RUMBAUGH ON BEHALF OF RUMBAUGH v. Estelle, Civ. A. No. CA-2-82-99.

• Decision Date: 07 March 1983
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. CA-2-82-99.
• Citation: 558 F. Supp. 651
• Parties: Harvey and Rebecca RUMBAUGH, Individually and as Next Friends Acting on Behalf of Charles RUMBAUGH, Petitioners, v. W.J. ESTELLE, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

558 F. Supp. 651

Harvey and Rebecca RUMBAUGH, Individually and as Next Friends Acting on Behalf of Charles RUMBAUGH, Petitioners, v. W.J. ESTELLE, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent.

Civ. A. No. CA-2-82-99.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Amarillo Division.

March 7, 1983.

Will Gray, Simonton, Tex., Tim L. Hoffman, Amarillo, Tex., Stanley G. Schneider, Houston, Tex., for petitioners.

Douglas Becker, Leslie Benitez, Austin, Tex., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARY LOU ROBINSON, District Judge.

Before the Court is an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought by Harvey and Rebecca Rumbaugh, Individually And As Next Friends Acting On Behalf Of Charles Rumbaugh, v. W.J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections. Charles Rumbaugh is a prisoner of the Texas Department of Corrections who was scheduled to be executed on July 23, 1982, by virtue of a judgment of conviction of capital murder and sentence of death from the 181st District Court of Potter County, Texas. Petitioners contend that Charles Rumbaugh is not mentally competent to decide whether to pursue a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The action was filed in the Houston Division of the Southern District of Texas and a stay of execution was ordered by the Honorable George E. Cire, who then transferred the action to the Amarillo Division of the Northern District of Texas where venue is proper.

The petitioners lack standing and the federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain the application for Writ of Habeas Corpus unless Charles Rumbaugh is incompetent to act on his own behalf in pursuing federal remedies. The burden of showing that Charles Rumbaugh is incompetent is on the petitioners seeking to act on his behalf. See Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301, 99 S.Ct. 1481, 59 L.Ed.2d 756 (1979); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 97 S.Ct. 436, 50 L.Ed.2d 632 (1976); Lenhard v. Wolff, 603 F.2d 91 (9th Cir.1979); Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.1978).

In Rees v. Payton, 384 U.S. 312, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966), the Supreme Court set out the standard to be applied in determining mental competence to make decisions concerning appeal. In Rees, the Court directed the District Court to

determine Rees' mental competence in the present posture of things, that is, whether he has the capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.

Accordingly, this Court set the application for preliminary hearing to determine whether examinations or evaluations of the prisoner should be made, whether any commitment for examination should be made to state or federal hospital facilities, and the conditions for any examinations, evaluations, or commitments.

After the preliminary hearing, and with the agreement of all counsel, the Court ordered Charles Rumbaugh committed to the maximum security unit of the federal prison in Springfield for thirty (30) days or such other time as might be reasonably necessary to determine his present mental competency. The order provided for an examination to determine "whether Charles Rumbaugh has the capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand, whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises."

Psychiatric reports were received by the Court December 9, 1982. Copies were forwarded to all parties. By subsequent orders the examining authorities were directed to make available to the parties copies of all tests and rough data sheets discussed in the psychiatric evaluation. No further psychological or psychiatric examination of the prisoner was requested by either party.

In the course of his evaluation at the Federal Medical Center the prisoner was given a list of twenty-two (22) questions which he answered by himself with the use of a typewriter over a period of several days. His answers which are included in the report show a rational understanding of his position and the options available to him with regard to continuing or abandoning further litigation. The opinion of the psychiatrist is as follows:

It is the opinion of the examining Psychiatrist that the defendant has the capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation. However, the extent of the defendant's depression does substantially affect his capacity in the premises.

At a hearing to determine Rumbaugh's competency on February 4, 1983, a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist testifying for petitioners and a clinical psychologist testifying for the respondent differed sharply in their interpretation of the report from the medical center. The Court on its own motion recessed the hearing until such time as Dr. William S. Logan, the medical center psychiatrist, could be present and testify. The hearing was resumed February 24, 1983, with Dr. Logan present.

At the hearing Dr. Logan testified that the prisoner is depressed; that his depression is based on a realistic assessment of his own mental...