Ruiz v. Estelle, s. 81-2224

Decision Date14 January 1982
Docket NumberNos. 81-2224,81-2380 and 81-2390,s. 81-2224
Citation666 F.2d 854
PartiesDavid R. RUIZ, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee, v. W. J. ESTELLE, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Mark White, Atty. Gen. of Tex., Ed Idar, Jr., Douglas M. Becker, Asst. Attys. Gen., Pike Powers, Kenneth L. Petersen, Jr., Austin, Tex., Lee C. Clyburn, William R. Pakalka, Jerry E. Smith, Houston, Tex., Keith A. Jones, Washington, D. C., for defendants-appellants.

Donald W. Jackson, Edward J. Landry, Asst. County Attys., Houston, Tex., for Heard.

William Bennett Turner, San Francisco, Cal., Joel Berger, New York City, Samuel T. Biscoe, Dallas, Tex., for Ruiz, et al.

Jim D. Wiginton, Angleton, Tex., for L. D. Hilliard.

Dennis J. Dimsey, W. Bradford Reynolds, Attys., Appellate Section, Civ. Rights Div., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for the U. S.

David Crump, Susan E. Waite, The Legal Foundation of America, Houston, Tex., for amicus, The Legal Foundation of America.

Alvin J. Bronstein, Elizabeth Alexander, ACLU, Washington, D. C., for amicus, ACLU-National Prison Project.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before CHARLES CLARK, Chief Judge, RUBIN and TATE, Circuit Judges.

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:

The State of Texas for the second time asks us to stay some of the provisions of the injunctive decree rendered by the district court. 1 The decree requires the Texas Department of Corrections ("TDC") to make numerous changes in its prisons and their administration. In Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (Ruiz I ), we granted a stay of some provisions of the decree. The State then requested a stay of other provisions of the decree, first in the district court and then by appeal from the district court's refusal to grant the requested relief. 2 We provisionally granted the stay requested in the second motion so that we could fully consider the briefs and hear oral argument. As in Ruiz I, we act separately on each of the specific issues presented; we grant the motion in part and deny it in part.

I

In Ruiz I, we reviewed the criteria to be applied in determining whether an appellate court should stay an injunction pending appeal. So well-established in this circuit as to be a rubric, these criteria are:

(1) whether the movant has made a showing of likelihood of success on the merits, (2) whether the movant has made a showing of irreparable injury if the stay is not granted, (3) whether the granting of the stay would substantially harm the other parties, and (4) whether the granting of the stay would serve the public interest.

Ruiz I, 650 F.2d at 565 (citing cases). 3 The party who seeks a stay bears the burden of establishing these prerequisites. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 532 F.2d 1001, 1002 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); see Dendy v. Washington Hosp. Center, 581 F.2d 990, 992 (D.C.Cir.1978) (per curiam); Long v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1970) (order by Winter, J.). 4

In granting the stay in Ruiz I, we held that "on motions for stay pending appeal the movant need not always show a 'probability' of success on the merits; instead, the movant need only present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is involved and show that the balance of the equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay." 650 F.2d at 565 (emphasis added). In the short time that has elapsed since Ruiz I, many applicants for stay seem to have assumed that Ruiz I was a coup de grace for the likelihood-of-success criterion in this circuit. This assumption, however, is unwarranted, for it ignores the careful language of Ruiz

                I.  5  Likelihood of success remains a prerequisite in the usual case even if it is not an invariable requirement.  Only "if the balance of equities (i.e. consideration of the other three factors) is ... heavily tilted in the movant's favor" will we issue a stay in its absence, and, even then, the issue must be one with patent substantial merit. Id. at 565-66 (emphasis added).  Guided by these considerations, we consider the State's present motion.  In acting on it, whether favorably or unfavorably, we intimate no predetermination of the decision on the merits with regard to the entire decree or any aspect of it
                
