Ruiz v. Estelle

Decision Date20 November 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-21003,97-21003
PartiesDavid R. RUIZ; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, United States of America, Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellee, v. W.J. ESTELLE; Texas Board of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees, v. Representative John CULBERSON; Senator J.E. Brown, Movants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Donna Brorby, William Bennett Turner, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Marie K. McElderry, Mark L. Gross, Bill Maddox, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Washington, DC, for Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellee.

Daniel E. Maeso, Austin, TX, for Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellee and Defendants-Appellees.

Drew Taylor Durham, Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Gregory Scott Coleman, Edmund D. Daniels, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, T. Gerald Treece, Houston, TX, for Movants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before KING, GARWOOD and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

This case involves the attempt by appellants, two Texas state legislators, to intervene in the long pending suit concerning Texas prison conditions, which began more than twenty-five years ago. The district court denied appellants' motion to intervene under Fed.R.Civ.P., Rules 24(a)(1), 24(a)(2), and 24(b)(2). 1 Because we conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(F) grants the appellants "an unconditional right to intervene" in this case within the meaning of Rule 24(a)(1), we reverse.

In 1972, class-action plaintiffs David Ruiz, et. al. (plaintiffs), initiated litigation against the Texas prison authorities, now the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (TDCJ), for constitutional violations in Texas prisons. See generally Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D.Tex.1980), rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.1982), modified in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S.Ct. 1438, 75 L.Ed.2d 795 (1983). After a lengthy trial, the district court ordered injunctive relief, and this Court largely affirmed. See id. Thereafter, the district court assumed a supervisory role over Texas prison conditions. See Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856 (5th Cir.1987).

In 1990, the district court ordered the parties to begin negotiations to bring about a comprehensive final order in the case, including timetables for termination of the court's jurisdiction. See Ruiz v. Collins, Civil No. H-78-987-CA (S.D.Tex. Dec. 11, 1992) (Memorandum Opinion Accompanying Order Approving Final Judgment). After notice and evidentiary hearing, the district court entered the parties' agreed Final Judgment in December 1992, which terminated the district court's jurisdiction in all but eight substantive areas. One of these eight areas was prison population and crowding conditions.

In March 1996, the TDCJ moved to terminate the Final Judgment, and accordingly end the district court's supervision over Texas prisons. On April 26, 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626, Pub.L. 104-134, Title VIII, Sec. 802(a), 110 Stat. 1321-66, was signed into law by President Clinton. On May 21, 1996, appellants filed a motion to intervene in the district court, and a proposed motion to vacate the December 1992 Final Judgment, pursuant to the PLRA. In June 1996, plaintiffs filed an opposition to TDCJ's motion to terminate, and plaintiffs and TDCJ filed their respective oppositions to appellants' motion to intervene. On September 6, 1996, TDCJ filed a supplemental motion to vacate the December 1992 judgment and terminate the district court's jurisdiction under the PLRA; later that month plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion. As of the time this case was orally argued before us in October 1998, TDCJ's motion to terminate was still pending and had not been ruled on. On August 29, 1997, appellants filed a motion for expedited ruling on their motion to intervene and on their therewith tendered motion to terminate. By order signed November 21 and entered November 24, 1997, the district court denied appellants' motion to intervene. On November 26, 1997, President Clinton signed into law amendments to the PLRA. Pub.L. 105-119, § 123(a), 111 Stat. 2470. On December 4, 1997, appellants filed their motion to reconsider the district court's November 24, 1997, order denying their motion to intervene, raising, inter alia, the November 1997 amendments to the PLRA. Plaintiffs and TDCJ opposed the motion. Also on December 4, appellants filed a protective notice of appeal from the November 24 order. On January 28, 1998, the district court denied appellants' motion for reconsideration, and on January 29, 1998, appellants filed an amended notice of appeal as to both the November 24 and the January 28 orders.

