Ruggles v. People of the State of Illinois

• Decision Date: 07 May 1883
• Citation: 2 S.Ct. 832,27 L.Ed. 812,108 U.S. 526
• Parties: RUGGLES v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

108 U.S. 526

2 S.Ct. 832

27 L.Ed. 812

RUGGLES v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

May 7, 1883.

[Syllabus from pages 526-527 intentionally omitted]

[Statement of Case from pages 527-528 intentionally omitted] Wirt Dexter and Sidney Bartlett, for plaintiff in error.

J. K. Edsall and Jas. McCartney, for defendant in error.

WAITE, C. J.

In the view we take of this case the only question that need by considered is whether the charter of the Central Military Tract Railroad Company, one of the Illinois corporations which, through agreements of consolidation, are now represented by the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, purports on its face to grant to the company the right to fix the rates of fare and freight to be charged for the conveyance of persons and property on its railroad free of all control by the state. If, on examination, we find that no such grant was intended, it will be unnecessary to decide whether one legislature has the power to bind succeeding legislatures by a contract to that effect.

The provisions of the charter relied on to establish such a grant may be stated as follows:

On the fifth of November, 1849, an act was passed by the general assembly of Illinois 'to provide for a general system of railroad incorporation.' That act contained the following provisions:

'Sec. 12. The directors of such company shall have power to make by-laws for the management and disposition of stock, property, and business affairs of such company, not inconsistent with the laws of this state, and prescribing the duties of officers, artificers, and servants that may be employed, for the appointment of all officers for carrying on all the business within the object and purposes of such company.

'Sec. 21. Every such corporation shall possess the general powers, and be subject to the general liabilities and restrictions, expressed in the special powers following; that is to say:

* * *

'(8) To take, transport, carry, and convey persons and property on their railroad, by the force and power of steam, of animals, or any mechanical powers, or by any combination of them, and receive tolls or compensation therefor.

* * *

'(10) To regulate the time and manner in which passengers and property shall be transported, and the tolls and compensation to be paid therefor; but such compensation for any passenger and his ordinary baggage shall not exceed three cents a mile, unless by special act of the legislature, and shall be subject to alteration as hereinafter provided.

* * *

'Sec. 32. The legislature may, when any such railroad shall be opened for use, from time to time, alter or reduce the rates of toll, fare, freight, or other profits upon such road; but the same shall not, without the consent of the corporation, be so reduced as to produce with said profits less than 15 per cent. per annum on the capital actually paid in; nor unless, on an examination of the amounts received and expended, to be made by the secretary of state, he shall ascertain that the net income divided by the com- pany from all sources for the year then last past shall have exceeded an annual income of 15 per cent. upon the capital of the corporation actually paid in.'

On the fifteenth of February, 1851, another act was passed to incorporate the Central Military Tract Railroad Company, for the purpose of building and using a railroad between certain designated points. Section 3 of that act is as follows:

'Sec. 3. The said company is hereby created and incorporated for the purpose of organizing under an act entitled 'An act to provide for a general system of railroad incorporations,' in force November 5, 1849, and in all things shall be governed by the provisions thereof, and shall be entitled to have and exercise the powers and privileges and be subject to the liabilities therein enumerated: provided, that the foregoing corporation may attach themselves to and form a part of the Northern Cross Railroad Company, in such manner or on such terms as said companies shall agree.'

On the nineteenth of June, 1852, another act was passed 'to amend an act entitled 'An act to incorporate the Central Military Tract Railroad Company." The following are the parts of this amending act on which, in our opinion, the case depends:

'Sec. 5. All the corporate powers of said company shall be vested in and exercised by a board of directors, and such officers and agents as they shall appoint. * * *

'Sec. 6. The said company shall have power to make, ordain, and establish all such by-laws, rules, and regulations as may be deemed expedient and necessary to fulfill the purposes and carry into effect the provisions of this act, and for the well-ordering, regulating, and securing the affairs, business, and interest of the company: provided, that the same be not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States or of this state, or repugnant to this act. The board of directors shall have power to establish such rates of toll for the conveyance of persons or property upon the same, as they shall from time to time, by their by-laws, determine, and to levy and collect the same for the use of the said company. The transportation of persons and property, the width of track, and all other matters and things respect- ing the use of said road, shall be in conformity to such rules and rgulations as the said board of directors shall from time to time determine.'

It is contended on the part of the company that this amending act repeals clause 10 of section 21 as well as section 32 of the general railroad law, so far as they are applicable to the Central Military Tract Company, and that under section 6 of the amending act the directors have absolute control of rates of fare and freight free of legislative interference. We deem it unnecessary to determine the question of repeal, because on full consideration we are satisfied that section 6 does not have the effect that is claimed for it.

Grants of immunity from legitimate governmental control are never to be presumed. On the contrary, the presumptions are all the other way, and unless an exemption is clearly established the legislature is free to act on all subjects within its general jurisdiction, as the public interest may seem to require. As was said by Chief Justice TANEY, speaking for the court, in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11...