before any conclusion of the litigation or disposition of the property in custodia legis, Hon. Francis J. Wing, District Judge for the Northern district of Ohio, sitting under a designation in the place of District Judge Wanty, made the following order:
'In this cause the receiver, John Patton, having served substantially one year as such receiver up to January 1 1905, and not having received or withdrawn any compensation for his services, and it appearing to the court proper that he should be permitted to receive and to pay himself each year a suitable sum on account of such compensation, it is ordered that said [143 F. 313] receiver may withdraw and pay to himself the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) for the year 1904, and at the rate of the same sum for each year or part of a year thereafter, while he remains receiver, on account of such compensation, for the whole period upon the final termination of the trust, if such further allowance be deemed proper.'
From this decree this appeal has been prosecuted by the appellants named in the caption.
The motion of the appellee to dismiss the appeal as not from a final decree presents the whole substance of the errors assigned. If the order was interlocutory, it is not appealable until a final decree shall be made in respect to the receiver's compensation. Upon the other hand, if the order that the receiver shall pay to himself out of the funds in his hands as receiver the sum of $20,000 for his services for the year 1904 is a final determination of the particular matter, it is a final decree, and appealable, although the receivership shall still continue.
The question is in narrow compass. The receiver contends that the order is not final, because he construes it as a mere payment upon account, and that the fund paid to himself under the order will continue to be subject to the order of the court, and his bond responsible for obedience to any order settling his compensation at a less sum and recalling any sum received in excess of the compensation allowed upon a final statement. If this is the correct interpretation of the order, it is plainly interlocutory, and not final, and, if not final, is not appealable. The order itself bears no such interpretation. It directs the payment of $20,000 for a definite service, the service of the receiver for the year 1904. It also directs that he be paid at the same rate for his future services. The only reservation over the subject of compensation for either past or future service is found in...
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Rector v. United States, No. 7172.
...decree involves but a part of the case, yet as respects that part it is final when it awards immediate execution." In Ruggles v. Patton, 143 F. 312 (C. C. A. 6), an order, made without notice, authorizing receiver to pay himself from funds in his hands for past services rendered. The court ......
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Mortimer v. Pacific States Sav. & Loan Co., 3395.
...to be heard. As was said in Weber v. Empire Holding Corporation, 149 Or. 503, 41 P.2d 1084, 1087, quoting from Ruggles v. Patton, 6 Cir., 143 F. 312, 314: "Nothing is better settled than that an allowance to a receiver by way of compensation for his services is not subject to the arbitrary ......
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Ritter v. Arizona Cattle Co., Civil 2712
...notice to all interested parties and a hearing thereon was irregular and the practice should not be encouraged. Ruggles v. Patton, (C.C.A.) 143 F. 312. We are of the opinion that the court's order approving the final account, where it appeared the expenditure was for the purpose of preservi......
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Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Rogers Milk Products Co., No. 323.
...compensation for services or expenses of a receivership may be set aside at any time before the estate is closed. See Ruggles v. Patton, 143 F. 312 (C. C. A. 6); In re De Ran, 260 F. 732 (C. C. A. 6); In re Lahongrais, 5 F.(2d) 899 (C. C. A. At the date of the order of distribution of March......
-
Rector v. United States, No. 7172.
...decree involves but a part of the case, yet as respects that part it is final when it awards immediate execution." In Ruggles v. Patton, 143 F. 312 (C. C. A. 6), an order, made without notice, authorizing receiver to pay himself from funds in his hands for past services rendered. The court ......
-
Mortimer v. Pacific States Sav. & Loan Co., 3395.
...to be heard. As was said in Weber v. Empire Holding Corporation, 149 Or. 503, 41 P.2d 1084, 1087, quoting from Ruggles v. Patton, 6 Cir., 143 F. 312, 314: "Nothing is better settled than that an allowance to a receiver by way of compensation for his services is not subject to the arbitrary ......
-
Ritter v. Arizona Cattle Co., Civil 2712
...notice to all interested parties and a hearing thereon was irregular and the practice should not be encouraged. Ruggles v. Patton, (C.C.A.) 143 F. 312. We are of the opinion that the court's order approving the final account, where it appeared the expenditure was for the purpose of preservi......
-
Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Rogers Milk Products Co., No. 323.
...compensation for services or expenses of a receivership may be set aside at any time before the estate is closed. See Ruggles v. Patton, 143 F. 312 (C. C. A. 6); In re De Ran, 260 F. 732 (C. C. A. 6); In re Lahongrais, 5 F.(2d) 899 (C. C. A. At the date of the order of distribution of March......