Ruiz v. Flores
| Decision Date | 04 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:14-cv-00179 AWI SMS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | Noah John Ruiz, Plaintiff v. Albert Flores, Dennis Frank, Deborah French, Mark Jenkins, Shane Kensey, Vince Villegas, Rey Morelos, State of California, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and DOES 1-25, inclusive, Defendant. |
(Docs. 24, 26, 29, 30.)
Defendants (1) Mark Jenkins, (2) Shane Kensey and Vince Villegas, (3) California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") and Reynaldo Morelos, and (4) Albert Flores and Deborah French (collectively "Defendants"), have filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff Noah Ruiz's ("Plaintiff") complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Noah Ruiz has filed oppositions to each of Defendants' motions to dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
Prior to December 30, 2012, Plaintiff was subject to a period of parole pursuant to California Penal Code Section 3000(b). (First Amended Complaint, Doc. 8 ("FAC") at ¶ 17.) On December 30, 2012, Plaintiff was discharged from parole. (FAC at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff contends that onJanuary 18, 2013, without prior notice, the seven named individual Defendants came to Plaintiff's residence. (FAC at ¶ 18.) Defendants informed Plaintiff that they were there to conduct a parole search. (FAC at ¶ 19.) They placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and asked him if he had anything illegal in his possession. (FAC at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff told the Defendants that he had approximately 3.5 grams of medicinal marijuana and an appropriate medical license pursuant to California Proposition 215. (FAC at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff also told the Defendants that he had a scale that he used for monitoring his personal consumption. (FAC at ¶ 19.) After Plaintiff disclosed his possession of the marijuana and the scale, Mr. Morelos announced that Plaintiff was under arrest. Plaintiff was then immediately taken to a holding cell at the Merced County Sheriff's Department Sub-Station in Los Banos. (FAC at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants did not have a search warrant or an arrest warrant. Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that Defendants did not have probable cause or any cause at all to search Plaintiff's residence or to lawfully arrest him. (FAC at ¶ 23.)
Plaintiff was incarcerated from Friday January 18, 2013 until Wednesday, January 23, 2013. (FAC at ¶ 21.) Shortly after being released on bail, Plaintiff reported to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Parole Office in Merced. (FAC at ¶ 22.) Plaintiff requested to speak to Mr. Morelos but the officer of the day told him that Mr. Morelos was unavailable. (FAC at ¶ 22.) The officer of the day informed Plaintiff of the following: (1) Plaintiff had been discharged from parole, (2) no formal charges would be filed against him as a result of his arrest, and (3) his marijuana and scale would be returned to him. (FAC at ¶ 22.)
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Where the plaintiff fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," the complaint may be dismissed for failure to allege facts sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "A claim has facial plausibility," and thus survives a motion to dismiss, "when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the courtaccepts all material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the court need not accept conclusory allegations, allegations contradicted by exhibits attached to the complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences. Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a trial court shall grant leave to amend freely when justice so requires. In addition, a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining whether leave to amend is appropriate, the district court considers the presence of any of four factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, and/or futility. Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges four causes of action: (1) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on a warrantless search and arrest of Plaintiff and his home in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) a claim under the Bane Act for violations of the United States and California Constitutions accomplished through intimidation, coercion, and threats; (3) a claim for false arrest; and (4) a violation of Section 815.6 of the California Government Code for failure in mandatory duty to report that Plaintiff was no longer on parole. The first three causes of action are alleged against each of the individual defendants. The fourth cause of action is alleged only against CDCR.
Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges three potential bases for Defendants' violation of the Fourth Amendment: (1) searching Plaintiff's residence without a warrant, (2) arresting Plaintiff without a warrant or probable cause, and (3) detaining Plaintiff while law enforcement officers conducted the search of his home.
The first inquiry in an § 1983 suit "is whether the Plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their "persons, houses, papers, and effects" against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). Search of a home or residence without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). A warrantless entry into a home violates the Fourth Amendment unless an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies, such as emergency, exigency, consent, or a reasonably conducted parole search. Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 2010). Similarly, a reasonably conducted parole search operates as an exception to the warrant requirement. Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-75 (1987)).
Plaintiff's alleges that the defendants' entry and search were accomplished without Plaintiff's consent, a warrant or some other lawful justification. (FAC at ¶ 29.) Plaintiff contends that since he was no longer on parole and because there were no exigent circumstances present, he was entitled to the full scope of his Constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure. Defendants CDCR and Morelos argue that Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights were not necessarily violated because the officers reasonably but mistakenly relied on erroneous information. (Doc. 29 at 6 (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009).) Defendants' reliance on Herring is ill-founded; the Herring Court assumed a Fourth Amendment violation and only addressed whether exclusion of evidence yielded by the search was appropriate in the criminal context.2
More recently, this District has confronted a case almost on all fours with the action presently before this Court. In Torres v. County of Madera, the plaintiff alleged that his formerparole officer and members of a gang enforcement taskforce searched his residence without a warrant after he had been discharged from parole. Torres v. County of Madera, 2011 WL 6141080, *1 (E.D. Cal. 2011). The defendants in that case partially conflated the issues of whether a Fourth Amendment violation had taken place and whether a defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. See Torres, 2011 WL 6141080, *4-5 () Defendants CDCR and Morelos have made the same argument; because defendants search was based on "reasonable but mistaken reliance on erroneous information" that the plaintiff was on parole, the parole exception to the warrant requirement was satisfied. (Doc. 29 at p. 6.) The Torres court rejected that argument, finding that an objectively reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief that the subject is subject to a warrantless search is insufficient to sidestep the presumption under the Fourth Amendment that a warrantless search of the home is unreasonable. Torres, 2011 WL 6141080 at *6 (). To trigger the warrantless search exception to the Fourth Amendment, the targeted individual must in fact be a parolee. Torres, 2011 WL 6141080 at *6 (citing Moore v. Vega, 371 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Because Plaintiff alleges that he was not subject to the probation term permitting search at the time of the search, the entry...
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