Ruggles v. Ruggles

• Decision Date: 16 August 1993
• Docket Number: 20639,Nos. 20547,s. 20547
• Parties: Nancy E. RUGGLES, Petitioner, v. Joseph A. RUGGLES, Respondent. Norman E. MICK, Petitioner, v. Hazel J. MICK, Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 182

860 P.2d 182

116 N.M. 52

Nancy E. RUGGLES, Petitioner, v. Joseph A. RUGGLES, Respondent.

Norman E. MICK, Petitioner, v. Hazel J. MICK, Respondent.

Nos. 20547, 20639.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Aug. 16, 1993.

[116 N.M. 54] Atkinson & Kelsey, P.A., Thomas C. Montoya, Albuquerque, for petitioner Ruggles.

Darrell N. Brantley, Alamogordo, for petitioner Mick.

Law Offices of Betty Read, Betty Read, Barbara V. Johnson, Albuquerque, for respondent Ruggles.

Burroughs & Rhodes, Jefferson R. Rhodes, Alamogordo, for respondent Mick.

OPINION

MONTGOMERY, Justice.

We granted certiorari in these cases, and consolidated them for decision, to revisit a subject of recurring concern in our case law: the proper treatment, in a proceeding to dissolve a marriage, of the spouses' community property interest in an employer-sponsored retirement plan. We deem this subject to involve an issue of substantial public interest, as contemplated by NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14(B)(4) (Repl.Pamp.1990) (conferring certiorari jurisdiction on Supreme Court in cases involving issues of substantial public interest). This Court discussed the subject most recently in Schweitzer v. Burch, 103 N.M. 612, 711 P.2d 889 (1985), in which we said (in what we shall see below was essentially dictum): "[U]pon dissolution of marriage, unless both parties agree otherwise, the trial court must divide community property retirement benefits on a 'pay as it comes in' basis." Id. at 615, 711 P.2d at 892 (emphasis added).

In the cases now under review, our Court of Appeals, in two 2-to-1 opinions by different panels, faithfully followed the Schweitzer "pay as it comes in" rule and held in effect that a nonemployee spouse is entitled, on dissolution of the marriage, to no monetary benefits representing his or her community interest in a retirement plan when the employee spouse has not yet retired. The nonemployee spouse's only entitlement on dissolution, the Court of Appeals held, is to an order that he or she will eventually, when the employee spouse actually retires and begins to receive payment of the pension provided for under the plan, receive payments of his or her share as they "come in." This is true even though the employee spouse's interest at the time of dissolution is, as it was in Ruggles,¹ fully vested and matured. Ruggles v. Ruggles, 114 N.M. 63, 68-70, 834 P.2d 940, 945-47 (Ct.App.1992); Mick v. Mick, 114 N.M. 174, 175, 836 P.2d 93, 94 (Ct.App.1992). As phrased by Judge Apodaca for the Ruggles majority, "[I]n New Mexico, unless the parties agree otherwise, the trial court must reserve jurisdiction and divide any retirement benefits on a 'pay as it comes in' basis." 114 N.M. at 68, 834 P.2d at 945.

We now withdraw Schweitzer 's rigid "pay as it comes in" mandate and return to the more flexible pre-Schweitzer formulations that permitted a trial court to award to a nonemployee spouse in a marital dissolution all or a portion of his or her community interest in a retirement plan. We hold that the preferred method of dealing with these community assets is to treat them as all other community assets are treated on dissolution--namely, to value, divide, and distribute them (or other assets with equivalent value) to the divorcing spouses. We realize that in some cases, given the innumerable variations in pension plans and the infinite variety in the circumstances of individual divorcing couples, it will not be possible or practicable to achieve this preferred method of distribution and that other methods, including the "reserved jurisdiction"" or "pay as it comes in" method, will have to be utilized. In cases such as the two before us, in which the employee spouse's interest is vested and matured, the desirability and feasibility of an immediate distribution to the nonemployee spouse are at their zenith. Consequently, we hold that in such cases the trial court should adopt as its first priority the making of a "lump sum" or other equivalent distribution to the nonemployee spouse. The Court of Appeals having ruled otherwise in these cases, its decisions are reversed and each case is remanded to the respective trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND ISSUES

The facts in the cases are relatively straightforward, although in Ruggles the parties executed a marital settlement agreement that may ultimately control the outcome of their dispute. We discuss the facts of each case, and the Court of Appeals' dispositions of the issues on appeal, in the order in which we granted certiorari and in which the cases are listed in the caption of this opinion.

