RUHL v. RUHL.

Decision Date03 May 1884
Citation24 W.Va. 279
PartiesRUHL v. RUHL.
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
1. A special commissioner in a chancery cause or a receiver of the

court is simply an officer of the court, and as such he has no right to intermeddle in questions affecting the rights of the parties or the disposition of the property or funds in his hands. His holding is the holding of the court, and he cannot interfere in the litigation or ask for the revision of any order or decree affecting the rights or claims of the parties; but when his own accounts or his personal rights are affected, he has the same means of redress, that any other party so affected would have, (p. 282.)

2. Where a court makes a void decree, by which it directs its receiver

to pay over funds in his hands, and for his failure to obey such decree attaches and imprisons him, such receiver is entitled to have such order of imprisonment reviewed (p. 282.)

3. A contempt of court is in the-nature of a criminal offence; and

the proceeding for its punishment is criminal in its character. Consequently, the proceedings after the attachment issues are distinct from the suit, in which the contempt was committed, and should be entered separately and entitled in the name of State against the offender. If the inferior court fails so to enter the proceedings, that will be error for which the Appellate Court will on an appeal by the offender reverse so much of the decree, if improper on its merits, as orders his punishment, (p. 283.)

4. It is no contempt to disobey an order or decree, which the court

had no jurisdiction or legal authority to make. Such an order is void." (p. 283.)

5. After the close of the term the parties to a cause, in which a final decree has been pronounced, are no longer in court; and no further order or decree as to them can be made therein, unless they are again brought into court by bill of review or by some other recognized legal method. After a final decree the court has no further jurisdiction either of the subject-matter or of the parties; and all subsequent orders or decrees entered without notice to the parties are void. (p. 284.)

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

W. P. Hubbard for appellant. II. M. Russel for appellee. Snyder, Judge:

This suit was pending in the municipal court of Wheeling prior to and on the 9th day of February, 1878, and on that day said court entered a decree therein confirming the report and sale of certain real estate made by Dennis O'Keeffe special commissioner, in pursuance of a former decree in the cause and directing said commissioner to withdraw the sale bonds for the deferred payments and collect the same as they should become due, "and that, after paying costs which may hereafter accrue in this cause out of the proceeds thereof, to pay the residue in equal parts to the said complainant, John Ruhl, and the said John T. Sullivan, guardian of the defendant, Joseph Ruhl, for the' use of his ward."

After said term no order was made in the cause except an order of continuance, entered in March, 1878, until the order of June 5, 1880, hereinafter mentioned, was made.

One Thomas W. Weitzel, who had brought an action of assumpsit in the circuit court of Ohio county against Joseph F. Ruhl, a non-resident ot this State, caused the clerk of said circuit court to issue an order of attachment against the estate of said Ruhl, designating by a memorandum endorsed thereon that Dennis O'Keeffe and others were debtors of said Ruhl and requiring them to appear at the next term of said court and answer, &c. This order was served on the garnishees and at the March term, 1879, an order of publication having been executed against the defendant, the said Ruhl, and he failing to appear, the court ascertained that the said defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of two hundred and twenty-six dollars and nineteen cents, and continued the case. On May 5, 1880, the said circuit court after reciting that it appeared from the answer of Dennis O'Keeffe that he, "as special commissioner in the chancery cause of John Ruhl v. Joseph Ruhl, held" two sale notes for the land sold as aforesaid in the proceeds of which the said Joseph F. Ruhl had an interest, declared that the plaintiff's order of attachment was a lien on the said interest of the defendant in said proceeds to the extent of the plaintiff's claim and costs, but declined to make any order in relation to said fund and gave the plaintiff leave to apply to the municipal court for such order and relief as that court might deem proper for the enforcement of the plaintiff's lien.

Weitzel exhibited this order to the municipal court and on June 5, 1880, that court made an order directing said O'Keeffe, special commissioner, out of the interest of Joseph Ruhl in the proceeds of said sale notes, to pay under the order of the circuit court, the plaintiff's said judgment and costs. And on the same day the circuit court made a like order directing said special commissioner, out of said Joseph Ruhl's interest in said proceeds, to "hold and pay out under the order of this court an amount of money sufficient to pay off and satisfy the lien of the plaintiff amounting to two hundred and twenty-six dollars and nineteen cents with interest and costs.

