Rule v. R. I. Dept. of Transp.

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BEVILACQUA
• Citation: Rule v. R. I. Dept. of Transp., 427 A.2d 1305 (R.I. 1981)
• Decision Date: 07 April 1981
• Docket Number: Nos. 78-444-M,s. 78-444-M
• Parties: Paul RULE v. R. I. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. Rose SIRENSKI v. Eugene PETIT, Jr., Registrar of Motor Vehicles. P., 78-92-M.P.

Page 1305

427 A.2d 1305

Paul RULE v. R. I. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.

Rose SIRENSKI v. Eugene PETIT, Jr., Registrar of Motor Vehicles.

Nos. 78-444-M.P., 78-92-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 7, 1981.

Mitchell S. Riffkin, Providence, R. Kevin Horan, Pawtucket, for petitioners.

Stephen F. Mullen, Chief Counsel, Dept. of Transp., Providence, for respondents.

OPINION

BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice.

These two cases are petitions for writs of certiorari filed under the provisions of G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 42-35-16, which petitions have been consolidated for argument because they present a cognate issue concerning the security and suspension requirements of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. ¹ We shall refer to the plaintiffs, Paul Rule and Rose Sirenski, as "Rule" and "Sirenski" individually and as "plaintiffs" collectively. We shall refer to the defendants Registrar of Motor Vehicles and Department of Transportation as "the registrar."

On November 20, 1976, Rule was involved in a three-car accident on Post Road in Warwick. A car driven by Patrick Wynne was waiting to make a left turn onto Masthead Drive when Rule hit the Wynne car from behind. The force of this impact pushed Wynne's car into the oncoming lane where Wynne was hit by a third vehicle owned by Eileen McCarron. The resulting damage was in excess of the statutory minimum for submitting accident reports with the Registry of Motor Vehicles. ² Thereafter, all parties involved in this accident filed reports with the registrar.

Sirenski was involved in a two-car accident on July 12, 1975, with a motor vehicle driven by William Frost. The accident occurred in a supermarket parking lot in Wakefield while Sirenski was attempting a left turn to proceed east into a fire lane that bordered the front of the store. Frost was already in the fire lane driving east and approaching the intersection where Sirenski was making a left turn. The collision of the two cars caused damages exceeding the amount required for submitting accident reports, and consequently both parties filed reports.

Because both Rule and Sirenski had no insurance to cover their potential liability for damages arising from their respective accidents, the registrar ordered them to comply with the Safety Responsibility Act. ³ Failure to comply would result in suspension of license and registration on a date assigned by the registrar's order.

Under the act, however, and in accordance with Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), the registrar was required to offer both Rule and Sirenski a hearing prior to suspending their licenses, thus temporarily postponing implementation of the order. The purpose of this administrative hearing is to determine whether a reasonable possibility exists that plaintiffs could be found liable for damages in connection with their individual accidents. If the hearing officer finds that no reasonable possibility of liability exists, the order to comply must be rescinded.

Rule requested a hearing at which he and his counsel, along with the officer, were the only parties in attendance. In rendering his decision on the Rule appeal, the hearing officer found:

"There is disagreement between petitioner (Rule) and the operator of the McCarron vehicle as to whether the time elapsed between the collisions was sufficient to have enabled the operator of the McCarron vehicle to avoid hitting the Wynne vehicle after the latter had been pushed into the path of the McCarron vehicle by petitioner's vehicle. That other evidence available provides no additional information to support one statement more than another."

Basing his decision on these findings, the officer concluded that there was a reasonable possibility that Rule "could be found causally negligent * * *."

Thereupon, the order requiring Rule to comply with the act was sustained. Rule appealed the decision of the hearing officer to the District Court, which affirmed the decision of the registrar, and judgment was entered accordingly. Rule filed his petition for a writ of certiorari, and we granted the petition to consider possible errors of law.

Sirenski similarly requested a hearing before the division. At the hearing, only Sirenski, her husband, and the registry officer were present. ⁴ The hearing consisted of Sirenski answering questions submitted by the hearing officer. In his decision, the hearing officer affirmed the registrar's prior order requiring Sirenski to file a security deposit to avoid suspension of her license. Sirenski appealed the registrar's order to the Superior Court. After a hearing, the reviewing justice reversed the registrar's decision, finding it was "clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record." The trial justice went on to state that under the Bell holding, "evidence taken at the hearing must establish this reasonable possibility." He found that Sirenski's testimony was uncontradicted. Subsequently, the registrar filed his petition for certiorari.

