Ruiz-Pagan v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R.
| Decision Date | 14 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL 18-1622(RAM) |
| Parties | ALFREDO G. RUIZ-PAGAN Plaintiff v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF PUERTO RICO Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Pending before the Court is Defendant the Department of Education of Puerto Rico's (“DOE” or “Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 19). For reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the pending Motion to Dismiss.
On August 29, 2018, Plaintiff Alfredo G. Ruiz-Pagan (“Plaintiff”), represented by his mother Leticia Pagan, filed a pro se Complaint against the DOE for alleged violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA” or “Act”) 20 U.S.C. §§ 100 et seq. (Docket No. 1). Plaintiff claims that the DOE: (1) did not complete his transition to either the world of work or toward an independent life; (2) did not provide “due process” when exiting him from the Special Education Program; (3) improperly limited access to his records; and (4) failed to provide and pay for all the Special Education and Related Services from August 2013 through May 2016, as required by the Individualized Education Program (“IEP”). Id. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that he received special education services from a private school, instead of from the DOE, for the following academic years: 2014-2015; 20152016; 2016-2017; and August 2017 - January 2018. Id. Accordingly, the relief sought consists of the cost for special education that Plaintiff was entitled to during the aforementioned academic years but that the DOE neither provided nor reimbursed. Id. Per the Complaint, the total cost of special education and related services (e.g., therapies, transportation, etc.) amounts to $68,480.00. Id.
On July 16, 2019, the case was automatically stayed pursuant to the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”), 48 U.S.C. §§ 2102-2241. (Docket No. 12). A stipulation modifying the stay in this case was made between the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Plaintiff on September 27, 2021, and the Court lifted the stay the next day. (Docket Nos. 15-16).
On November 10, 2021, the DOE filed its Motion to Dismiss.
(Docket No. 19). Essentially, it argues Plaintiff's claims regarding academic school years between 2013 and 2016 are time-barred in light of the IDEA's two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 9-10. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C)). Moreover, the DOE maintains that Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies regarding his claims as to the 2016-2017 and August 2017 - January 2018 school years. Id. at 11-12. Alongside its motion, Defendant attached the DOE Resolution, dated May 31, 2018, of Plaintiff's Administrative Complaint which only references claims made up to and including the 2015-2016 academic year. (Docket No. 24-1). Furthermore, Defendant highlighted that per the DOE Resolution, Plaintiff was 25 years old when he was discharged from the Special Education Program on June 10, 2014, and 29 years old when the Resolution was issued. Id. at 8-9. The DOE Resolution further notes that Plaintiff did not agree with being discharged from the program and has since filed several prior complaints, which were all dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.
Following extensive briefing regarding whether counsel should be appointed, Plaintiff filed his Opposition to Motion to Dismiss on July 12, 2022. (Docket No. 60). Plaintiff asserts that the two-year statute of limitations does not apply if the agency withheld information, as was alleged in the Complaint. Id. at 7. Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that he did not have to exhaust administrative remedies if doing so would be futile. Id. On August 3, 2022, the DOE filed a Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 63).
Federal courts are courts “of limited jurisdiction, limited to deciding certain cases and controversies.” Belsito Commc'ns, Inc. v. Decker, 845 F.3d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 2016). The “party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of demonstrating its existence.” Fina Air Inc. v. United States, 555 F.Supp.2d 321, 323 (D.P.R. 2008). Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A defendant may challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction either through a “facial attack” or a “factual attack.” Id.
“In a facial attack, a defendant argues that the plaintiff did not properly plead jurisdiction.” Compagnie Mar. Marfret v. San Juan Bay Pilots Corp., 532 F.Supp.2d 369, 373 (D.P.R. 2008) (quotation omitted). The court must take all the allegations in the complaint as true and determine if the plaintiff sufficiently evinced a basis of subject matter jurisdiction. See Torres-Negron v. J & N Records, LLC, 504 F.3d 151, 162 (1st Cir. 2007). Whereas “a factual attack asserts that jurisdiction is lacking on the basis of facts outside of the pleadings.” Compagnie Mar. Marfret, 532 F.Supp.2d at 373 (quotations omitted). When facing a factual attack, the court is “not confined to the allegations in the complaint and ‘can look beyond the pleadings to decide factual matters relating to jurisdiction.'” Rivera Torres v. Junta de Retiro Para Maestros, 502 F.Supp.2d 242, 247 n.3 (D.P.R. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) requires dismissal of a complaint that “fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must plead enough facts to state a claim that is “plausible” on its face, and the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, [...] on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) . ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotations marks, citations and footnote omitted). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Further, a complaint will not stand if it offers only “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
To determine whether a complaint has stated a plausible, non-speculative claim for relief, courts must treat non-conclusory factual allegations as true. See Nieto-Vicenty v. Valledor, 984 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.P.R. 2013) . They may also consider: “(a) ‘implications from documents' attached to or fairly ‘incorporated into the complaint,'(b) ‘facts' susceptible to ‘judicial notice,' and (c) ‘concessions' in plaintiff's ‘response to the motion to dismiss.'” Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).
The IDEA was enacted “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education [(“FAPE”)] that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (d)(1)(A). See also C.G. ex rel. A.S. v. Five Town Cmty. Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 279, 284 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Five Town”) (); Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S.Ct. 743, 748 (2017). Specifically, the IDEA allocates federal funding to states in exchange for their commitment to ensure that FAPE “is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a) (1) (A) (emphasis added) . See also Arroyo-Delgado v. Dep't of Educ. of Puerto Rico, 199 F.Supp.3d 548, (D.P.R. 2016) (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 18, § 1352(2)) ( that Puerto Rico law protects the right of disabled individuals to free education from birth through the age of 21 years.).
The IDEA “provides a framework for parents to commence an administrative process [conducted by the local or state educational agency] to raise complaints ‘with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.'” Valentin-Marrero v. Puerto Rico, 29 F.4th 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A)). See also Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 2002); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)-(g). Furthermore, “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [at the administrative hearing] shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section [in state or federal court].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
However before doing so, the IDEA mandates that parties must exhaust the administrative procedures outlined in the Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1). See also Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S.Ct. 743, 755 (2017) (). The First Circuit recently underscored the importance of exhausting the IDEA's administrative procedures by explaining that the fact “[t]hat the IDEA provides for judicial review of administrative decisions is ‘by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.'” Valentin-Marr...
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