Ruiz v. Nev. Dep't of Corrs.

• Decision Date: 24 February 2022
• Docket Number: 3:18-cv-00206-RCJ-CSD
• Parties: CARLOS RUIZ, Plaintiff v. NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

CARLOS RUIZ, Plaintiff v. NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants

No. 3:18-cv-00206-RCJ-CSD

United States District Court, D. Nevada

February 24, 2022

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

RE: ECF NOS. 69, 72

Craig S. DenneyUnited States Magistrate Judge

This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Robert C Jones, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1)(B) and the Local Rules of Practice, LR 1B 1-4.

Before the court is Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 69.) Defendants filed a response (ECF No. 74), and Plaintiff filed a reply (ECF No. 75). Also before the court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 72 72-1 to 72-16.) Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 77), and Defendants filed a reply (ECF Nos. 81, 81-1).

After a thorough review, it is recommended that Plaintiff's and Defendants' motions be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC), proceeding pro se with this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (First Amended Complaint (FAC), ECF No. 6.) The events giving rise to this action took place while Plaintiff was housed at Lovelock Correctional Center (LCC). (Id.)

The court screened Plaintiff's FAC, and determined Plaintiff could proceed with claims under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). (ECF No. 9.)

In Count I, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed with Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA claims based on allegations that Plaintiff observes Messianic Judaism, which requires holy days to be observed on the actual date the holy days occur, and to use matzah bread and grape juice on certain holy days. Plaintiff claims that Administrative Regulation (AR) 810 restricts his ability to observe the Messianic holy days on their actual dates, and does not provide matzah or grape juice to indigent Messianic inmates for certain holy days. For the Free Exercise Clause claim, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed against Baker, Carpenter, Dzurenda, Sisolak, Ford and Cegavske. The latter four defendants were only allowed to be sued for injunctive relief. For the RLUIPA claim, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed against Baker, Carpenter, Dzurenda, Ford and Cegavske for injunctive relief only.^[1]

In Count II, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed with Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA claims based on allegations that his faith requires him to eat kosher meals, but the common fare food is not kosher, and AR 814 does not correctly set forth kosher guidelines. The Free Exercise Clause claim was allowed to proceed against Henry, Rosskamm, Stammerjohn, Baker, Wickham and Carpenter. The RLUIPA claim was allowed to proceed against Dzurenda, Sisolak, Ford, Cegavske, Rosskamm, Henry, Stammerjohn, Baker, Carpenter, and the Doe Chief Medical Officer (when Plaintiff learned of his or her identity), for injunctive relief only.

Defendant Rosskamm has been dismissed for failure to timely serve him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). (ECF No. 46.)

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, arguing Defendants have substantially burdened his religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA. Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion, and have filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Defendants question the sincerity of Plaintiff's religious belief and argue they did not substantially burden Plaintiff's religious exercise. Alternatively, they contend they are entitled to qualified immunity.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The legal standard governing this motion is well settled: a party is entitled to summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248 (disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will preclude summary judgment, but factual disputes which are irrelevant or unnecessary are not considered). On the other hand, where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, summary judgment is not appropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

“The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court.” Northwest Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims"); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether a case "is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law"). In considering a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986). That being said, "if the evidence of the nonmoving party "is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250 (citations omitted). The court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth or to make credibility determinations. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 249, 255; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court applies a burden-shifting analysis. “When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, ‘it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.'… In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine [dispute] of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rest., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party cannot establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will have the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986).

If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine dispute exists as to a material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party need not establish a genuine dispute of material fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual data. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Instead, the opposition must go beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing competent evidence that shows a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Free Exercise Clause & RLUIPA Standards

1. Free Exercise Clause

Plaintiff argues that strict scrutiny applies to his First Amendment free exercise claim. Plaintiff is mistaken.

“The First Amendment, applicable to state action by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment...prohibits government from making a law prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted, alteration original). “The right to exercise religious practices and beliefs does not terminate at the prison door. The free exercise right, however, is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1122; Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2008).

To implicate the free exercise clause, a prisoner must establish his belief is both sincerely held and rooted in religious belief. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85. “The Free Exercise Clause does not require plaintiffs to prove the centrality or consistency of their religious practice: ‘It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.'” Jones v. Slade, 23 F.4th 1124, 1145 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 689 (1989)). The test is whether the plaintiff sincerely believes the conduct at issue is consistent with his faith. Id. (citation omitted).

“A person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the government action in question substantially burdens the person's practice of her religion.” Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)).

“On...