The municipal court, on June 9, 1882, upon the motion and affidavit of Weitzel, ordered a rule to issue against Dennis O'Keeffe requiring him to appear and show cause why he should not be attached, &c, for his failure to comply with the said order of the circuit court and of this court entered June 5, 1880. This rule having been served on O'Keeffe, he gave written notice to Weitzel that he would, for errors assigned in said notice, move the municipal court to set aside and reverse its said order of June 5, 1880.

On March 19, 1883, the municipal court overruled said motion to set aside and reverse said order of June 5, 1880, and refused to discharge the rule against O'Keeffe. The decree then proceeds as follows: "And the said O'Keeffe not showing nor asking to be allowed to show any further or other cause why he should not be attached or otherwise proceeded against for his failure to comply with the order of this court made on the 5th day of June, 1880, and with the order of the circuit court of Ohio county, mentioned in said rule, it is ordered that the sergeant of the city of Wheeling do attach the body of the said Dennis O'Keeffe and keep him in safe custody in the jail of Ohio county aforesaid until the further order of this court."

On the petition of Dennis O'Keeffe he was allowed by this Court an appeal and supersedeas from this decree and the order entered by.the municipal court on June 5, 1880.

The appellee, Thomas W. Weitzel, claims that the rights and duties of the appellant are in this cause merely those or a special receiver and that he is, therefore, not entitled to appeal. Blair v. Core, 20 W. Va. 255; In re Colvin, 3 Md. Ch. Dec. 303.

It must be conceded that a receiver or commissioner, such as the appellant here, is but an officer of the court and he has no right to intermeddle in questions affecting the rights of the parties or the disposition of the property or funds in his hands. His holding is the holding of the court for him, from whom the possession is taken, and he has no more right to interfere in the litigation or ask for a revision of a decree or order affecting the rights or claims of the parties than an entire stranger to the cause. But where his own accounts or his personal rights are affected, he must necessarily have the same means of redress that any other party so affected would have. Hinchley v. Railroad Co., 94 IT. S. 467; Horey v. McDonald, 109 Id. 140; Grinnan v. Long, 22 W. Ya. 693.

It cannot be doubted that, where a court makes a void decree by which it directs its receiver to pay over funds in his hands and,-because he fails to obey such void decree, attaches and imprisons him for an indefinite time, the receiver is entitled to have such order of imprisonment reviewed. If the decree was void he was not bound to obey it, and he certainly could not be punished for refusing to do what he was under no legal obligation to do. Allegheny Bank's Appeal, 48 Pa. St. 328, 334. If he is not entitled to have the proceedings reviewed in such case he must either violate his duty and thereby, perhaps, subject himself to liability for the fund, or he must content himself to remain in prison until the court sees proper to discharge him. In the one event his accounts as receiver may be affected and, in the other, he is deprived of his liberty; so it seems.to me entirely clear that he is entitled to have the matter reviewed by the Appellate Court.

It is claimed however, that so much of the decree of March 19, 1883, in this cause as pertains to the proceeding against the appellant for contempt, cannot be reviewed on appeal, but only, it at all, on a writ of error. Bait. $ Ohio R. R. Co. v. Wheeling, 13 Gratt. 40. As a general proposition, I think this position is correct. A contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal offense, and the proceeding for its punishment, is in its character a criminal proceeding. Before the attachment for the contempt issues the proceedings are to be entitled in the names of the parties to the suit, but afterwards in the name of the State. State ex. rel. v. Ihe Harper's Ferry Bridge Co. 16 W. Va. 864. According to this authority the court below should have entitled the proceedings after the return of the rule against O'Keeffe in the name of the State, and made it a separate and distinct proceeding, and entered a separate order in relation thereto. From such an order a writ of error could have been taken. But no such order was made by the municipal court in this cause. It follows then that said court erred in...

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