It is apparent from a reading of the record in both cases that the hearing officer relied on the accident reports submitted by the parties involved in the accidents. Basing his evaluation on these reports and plaintiffs' testimony, he concluded that there was a reasonable possibility that judgment might result against them.

The sole issue we shall consider on these petitions for certiorari is whether the hearing officer at a presuspension hearing can consider accident reports to determine whether a reasonable possibility exists that plaintiffs could be found liable for damages in connection with an accident. Although plaintiffs raise other issues on this petition, our disposition of the primary issue makes it unnecessary for us to decide these issues at the present time.

The plaintiffs argue that these reports should be excluded at presuspension hearings; they base their argument on language found in G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 31-26-13 and § 31-33-1. ⁵ The language referred to by plaintiffs in § 31-26-13 states that the filing of an accident report "shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting * * *." With regard to § 31-33-1, plaintiff argues that the statute delineates what use may be made of these reports to learn whether an operator has insurance for his vehicle raising the inference that this is the only permissible use. The registrar, however, directs our attention to a third statute that, the registrar contends, expands the permissible use of these reports. This statute states in pertinent part that "(t)he registry shall determine the amount of security deposit required of any person upon the basis of the reports or other information submitted." General Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 31-31-5(b), as amended by P.L.1975, ch. 80, § 1.

Initially, we observe that the § 31-33-1 accident reports constitute a form of hearsay evidence. When no hearing is required, administrative agencies are usually permitted to consider hearsay evidence otherwise inadmissible in judicial proceedings. Walker v. Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 1110, 59 N.W.2d 785, 791 (1953). When a hearing is required, courts have disagreed regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence before administrative bodies. Compare Griffin v. Heath, 257 A.2d 488, 491 (D.C.1969) and Redding v. Board of County Commissioners, 263 Md. 94, 110-11, 282 A.2d 136, 145 (1971) and New Hampshire Milk Dealers' Association v. New Hampshire Milk Control Board, 107 N.H. 335, 340, 222 A.2d 194, 199 (1966) with August v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal.App.2d 52, 64, 70 Cal.Rptr. 172, 180 (1968) and Robinson v. Twigg Industries, Inc., 154 Ind.App. 339, 289 N.E.2d 733, 736 (1972) and Lewis v. Southmore Savings Association, 480 S.W.2d 180, 186 (Tex.1972). Nevertheless, most courts take the position that, although many administrative proceedings are not governed by the strict rules of evidence, hearsay evidence by itself should not be the exclusive basis for an administrative determination absent a special statute to the contrary. See, e. g., Sinclair v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 331 Mass. 101, 103, 117 N.E.2d 164, 165 (1954); State ex rel. Independent School District No. 276 v. Department of Education, Minn., 256 N.W.2d 619, 627 (1977); Stammer v. Board of Regents, 287 N.Y. 359, 365, 39 N.E.2d 913, 915 (1942).

Prior to 1971, the registrar was not required to provide a hearing under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. However, in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), the United States Supreme Court ruled that in order to protect the procedural due process rights of the licensee, a "meaningful" hearing must be held prior to suspension of a driver's license in a financial responsibility proceeding. Id. at 541, 91 S.Ct. at 1590-91, 29 L.Ed.2d at 96. Moreover, the Court stated that to satisfy due process, the inquiry at such a hearing must focus on the issue of "whether there is a reasonable possibility of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the licensee." Id. at 540, 91 S.Ct. at 1590, 29 L.Ed.2d at 95. Therefore, in accordance with Bell v. Burson, supra, the registrar is required to provide a hearing to a licensee if it is requested. When this occurs, the hearing officer must make a fault determination, and the driver's appeal takes the form of a contested case. ⁶

We believe that in order to determine the admissibility of these reports, it is necessary that we examine the scope and purpose of the Safety Responsibility Act and construe the applicable sections of the act as set forth in §§ 31-26-13 and 31-31-5(b). Before addressing the sections referred to, we note that several jurisdictions have allowed admission of hearsay evidence in the form of police or accident reports at license-suspension hearings.

In Chmela v. State, 88 Wash.2d 385, 561 P.2d 1085 (1977), the court upheld admission of police reports at...