The PLRA narrowly limits the relief which a federal court may order in prisoner suits. See section 3626. It prohibits a federal court from ordering any prospective relief "unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary...." See section 3626(a)(1)(A). Moreover, the PLRA authorizes the termination of existing prospective relief that does not comply with these limits. See section 3626(b)(2). 2 See also Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 369 (4th Cir.1996) ("The PLRA also provides an avenue for states to end their obligations under consent decrees providing for greater prospective relief than that required by federal law."). The PLRA grants certain governmental officials the right to intervene in relevant litigation. 3 This intervention provision forms the basis of the present appeal.

I. Whether the PLRA Applies

Appellants, Texas State Senator J.E. "Buster" Brown and Texas State Representative John Culberson (appellants or "Brown and Culberson"), seek to intervene in the termination action brought by TDCJ. 4 TDCJ, Brown, and Culberson seek the very same ultimate relief, namely termination of the Final Judgment. However, appellants contend that TDCJ is not adequately pursuing this goal. Specifically, Brown and Culberson object to the TDCJ's claimed failure to assert alternative arguments for termination of the Final Judgment, including arguments under the Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amendment, and Guarantee Clause of the United States constitution. 5

Brown and Culberson moved to intervene pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(1) ("Upon timely application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene"), contending that the PLRA granted them an unconditional right to intervene. The district court held that the PLRA's intervention provision applies neither to appellants nor to this case. Finding error as to each of these grounds, we reverse.

A. Including A Legislator

At the time Brown and Culberson initially moved to intervene in May 1996, the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(F), granted a right to intervene to:

"[a]ny state or local official or unit of government whose jurisdiction or function includes the appropriation of funds for the construction, operation, or maintenance of prison facilities, or the prosecution or custody of persons who may be released from, or not admitted to, a prison as a result of a prisoner release order...."

In October 1996, while the motion to intervene was still pending before the district court, TDCJ sought to appeal to this Court the district court's failure to promptly rule on TDCJ's referenced motions to terminate, and in February 1996 Brown and Culberson filed with this Court a motion to intervene in that appeal. We denied Brown and Culberson's motion as inappropriate because the district court had not yet ruled on Brown and Culberson's initial motion. See Ruiz v. Scott, No. 96-21118, 124 F.3d 191 (unpublished) (5th Cir.1997) (we also dismissed TDCJ's appeal). However, we then expressed the view that it was "at best doubtful that either Representative Culberson or Senator Brown is that sort of state or local official or unit of government to whom or which section 3626(a)(3)(F) grants a right to intervene." Id. 6 Indeed, we made this remark in response to arguments made by TDCJ and plaintiffs, which mirror the arguments appellees urge on the present appeal. 7

Following our lead, the district court held that Brown and Culberson did not fall within the statute's definition of "state or local official." See Ruiz v. Scott, Civil No. H-78-987, 1996 WL 932104 (S.D.Tex., Nov. 24, 1997). The district court determined that the qualifying "jurisdiction or function" language of section 3626(a)(3)(F) applies to "state and local official[s]" as well as to "unit[s] of government." The court held that Brown and Culberson do not have the "jurisdiction or function" of appropriating funds. Only a collective body and no individual legislator can have the "jurisdiction" or "function" of appropriating funds. Texas law vests authority to appropriate funds with the legislative body as a whole, not with individual legislators. Id. See also Vernon's Ann. Tex. Const. Art. 8 § 6 (1998) ("No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in pursuance of specific appropriations made by law...."). Therefore, the district court held that individual legislators were not state officials of the kind covered by the intervention provision.

Significantly, the district court found the absence of the words "individual legislators" indicative of congressional intent.

"Of particular salience in this matter is the ease with which the putative intervenors' interpretation could have been expressed, had the drafters clearly intended it. This is not an instance of inadvertent ambiguity, nor is it the case of a complex statute that resists interpretation. Neither the standing provision, nor the definitions section, makes any reference to 'individual legislators.' By doing so, it signaled that mere status as a legislator is...

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