Rumfelt v. Jazzie Pools Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 May 2011
• Docket Number: 1:11cv217 (JCC/TCB)
• Citation: Rumfelt v. Jazzie Pools, Inc., 1:11cv217 (JCC/TCB) (E.D. Va. May 31, 2011)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: RONALD RUMFELT, Plaintiff, v. JAZZIE POOLS, INC., Defendant.

RONALD RUMFELT, Plaintiff,

v.JAZZIE POOLS, INC., Defendant.

1:11cv217 (JCC/TCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

May 31, 2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on DefendantJazzie Pools, Spas & Fitness, LLC's ("Jazzie Pools" or "Defendant")Amended Motion to Dismiss(the "Motion").[Dkt. 12.]For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion.

I.Background

A.Factual Background

In his Complaint, PlaintiffRonald Rumfelt("Plaintiff" or "Rumfelt"), states that he worked for Jazzie Pools as a pool manager at the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel in Washington, D.C., from August 2008 until at least December 2009.(Complaint[Dkt. 1]("Compl.")¶¶ 3-4.¹)

In early December 2009, Plaintiff received a letter from Jazzie Pools.(Compl. ¶ 3.)Enclosed with that letter wasa document from the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") placing a levy on Plaintiff's wages for on unpaid back taxes.Id.Also enclosed was Defendant's reply to the IRS, in which Gwendolyn Pierce, one of Defendant's corporate officers, told the IRS that Plaintiff had not worked for Jazzie Pools since February 19, 2009.(Compl. ¶¶ 3-4.)Plaintiff asserts that he worked for Jazzie Pools at the time the IRS placed a levy on his wages.(Compl. ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant"disavow[ed] him as an employee instead of honoring the levy as instructed to by the IRS."Id.Because of this "disavowal," Jazzie Pools "made it impossible for [Plaintiff]" to receive a Form W-2 ("W-2") for the years 2009 and 2010. Id.

After receiving the letter in early December 2009, Plaintiff went to Jazzie Pools to pick up his paycheck.Id.In the parking lot, he spoke with Gwendolyn Pierce, who told Plaintiff that his wages were being retroactively cut on his pay until further notice.Id.

Plaintiff also alleges that Jazzie Pools stopped withholding his income taxes "as far back as October 2008."(Compl. ¶ 5.)Plaintiff further alleges that Jazzie Pools did not list the number of hours Plaintiff worked or Plaintiff's pay rate on his pay stubs, so that it was "impossible" for him to know exactly what he had earned.Id.

Defendant also alleges that Jazzie Pools interfered with his tax obligations and did not obey "all applicable sections of the Internal Revenue Code."(Compl. ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff seeks "$100,000 in damages and $200,000 in punitive damages" against Jazzie Pools.(Compl. ¶ 7.)

B.Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 3, 2011.[Dkt. 1.]On April 28, 2011, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss.²[Dkt. 5.]The Motion was accompanied by the proper notice required by Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309(4th Cir.1975)andLocalRule 7(K).[Dkt. 5.]

Plaintiff filed his opposition and a memorandum in support thereto on May 3, 2011.[Dkts. 15, 16.]Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is now before the Court.

II.Standard of Review

A.Jurisdiction

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a claim may be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).Defendants may attack subject matter jurisdiction in one of two ways.First, defendants may contend that the complaint fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction may be based.SeeAdams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213,1219(4th Cir.1982);King v. Riverside Reg'l Med. Ctr., 211 F. Supp. 2d 779, 780(E.D. Va.2002).In such instances, all facts alleged in the complaint are presumed to be true.Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219;Virginia v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 537, 540(E.D. Va.1995).Alternatively, defendants may argue that the jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint are untrue.Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219;King, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 780.In that situation, "the Court may 'look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.'"Virginia, 926 F. Supp. at 540(citingCapitol Leasing Co. v. FDIC, 999 F.2d 188, 191(7th Cir.1993));see alsoAdams, 697 F.2d at 1219;Ocean Breeze Festival Park, Inc. v. Reich, 853 F. Supp. 906, 911(E.D. Va.1994);Velasco v. Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 393, 398(4th Cir.2004)(holding that "the district court may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment").In either circumstance, the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction falls on the plaintiff.McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189(1936);Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219;Johnson v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 682 F. Supp. 2d 560, 566(E.D. Va.2009)(holding that "having filed this suit and thereby seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of theCourt, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction").