A. Ruggles

Joseph and Nancy Ruggles were married on April 4, 1959. At the time of their marriage, Joseph was employed by Sandia Corporation ("Sandia") in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He began employment with Sandia on May 26, 1958, and remained continuously employed there through the time of trial. Sandia maintained a retirement plan for its employees, under which Joseph's interest was fully vested and matured at the time of trial;² he had become eligible to retire after thirty years' employment. The trial court found that as of the date of trial, June 28, 1988, Joseph would have been entitled to receive a pension of $1,570.71 per month had he elected to retire on that date. However, as of the date of trial he had not decided to retire and did not know when he would retire; he speculated that he might retire at age 63. At the time of trial he was 50.

The parties stipulated that as of June 28, 1988, Nancy owned a 48% interest in Joseph's Sandia pension benefits. Although they had entered into a comprehensive marital settlement agreement (discussed below), the agreement did not specifically provide when Nancy was to begin receiving her interest in the pension plan nor the specific dollar amount she was to receive, and these issues were disputed at trial. The court ruled that Nancy was entitled to receive 48% of $1,570.71, or $753.94, directly from Joseph, effective June 28, 1988, and continuing each month thereafter until Joseph's retirement from Sandia. At that time Nancy could receive her $753.94 directly from Sandia pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO").³ The court also found that, if Joseph retired at the time of trial (at age 50), the then present value of the benefits he would receive from Sandia was $269,854.00; that if he retired at age 55, the present value of the benefits would be $182,000.00; and that if he retired at age 65, the present value would be $48,000.00. The court summed up these findings by declaring: "The present value of Joseph Ruggles's Sandia pension benefits drops every day that passes before retirement."

As stated above, the Ruggles entered into a marital settlement agreement ("MSA") before trial. Article IV of the agreement purported to distribute the parties' community estate, including the community interest in each party's retirement benefits--Nancy's with her employer, the Albuquerque Public Schools (concerning which there is no issue on this appeal), and Joseph's with Sandia--in each case as earned from the date of marriage until February 1, 1988. The agreement did not specify when either spouse was to receive his or her community share of the other's benefits. Other provisions pertinent to the MSA will be noted later in this opinion.

At trial, each party contended that the MSA, insofar as it related to disposition of Nancy's entitlement to her community share of Joseph's retirement benefits, was unambiguous. Each party renews that contention on appeal, though Joseph also argued to the Court of Appeals that if the Court found the MSA ambiguous, it should be construed according to standard rules of construction governing ambiguous agreements. The trial court ruled that the agreement was not ambiguous and applied it in accordance with Nancy's contention: that she was entitled to receive $753.94 per month from Joseph commencing June 28, 1988, representing her interest in the Sandia pension benefits that Joseph would receive if he elected to retire at that time.

Joseph appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing generally that the trial court's rulings contravened basic principles of community property law and misapplied the parties' MSA. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the trial court's judgment. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals first considered the parties' MSA. Although the Court agreed with the trial court that the agreement was unambiguous, it disagreed with the trial court as to the meaning of the agreement and concluded that the parties had agreed that Nancy would not receive her share of Joseph's benefits until he actually retired. Ruggles, 114 N.M. at 66-67, 834 P.2d at 943-44. The Court then stated that, while the MSA was binding on the parties, the trial court had discretion to modify it to ensure "fairness." It identified the fairness in question as "the equalized division of community property upon divorce." Id. at 67, 834 P.2d at 944.

The Court of Appeals then went on to discuss the trial court's order that Joseph pay Nancy her share of the retirement benefits before he actually retired. The Court gave three reasons for rejecting Nancy's argument that Joseph should not be able to time his retirement to deprive her of her share of their community property. First, the Court said that Nancy's position was contrary to Schweitzer, which requires distribution of retirement benefits on a "pay as it comes in basis." Id. at 69, 834 P.2d at 946. The Court's second reason was that delaying Nancy's receipt of benefits until Joseph actually retired did not deprive her of any rights because her rights derived from the community's rights; since the community's right to the benefits was always subject to Joseph's decision on when to retire, so too was her community interest upon dissolution of the marriage. Id. at 69-70, 834 P.2d at 946-47. Finally, as its third reason the Court said that...