Ruhl v. Corner

• Decision Date: 12 February 1885
• Citation: 63 Md. 179
• Parties: CONRAD RUHL and Son v. JAMES J. CORNER & CO.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

63 Md. 179

CONRAD RUHL and Son v. JAMES J. CORNER & CO.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

February 12, 1885

Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City.

This is an action of assumpsit brought by the appellants against the appellee, James J. Corner, trading as James J. Corner & Co. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

First Exception.--Sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

Second Exception.--All the testimony in the record is contained in the first exception. The second exception, without referring in express terms to the first, begins as follows: "All the testimony being in, the plaintiffs offered the following prayers." The prayers offered by the plaintiffs were the three following:

1. If the jury shall find from the evidence that Oliver Merion on the 21st of January, 1882, shipped the car of flour which is the subject of suit to the defendant, and that on the 30th of that month he accepted an offer from the plaintiffs surrendered to the railroad company its receipt, which had been previously taken, took a bill of lading for said car in favor of plaintiffs and drew a draft on them, and that said draft and bill of lading were sent to plaintiffs, the draft paid and the bill of lading taken by them before the 8th of February, 1882, then said plaintiffs, as the holders of said bill of lading, had at that time the title to the property mentioned in said bill of lading unaffected by any rights or equities that may have existed between said defendant and the said Oliver Merion, and are entitled to recover in this action.

2. That under the letter of January --, 1882, the defendants were instructed by Merion not to sell the carload of 125 barrels Champion flour for less than $6 per barrel; and if the jury shall find from the evidence in the cause that the defendant sold said flour for $3.75 per barrel, without any further authority from said Merion, then said sale was without authority.

3. If the jury shall find the facts stated in the plaintiffs' first prayer, then the amount of their verdict shall be for such a sum of money as the jury shall believe is a fair equivalent for the value of the flour in Baltimore at time of said sale.

And the defendant offered the following prayer:

That if the jury shall find from the evidence that the defendant received the flour in question in good faith, and sold it for a fair market price after making usual and proper efforts to sell the same to the best advantage, and that at the time of the demand made upon him by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company for the alleged value of said flour Oliver Merion the consignor of said flour, was indebted to the defendant on the account current between them for advances made and liabilities incurred by the defendant on account of said Merion, then the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover.

The court (Stewart, J.) refused the plaintiffs' prayers, and granted the defendant's prayer. The plaintiffs excepted and the verdict and judgment being against them, appealed.

The cause was argued before ALVEY, C.J., YELLOTT, STONE, MILLER ROBINSON, IRVING and BRYAN, JJ.

W. Irvine Cross and John K. Cowen, for the appellants.

Joseph C. France and John Prentiss Poe, for the appellee.

Irving J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellee, being a commission merchant in Baltimore, between August, 1881, and January, 1882, received consignments of flour from Oliver Merion of Minneapolis, Minn., for sale upon commission. Upon the 21st of January, 1882, Merion shipped to Corner & Co., without order, a carload of "Champion" flour, being 125 barrels, by Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad and Baltimore & Ohio Railroad via Chicago. On the same day he wrote Corner & Co. advising this shipment, and naming a price at which Corner, his factor, should sell the same. No bill of lading was sent to Corner & Co., but at the time of the shipment a shipping receipt was taken from the railroad for the flour, and that, with a draft on Corner & Co. for $500, was placed in bank for transmission to Baltimore, but was subsequently withdrawn, and was never sent. Subsequent to the shipment to Corner & Co., Merion received an order for flour from Conrad Ruhl & Son of Baltimore, and decided to change the shipment and to send to Ruhl & Son this car of flour on their order. Accordingly, on the 24th of January, 1882, the railroad having been notified, its agent at Minneapolis telegraphed the Chicago agent to hold the car of flour, as Merion wished to change the consignment to Ruhl & Son. On the 30th of January the original receipt was surrendered to the railroad agent at Minneapolis, and a bill of lading for the flour was taken out to Ruhl & Son. The agent on the 24th had taken steps to have the address of Corner & Co. removed from the car, and to have that of Ruhl & Son substituted. He telegraphed to Chicago directing this change to be made, but it was neglected, and the flour came through to Baltimore labeled for Corner & Co., and was delivered to them, the Baltimore agents of the railroad not being advised of the change of destination, and Corner & Co. as yet having received no information of Merion's change of purpose, and the actual consignment, by bill of lading, to Ruhl & Son. The proof shows that on the 24th of January, three days after the shipment spoken of, but before Corner knew of it, he wrote to Merion advising against further shipment unless Merion chose to ship a car of "Clematis" flour, without draft, as the margins on the flour still on hand were exhausted. On the 26th of January Corner acknowledged the receipt of the letter telling him of the shipment of "Champion," promising it should be sold for the best prices, and saying, "we note you have not made draft on this car, as if in anticipation of our request of the 24th to send us a car without draft to cover the margins on shipments now on hand."

Corner says in the testimony he sold the flour on the 9th of February, although on the 27th of February he wrote Merion he had received no offers, and does not apprise him of a sale until the 4th of March.

The bill of lading, though issued on the 30th of January, was dated back to the 21st of January to correspond with the actual shipment. This bill of lading in favor of Ruhl & Son, with draft on them for $615, was presented by Merion to the Security Bank of Minnesota, and the draft was cashed by the bank, which sent both bill of lading and draft to the Bank of Commerce in Baltimore, at which bank Ruhl & Son paid the draft and received in consideration of such payment, viz., the bill of lading for the flour. Ascertaining the flour had been received by Corner, appellants in the latter part of February, or early in March, demanded payment for the same, and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad also in March demanded the flour.

Upon this state of facts the question arises, who was entitled to this flour-- the appellants, or the appellee? It is conceded that no bill of lading or invoice was ever sent to or received by Corner; whereas it is equally well established, and not denied, that Ruhl & Sons did receive a bill of lading, and did pay a draft on them for $615 on it.

The appellants insist that although the flour was originally shipped to Corner & Co., it was so shipped without their order, and that afterwards, and while it was in the power of the shipper to do so, the consignment was changed, and the flour was sold to Ruhl & Sons, to whom a bill of lading and draft were sent, and who paid therefor. They claim that title never passed from Merion to Corner & Co., but that it did pass to Ruhl & Son. The appellants further and strongly relied on the Act of 1876, ch. 262, in respect to bills of lading, and the effect of the possession of such bills of lading upon title. But the decision of this case does not involve any consideration by the court of the effect of the Act of 1876, or what construction shall be given it, for there are well-settled principles established and acted upon in very many cases, which will control the decision of this case irrespective of any Act of Assembly.

It is the well-settled law that the delivery of goods to a common carrier for one who has purchased, and who has ordered them is a delivery to the purchaser,...