B.Failure to State a Claim

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.SeeRandall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522(4th Cir.1994).In deciding such a motion, a court must first be mindful of the liberal pleading standards under Rule 8, which require only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.A court must take "the material allegations of the complaint" as admitted and liberally construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff.Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421(1969).

While Rule 8 does not require "detailed factual allegations,"a plaintiff must still provide "more than labels and conclusions" because "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65(2007)(citation omitted).Indeed, the legal framework of the complaint must be supported by factual allegations that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level."Id. at 1965.In its recent decision, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct 1937(2009), the Supreme Court expanded upon Twomblyby articulating a two-pronged analytical approach to be followed in any Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.First, acourt must identify and reject legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations because they are not entitled to the presumption of truth.Id. at 1951."[B]are assertions" that amount to nothing more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements" do not suffice.Id.(citations omitted).Second, assuming the veracity of "well-pleaded factual allegations,"a court must conduct a "context-specific" analysis drawing on "its judicial experience and common sense" and determine whether the factual allegations "plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief."Id. at 1950-51.The plausibility standard requires more than a showing of "a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."Id. at 1949.In other words, "a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."Id.

C.Pro Se Plaintiff

The Court construes the pro se Complaint in this case more liberally than those drafted by an attorney.SeeHaines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520(1972);see alsoKhozam v. LSAA, Inc., No. 3:06cv298, 2007 WL 2932817(W.D.N.C.Oct. 5, 2007).Nevertheless, while pro se litigants cannot "be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issuesnever fairly presented to them."Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276(4th Cir.1985).Thus, even in cases involving pro se litigants, as in here, the Court"cannot be expected to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments."Id. at 1278.

III.Analysis

Though difficult to surmise, the Court reads Plaintiff's Complaint as alleging the following causes of action: (1) Jazzie Pools "intentionally and fraudulently interfered with [Plaintiff's] business with the IRS,"³(Compl. ¶ 4); (2) Jazzie Pools "committed the intentional tort of fraud by writing a false statement to the IRS,"(Compl. ¶ 4); (3) Jazzie Pools "displayed a negligent disregard for what is required under United States [l]aw and what is held as a customary element of the employer-employee relationship in that the employer has a customary duty of care . . . to not interfere in the employee's tax obligations and to consistently state what [employees] earn,"(Compl. ¶ 5); (4)Defendant's "tortious actions" violated "26 U.S.C. § 7204,26 U.S.C. § 6051,26 U.S.C. § 7206,26 U.S.C. § 6674,26 U.S.C. § 7207,26 U.S.C. § 3402,26 U.S.C. § 6682,26 U.S.C. § 6723,26 U.S.C. § 1441,26 U.S.C. § 7501,"(Compl. ¶ 6); and (5) Jazzie Pools acted "reckless[ly] and negligent[ly] in that a reasonable person could assume thattheir employer would not interfere with their tax obligations without their consent and would obey all applicable sections of the Internal Revenue Code."(Compl. ¶ 7.)

For its part, Defendant argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case.(Memorandum in Support [Dkt. 13]("Mem.")at 1.)Specifically, Defendant argues that the Complaint "lists a number of citations to Title 26 of the United States Code that relate to penalties which the United States may seek against employers who violate the federal tax code" but it does "not plead a 'civil action[] arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,'28 U.S.C. § 1331, that he himself may bring."Id.Presumably, Defendant's argument is that the Court must dismiss Plaintiff's Internal Revenue Code allegations for failure to state a claim and, after doing so, must dismiss the remaining claims for lack of subject matter and supplemental jurisdiction.

Defendant also argues that dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff lacks standing.(Mem.at 2.)

With this in mind, the Court will address each Count in turn.

A.Count 1

Count 1...