Ruiz De Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency

• Decision Date: 14 February 2002
• Docket Number: Nos. Civ.A. 96-BE-3166-S, Civ.A. 00-BE-2172-S.,s. Civ.A. 96-BE-3166-S, Civ.A. 00-BE-2172-S.
• Citation: 220 F.Supp.2d 1249
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
• Parties: Eladio RUIZ DE MOLINA, Plaintiff, v. MERRITT & FURMAN INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., et al, Defendants. Merritt & Furman Insurance Agency, Inc., et al, Plaintiffs, v. Worldwide Marine Underwriters, Inc., et al., Defendants.

220 F.Supp.2d 1249

Eladio RUIZ DE MOLINA, Plaintiff, v. MERRITT & FURMAN INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., et al, Defendants.

Merritt & Furman Insurance Agency, Inc., et al, Plaintiffs, v. Worldwide Marine Underwriters, Inc., et al., Defendants.

Nos. Civ.A. 96-BE-3166-S, Civ.A. 00-BE-2172-S.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

February 14, 2002.

W. Lee Pittman, J. Chris Cochran, Pittman Hooks Dutton & Hollis, Birmingham, AL, for plaintiff.

L. Graves Stiff, III, Elise May Frohsin, J. Scott Dickens, Starnes & Atchison LLP, Birmingham, AL, Vernon L. Wells, II, Emily Sides Bonds, Leland Lawson Price, Alan Warfield, Walston Wells Anderson & Bains, Birmingham, AL, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOWDRE, District Judge.

This case is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Worldwide Marine Underwriters, Inc. ("WMU") and Robert Luellen as to the claims asserted against them by the plaintiff Eladio Ruiz de Molina. The defendants assert that the plaintiff's claims against them are barred as a matter of law because the plaintiff previously received and accepted satisfaction of the judgments entered in this action against the other defendants Merritt & Furman Insurance Agency, Inc. and Frank Smith, alleged joint tortfeasors. For the reasons stated herein, the court agrees with these defendants and enters summary judgment in their favor and against the plaintiff.

FACTS¹ AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because the issue presented by the present motion is one of law, few facts are critical to the court's ruling. However, the background facts enlighten the context in which the question of law arises.

In August of 1995, Mr. Ruiz de Molina contacted Frank Smith, an agent of Merritt & Furman, about insurance on the Ariel II if she were moored in Mexico. Smith contacted Robert Luellen, an insurance broker in Michigan with WMU, and obtained a verbal quote, followed by a fax, for insurance on the Ariel II if moored in Mexico. Smith transmitted that quote to Ruiz de Molina. Ruiz de Molina subsequently decided to moor the Ariel II in Florida instead, and contacted Smith in early December, requesting that insurance be bound with a mooring in Florida. He requested a written binder of the coverage. Smith contacted Luellen again to obtain a new quote and sent a fax to Luellen on December 6 requesting that coverage be bound. As Smith testified in the prior trial, he had several phone conversations with Luellen concerning the placement of coverage and Luellen allegedly informed him that coverage could be bound. Smith faxed a binder to Ruiz de Molina indicating that coverage was effective that day, December 6.

On December 8, Ruiz de Molina and Ariel II left Fairhope, Alabama, for Ft. Myers, Florida. En route, the boat was damaged by a storm at sea on or about December 9, 1995. Unfortunately, no insurance had been procured to cover the damages to the Ariel II.

This lawsuit grew out of a failure to obtain insurance coverage for the plaintiff's Gulfstar sloop the Ariel II. The dispute actually resulted in two lawsuits, which have been consolidated. In the first suit, the plaintiff, an Alabama resident, sued Merritt & Furman, a Florida insurance broker, Frank Smith, its agent, Worldwide Marine Underwriters, a Michigan insurance broker, and Robert Luellen, its agent. Merritt & Furman and Smith cross-claimed against WMU and Luellen seeking indemnity and allegeding breach of contract, negligence and fraud. WMU and Luellen moved to dismiss all claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. That motion was granted without prejudice because of lack of in personam jurisdiction.