II
A. Dormitory Space Requirements

The district court's decree forbids TDC to "accept any further prisoners" if, by November 1, 1981, it has not reduced the "overall TDC population to a figure equal to twice the number of general population cells, plus the number of prisoners who can be housed in dormitories that afford forty square feet (excluding bathing, toilet and activity areas) per prisoner." Part I(B)(2). By November 1, 1982, TDC must calculate its permissible overall population on the basis of sixty square feet per dormitory prisoner. Part I(B)(3). 6 The decree also forbids TDC, after November 1, 1981, to "confine any prisoner to a dormitory providing less than forty square feet per prisoner," and, after November 1, 1982, less than sixty square feet per prisoner. Part I(F). Finally, the decree requires that, in "any new units for housing prisoners," TDC provide at least sixty square feet of space for "(a)ll prisoners classified as minimum security prisoners" who are placed in dormitories. Part VII(A)(4). The State asks us to stay these provisions. 7

The TDC prisoner population is growing rapidly: 25,000 prisoners when this case was tried in 1979, and more than 30,000 when it was argued before this court. The overpopulation problem in TDC units is, therefore, being steadily exacerbated. The forty-square-feet-per-prisoner rule for dormitories would require TDC to provide other housing for 641 prisoners, located in twelve different units; the unit most seriously affected is Darrington, which must relocate 171 prisoners. 8 Enforcement of The district court's findings concerning the TDC dormitories portray conditions that are inhumane. Lack of space alone does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, save perhaps in the most aggravated circumstances. The eighth amendment mandates no specific standard for prison housing. Whether confinement of prisoners results in cruel and unusual punishment depends not only on the size of the area in which they are confined, but also on the conditions attending their confinement in that area including sanitation, provision of security, protection against prisoner violence, and time and facilities available for work and exercise.

this part of the decree would not, therefore, impose a massive relocation problem.

The provision of forty square feet per prisoner allows only a small distance between bunks. Under other conditions, a smaller dormitory area might not offend constitutional standards; but, under the conditions now prevailing in TDC units, the gauge fixed by the district judge appears to be within his discretion. As to it, the State has not satisfied its burden.

Having considered the authorities cited to us, including Rhodes v. Chapman, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) and Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the injury to the State that will result if the forty- The forty-square-feet-per-prisoner requirement is not inexorable. De minimis variations, when on occasion in particular dormitories the prisoner population rises so that the space available is only 38 or 39 square feet, are permissible. The necessity for such temporary variations should be presented to the district court either immediately or from time to time as they occur.

square-feet-per-prisoner provisions of Parts I(B)(2) and I(F) of the decree are not stayed, the injury to the prisoners if the stay is granted, and the public interest in awaiting a determination on the merits, we conclude that the State has not established that we should extend our stay of these provisions. Accordingly, we vacate the stay we granted pending our further orders and deny the motion to stay the forty-square-feet-per-prisoner provisions of Parts I(B)(2) and I(F) of the decree.

However, because these provisions were to become effective on November 1, 1981, and, as a result of our issuance of a stay, that date has now passed, the State is granted sixty days from the date of issuance of this opinion to comply with these provisions of the decree. 9

We have already heard argument of the case on the merits. Although the relief required by the sixty-square-feet-per-prisoner provisions of Parts I(B)(3)-(4), I(F), and VII(A)(4) of the decree is entirely prospective, planning for it would have to begin immediately if it is to be implemented fully by November, and commencing implementation of it will put a considerable immediate burden on TDC. However, we hope to reach a decision on the merits in this case well before November 1, 1982. Considering all of these factors, we grant the motion to stay the sixty-square-feet-per-prisoner provisions of Parts I(B)(3)-(4), I(F), and VII(A)(4) of the decree.

B. Double-celling of Prisoners in Administrative Segregation

The district court's decree provides: "No prisoner shall be confined to administrative segregation with another prisoner in a cell containing sixty square feet or less after August 1, 1981." Part IV(C)(3). Administrative segregation is not punitive, Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. at 1364, but is used, for example, to confine prisoners pending investigation of potential disciplinary charges against them, and to protect particular prisoners, id. at 1365. Whether the confinement of two prisoners to a cell is cruel and unusual punishment cannot be determined without considering conditions other than the amount of space in which the prisoners are confined, as we have already noted in our discussion of the dormitory space requirements.

The district court found that prisoners in administrative...

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