Rule v. S. Indus. Mech. Maint. Co.
| Decision Date | 06 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO: 16-CV-01408 |
| Parties | SHANNON RULE, ET AL. v. SOUTHERN INDUSTRIAL MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE CO., L.L.C., ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
This case arises out of a dispute between employees and their employer, Southern Industrial Mechanical Maintenance Company, LLC ("SIMMCO"), about whether payments SIMMCO made to its traveling employees were properly excluded from their regular rate of pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. Now pending before the Court are three motions: a Motion for Discovery Pursuant to Rule 56(d) filed by Plaintiffs [Record Document 163], a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants David and Ginger Blurton ("the Blurtons"), the owners of SIMMCO, [Record Document 154], and a Motion for Summary Judgment as to FLSA Liability filed by Plaintiffs [Record Document 167]. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Discovery Pursuant to Rule 56(d) [Record Document 163] is DENIED. The Blurtons' Motion for Summary Judgment [Record Document 154] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED as to the applicable statute of limitations and DENIED as to FLSA liability and liquidated damages. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to FLSA liability [Record Document 167] is DENIED.
On October 7, 2016, Plaintiffs Shannon Rule and Karina Esquivel ("Plaintiffs") filed the instant collective action under the FLSA on behalf of themselves and all other similarly-situated current and former employees of SIMMCO, seeking unpaid overtime pay, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees, and costs. Record Document 1, ¶s 1 & 22. Plaintiffs allege that they were hourly, non-exempt employees who were entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiffs claim that SIMMCO paid them per diems for travel expenses and then failed to include those per diems in their regular rate of pay when calculating their overtime pay, in violation of the FLSA. Id. at ¶s 11-12. Plaintiffs argue that the per diems should have been included in their regular rate of pay because SIMMCO's policy tied the amount of the per diems to the number of hours an employee worked. Id. at ¶s 10-11 (citing Newman v. Advanced Tech. Innovation Corp., 749 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2014)).
This case was conditionally certified as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on April 24, 2017. Record Document 45. In addition to the two named Plaintiffs, over 170 additional Plaintiffs have opted-in to this litigation. On June 14, 2017, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include David and Ginger Blurton as individual defendants. Record Document 85. On February 12, 2018, this case was stayed as to SIMMCO pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), after SIMMCO filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy into the record. Record Document 108. Plaintiffs amended their complaint again on July 10, 2019, to include David Payne, Randy Sawdey, Southern Industrial Mechanical Maintenance Company II, L.L.C. ("SIMMCO II"), and The Blurton Group, L.L.C. as Defendants. Record Document 148.
The Blurtons filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that they are entitled to a dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims because the facts show that SIMMCO's per diem policy did not violate the FLSA as a matter of law. Record Document 154, p. 2. In the alternative, they argue that if they are found liable for an FLSA violation, the Court should also find (1) that the FLSA's standard two-year statute of limitations should apply in this case rather than the three-year statute of limitations for willful violations and (2) that Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover liquidated damages under the FLSA. Id. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), requesting further discovery on the issue of whether Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. Record Document 163, p. 1. Finally, Plaintiffs filed their own motion for summary judgment on the issue of FLSA liability. Record Document 167.
Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), requesting additional time for discovery on the issue of willfulness. Record Document 163. Plaintiffs also request the costs and attorneys' fees incurred in the filing of this motion and request that the Court enter an order regarding Defendants' failure to comply with discovery obligations. Id. 1 Plaintiffs state that, although they have been diligent in conducting discovery, they have been unable to locate or depose Vanessa Carrasco ("Carrasco") or David Payne ("Payne"), two of the witnesses SIMMCO named in discovery, or Randy Sawdey ("Sawdey"), a recently added Defendant. Record Document 163-1, pp. 2-3. Plaintiffs also claim that David and Ginger Blurton have not been fully deposed because they have not been questioned about 7,000 pages of personnel files that Plaintiffs received after the Blurtons had already been deposed. Id. at 3-4.
Rule 56(d) provides that "[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition [to summary judgment], the court may:
(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;
(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Rule 56(d) discovery motions are intended to "safeguard non-moving parties from summary judgment motions that they cannot adequately oppose" and are therefore "broadly favored and should be liberally granted." Culwell v. City of Fort Worth, 468 F.3d 868, 871 (5th Cir. 2006). However, a nonmovant may not "simply rely on vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts." SEC v. Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir. 1980). This is especially true where "ample time and opportunities for discovery have already lapsed." Id.
A nonmovant must present "specific facts explaining the inability to make a substantive response as required by Rule 56(e)" and specifically demonstrate "'how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.'" Id. (quoting Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976)). A plaintiff's entitlement to discovery prior to a ruling on a motion for summary judgment may be cut off "when the record shows that the requested discovery is not likely to produce the facts needed by the plaintiff to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, a Rule 56(d) motion may be denied if a party had the opportunity to conduct discovery but did not diligently pursue it. Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cir.1991).
The Court begins by analyzing the facts that Plaintiffs claim they will uncover through further discovery.2 Plaintiffs state that Carrasco, SIMMCO's former Human Resources Manager, authored and received several emails regarding the per diem policy and likely had "substantial responsibility" over SIMMCO's FLSA compliance. Record Document 163-1, p. 3. As to Payne, Plaintiffs state that he also authored and received emails regarding the per diem policy and was one of the highest management-level employees working for SIMMCO in Shreveport. Id. Plaintiffs do not provide the Court with any specific reasons why it is relevant to the issue of willfulness that they depose Sawdey or re-depose David and Ginger Blurton.
The record already contains several facts relevant to the issue of willfulness. The Blurtons have represented that they created SIMMCO's per diem policy. Record Document 154-3, p. 3, Ginger Blurton's Responses to Interrogatories. In her declaration, Ginger Blurton stated that she was not aware of any employees complaining that the per diem policy violated the FLSA, nor had SIMMCO ever been sued for an FLSA violation regarding its calculation of the regular rate of pay. Record Document 154-2, p. 3. Plaintiffs have not identified any facts they hope to find through further discovery or facts indicating that Carrasco, Payne, or Sawdey would be able to provide additional information as to willfulness. The closest Plaintiffs come to explaining the need for additional discovery is stating that Carrasco was likely responsible for SIMMCO's FLSA compliance. However, this reasoning is still vague. Plaintiffs do not state what facts might be adduced from Carrasco, or any other witness, that would influence the pending motion for summary judgment on the issue of willfulness. C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 137 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1998) ). Because Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how further discovery will create a genuine issue of material fact as to willfulness, the Court may grant the Blurtons' motion for summary judgment over Plaintiffs' request for an extension of discovery. Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 720 (5th Cir. 1999).
Even if Plaintiffs had outlined specific facts that they hoped to find through further discovery, the Rule 56(d) motion would still fail because Plaintiffs cannot establish that they have diligently pursued the requested discovery. Int'l Shortstop, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1267. Plaintiffs have known that the applicable statute of limitations and willfulness were going to be contested in this case since SIMMCO filed its answer on November 16, 2016. Record Document 8, p. 9. Furthermore, SIMMCO's discovery responses from January 9, 2017,3 identified Carrasco and Payne, along with David and Ginger...
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