Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co., 98470
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | Ginsburg |
| Citation | 526 U.S. 574,143 L.Ed.2d 760,119 S.Ct. 1563 |
| Docket Number | 98470 |
| Decision Date | 17 May 1999 |
| Parties | 145 F.3d 211, reversed and remanded. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES470 RUHRGAS AG, PETITIONER v. MARATHON OIL COMPANY et al. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [ |
119 S.Ct. 1563
143 L.Ed.2d 760
145 F.3d 211, reversed and remanded.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 98 470
RUHRGAS AG, PETITIONER
v.
MARATHON OIL COMPANY et al.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[May 17, 1999]
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the authority of the federal courts to adjudicate controversies. Jurisdiction to resolve cases on the merits requires both authority over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and authority over the parties (personal jurisdiction), so that the court's decision will bind them. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), this Court adhered to the rule that a federal court may not hypothesize subject-matter jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits. Steel Co. rejected a doctrine, once approved by several Courts of Appeals, that allowed federal tribunals to pretermit jurisdictional objections "where (1) the merits question is more readily resolved, and (2) the prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction denied." Id., at 93. Recalling "a long and venerable line of our cases," id., at 94, Steel Co. reiterated: "The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter is'inflexible and without exception,' " id., at 94 95 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)); for "[j]urisdiction is power to declare the law," and " '[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause,' " 523 U.S., at 94 (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869)). The Court, in Steel Co., acknowledged that "the absolute purity" of the jurisdiction-first rule had been diluted in a few extraordinary cases, 523 U.S., at 101, and Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, joined the majority on the understanding that the Court's opinion did not catalog "an exhaustive list of circumstances" in which exceptions to the solid rule were appropriate, id., at 110.
Steel Co. is the backdrop for the issue now before us: If, as Steel Co. held, jurisdiction generally must precede merits in dispositional order, must subject-matter jurisdiction precede personal jurisdiction on the decisional line? Or, do federal district courts have discretion to avoid a difficult question of subject-matter jurisdiction when the absence of personal jurisdiction is the surer ground? The particular civil action we confront was commenced in state court and removed to federal court. The specific question on which we granted certiorari asks "[w]hether a federal district court is absolutely barred in all circumstances from dismissing a removed case for lack of personal jurisdiction without first deciding its subject-matter jurisdiction." Pet. for Cert. i.
We hold that in cases removed from state court to federal court, as in cases originating in federal court, there is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy. Customarily, a federal court first resolves doubts about its jurisdiction over the subject matter, but there are circumstances in which a district court appropriately accords priority to a personal jurisdiction inquiry. The proceeding before us is such a case.
I
The underlying controversy stems from a venture to produce gas in the Heimdal Field of the Norwegian North Sea. In 1976, respondents Marathon Oil Company and Marathon International Oil Company acquired Marathon Petroleum Company (Norway) (MPCN) and respondent Marathon Petroleum Norge (Norge). See App. 26.1 Before the acquisition, Norge held a license to produce gas in the Heimdal Field; following the transaction, Norge assigned the license to MPCN. See Record, Exhs. 61 and 62 to Document 64. In 1981, MPCN contracted to sell 70% of its share of the Heimdal gas production to a group of European buyers, including petitioner Ruhrgas AG. See Record, Exh. 1 to Document 63, pp. 90, 280. The parties' agreement was incorporated into the Heimdal Gas Sales Agreement (Heimdal Agreement), which is "governed by and construed in accordance with Norwegian Law," Record, Exh. B, Tab 1 to Pet. for Removal, Heimdal Agreement, p. 102; disputes thereunder are to be "exclusively and finally settled by arbitration in Stockholm, Sweden, in accordance with" International Chamber of Commerce rules, id., at 100.
II
Marathon Oil Company, Marathon International Oil Company, and Norge (collectively, Marathon) filed this lawsuit against Ruhrgas in Texas state court on July 6, 1995, asserting state-law claims of fraud, tortious interference with prospective business relations, participation in breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. See App. 33 40. Marathon Oil Company and Marathon International Oil Company alleged that Ruhrgas and the other European buyers induced them with false promises of "premium prices" and guaranteed pipeline tariffs to invest over $300 million in MPCN for the development of the Heimdal Field and the erection of a pipeline to Ruhrgas' plant in Germany. See id., at 26 28; Brief for Respondents 1 2. Norge alleged that Ruhrgas' effective monopolization of the Heimdal gas diminished the value of the license Norge had assigned to MPCN. See App. 31, 33, 357; Brief for Respondents 2. Marathon asserted that Ruhrgas had furthered its plans...
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1787 practice notes
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State v. Wayfair, Inc., 3:16–CV–03019–RAL
...U.S.C. § 1447(c) ; United States v. Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ; Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. , 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999). A case may only be removed to federal court where the federal court would have had original ju......
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...of Section 230, we must independently ensure the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. , 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999). Plaintiffs allege that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), we have diversity jurisdiction over their foreign......
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Lujan v. City of Santa Fe, No. CIV. 13–0438 JB/SMV.
...jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party."Motion at 7–8 (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) ).Second, M. Lujan says that the Court applied the incorrect standard in the MOO to determine whether "the......
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Palmer v. University of Medicine and Dentistry, Civil Action No. 08-3066 (JAG).
...delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level." Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760...
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1733 cases
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State v. Wayfair, Inc., 3:16–CV–03019–RAL
...U.S.C. § 1447(c) ; United States v. Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ; Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. , 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999). A case may only be removed to federal court where the federal court would have had original ju......
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Covenant v. Trump, No. 18-17274
...we address it here as a threshold issue.6 We have a continuing obligation to assure our jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. , 526 U.S. 574, 583–84, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears ... that the court lacks jurisdiction of the s......
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Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 16-CV-4453 (NGG) (LB) 16-CV-5158 (NGG) (LB).
...there is no such required ordering as between questions of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586–87, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) ; Carver v. Nassau Cty. Interim Fin. Auth., 730 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that courts......
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Turedi v. Coca Cola Co., No. 05 Civ. 9635.
...Oil Co. the Supreme Court equated dismissals predicated on the absence of personal jurisdiction to those based on "non-merits grounds." 526 U.S. 574, 584, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999). It held that because such actions do not entail exercise of judicial power to adjudicate the mer......
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1 firm's commentaries
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To Plead Or Not To Plead Citizenship? That Is The Question (Among Others) For Limited Liability Companies Asserting Diversity Jurisdiction
...11 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing Ruhgras AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 12 2022 WL 16954346, 'F.4th' (4th Cir. 2022). 13 See Compl., Capps v. Newmark Southern Region, LLC, No. 5:18-cv-00133-FL (ECF No. 1, March 29, 2018); Answer to Compl. And Countercla......
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DEFERRING TO FOREIGN COURTS.
...dismissals are still based on the assumption that the court has proper jurisdiction over the dispute. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marahon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999) (explaining hypothetical (195) See infra subsection II.A.2. (196) See, e.g., Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 75 (citing plaintiff's safety-......
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TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY: COMPETING MOTIONS IN THE SHADOW OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION.
...of Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Company, 526 U.S. 574, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999), and Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 127 S.C......