Ruiz de Molina's case proceeded to trial against the remaining defendants, Merritt & Furman, and Smith. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding Merritt & Furman liable for breach of contract, and Merritt & Furman and Smith liable for negligence and innocent misrepresentation. The jury assessed damages for breach of contract at $59,774.53, and at a total of $136,170.28 on the other counts against both defendants, which included $90,000 assessed as mental anguish. Because the court found that none of the claims on which the jury found the defendants liable would not support a claim for mental anguish damages, the trial court reduced the amount of the judgment by $90,000.

The plaintiff appealed the reduction of the judgment and the dismissal of WMU and Luellen to the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the reduction of the damage award, but reversed the dismissal of WMU and Luellen, finding that these defendants had "purposefully availed themselves of the opportunity to do business with an Alabama resident in Alabama. Since plaintiff's claim arises out of defendants' forum-related activities — the procurement of his insurance policy — jurisdiction over them for this specific claim is appropriate." Ruiz de Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, Inc., 207 F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir.2000).

In the meantime, after the dismissal of WMU and Luellen in this case but prior to the appeal, defendants Smith and Merritt & Furman filed a separate lawsuit against them in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to preserve their claims against WMU and Luellen. After the Eleventh Circuit mandate, the Florida court transferred the action pending there to this court where the Florida case was consolidated with the original Ruiz de Molina action.

The issue presented by the motion for summary judgment is a relatively simple, straightforward one: does the acceptance by the plaintiff of the payment in full by defendants Merritt & Furman and Smith of the judgment previously entered in this case constitute complete satisfaction and thereby discharge these defendants even though the plaintiff sought to preserve his claims against these defendants by executing a pro tanto release?

The facts presented regarding this issue are not in dispute: the plaintiff received a judgment against Merritt & Furman and Smith for $105,944.71 arising out of the failure to procure insurance coverage for the Ariel II; after the Eleventh Circuit opinion was issued, the plaintiff received on behalf of those defendants a check for $114,045.89 dated June 14, 2000.² On August 16, 2001, the plaintiff executed a pro tanto release that purported to release only Merritt & Furman and Smith and to retain the right to pursue his claims against WMU and Luellen.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is proper when no genuine issue of material fact exists and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Mitchell v. USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir.1999); Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.1990). The moving party always shoulders the initial burden of supporting its motion and submitting evidence to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant meets this burden by presenting evidence that shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, or by establishing that the nonmoving party cannot present evidence to support an element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on the pleadings or mere allegations but must offer evidence of specific facts showing that a genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Disputes as to the facts present a genuine issue of material fact if the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To create a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Not every dispute regarding a fact is a material one sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In evaluating the evidence, the court should not make determinations about credibility or weight of evidence; nor should the court draw inferences from the facts as these are the province of the jury; therefore, the court should believe the evidence submitted by the nonmoving party and should give the nonmovant the benefit of justifiable and reasonable inferences in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Crawford v. Babbitt 186 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir.1999) quoting Witter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 138 F.3d 1366, 1369 (11th Cir.1998), Brown v. Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir.1988). The court must grant summary judgment if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

ONE CAUSE OF ACTION AND ONE SATISFACTION

The defendants assert that the plaintiff's claims against them are barred as a matter of law because plaintiff has already obtained judgments against defendants Merritt & Furman and Smith, co-defendants and alleged joint tortfeasors in this action, to compensate him for the injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of the denial of insurance coverage for the damage to the Ariel II. Those judgments have been satisfied and paid in full. These defendants argue that plaintiff now seeks to recover, for a second time, compensation for the same injuries for which he has already once been compensated. Movants Worldwide Marine Underwriter's Inc.'s and Robert Luellen's Second Initial Submission in Response to Exhibit D of the Court's Order 4 (Sep. 25, 2001) (hereinafter "Defs.' Second Initial Submission").

The...