Runion v. Minn. Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 06 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-2538 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | TERRIE L. RUNION, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Ashleigh Runion, Plaintiff, v. MINNESOTA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
Pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on Count One of the complaint. ECF Nos. 16 (Defendant's motion) and 18 (Plaintiff's motion). Plaintiff, the administratrix of the estate of her deceased daughter, Ashleigh Runion ("Ms. Runion"), seeks a declaratory judgment that accidental death benefits are payable pursuant to a life insurance policy issued by Defendant Minnesota Life Insurance Company. Defendant argues that the terms of its policy specifically exclude accidental death coverage for Ms. Runion's death and asks the Court to enter judgment in its favor. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiff's motion.
This case arises from an automobile collision that tragically resulted in the death of Ashleigh Runion and her 10-month-old son. The relevant facts surrounding the collision areuncontested.1 On the morning of July 4, 2010, Ms. Runion was operating a motor vehicle traveling southbound on U.S. Route 35 in Putnam County, West Virginia. Her son was in the front passenger seat without a child safety seat. Neither was wearing a seat belt. Witnesses observed Ms. Runion's vehicle cross the center line into the northbound lane, going against the flow of traffic. One northbound vehicle ran off the road to avoid a collision with Ms. Runion's vehicle. Ms. Runion's vehicle continued driving the wrong way in the northbound lane, towards an oncoming tractor trailer. In an apparent attempt to avoid collision, the tractor trailer began to move into the southbound lane. Ms. Runion's vehicle, however, then moved back to the proper lane and collided with the tractor trailer. She and her son were pronounced dead at the scene.
The Office of the Medical Examiner performed a post-mortem examination of Ms. Runion's body to determine the cause of death. Ex. 3, Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 21-5. The examination included a blood and urine toxicology analysis. Ex. 7, Pl.'s Mot. Summ J., ECF No. 18-7. The medical examiner found multiple injuries due to the motor vehicle collision, which included bone fractures, lacerations, and a "closed chest injury." Ex. 3, ECF No. 21-5, at 6. The toxicology report states that Ms. Runion's blood contained two controlled substances: oxycodone in a concentration of 0.27 mg/L and oxymorphone in a concentration of 0.02 mg/L. ECF No. 18-7. The report identified a "therapeutic" concentration of oxycodone to be within the range 0.01 mg/L to 0.10 mg/L, and a level in excess of .10 mg/L is considered "toxic." Id. The report noted that "[t]he narcotic analgesic oxycodone was present in the blood at a concentration that can cause toxicity in those who do not have tolerance to opiate medications." Id. The medical examiner's final opinion as to cause of death was that Ms. Runion "died as the result of multipleinjuries received as the unrestrained, oxycodone impaired operator of a motor vehicle involved in a two vehicle crash." Ex. 3, ECF No. 21-5, at 6.
As an employee of the Putnam County Schools, Ms. Runion was insured by a group term life insurance policy issued by Defendant, Minnesota Life Insurance Company. Ex. 1, Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 16-1. Upon Ms. Runion's death, Defendant paid Plaintiff's claim for basic and optional term life benefits, in the amount of $110,000. Plaintiff also submitted a claim for accidental death benefits, which are provided under an Accidental Death and Dismemberment Policy Rider. On July 22, 2011, Defendant denied this claim. Ex. 6, Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 18-6. Plaintiff thereafter filed this action, alleging that Defendant wrongfully denied Plaintiff's claim for accidental death benefits. Count One of the complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the life insurance policy provides accidental death coverage for Ms. Runion's death. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12. In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts a claim that Defendant violated the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, W. Va. Code § 33-11-4. Compl. ¶¶ 13-17. The parties have now filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Count One of the complaint. With this background in mind, the Court now turns to the language of the policy, the parties' arguments, and the applicable legal standards.
To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court will not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter[.]" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Instead, the Court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts inthe light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).
Although the Court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer some "concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor[.]" Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere "scintilla of evidence" in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The dispositive issue here is whether Ms. Runion's death qualifies as an "accidental death" under the terms of her life insurance policy, for which benefits are payable. It is a contract dispute. In a West Virginia action for declaratory judgment to determine the scope of coverage under a particular insurance policy, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case that the claim falls within the scope of coverage. Camden-Clark Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 682 S.E.2d 566, 574 (W. Va. 2009). Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the insurer to demonstrate that an exclusion applies. Id. . Where "the policy language involved is exclusionary, it will be strictly construed against the insurer in order that the purpose of providing indemnity not be defeated." Id. ). Although insurance contracts are construed liberally in favor of the insured, Syl., Thompson v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.E.2d 849 (W. Va. 1940), "[w]here theprovisions of an insurance policy contract are clear and unambiguous they are not subject to judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be given to the plain meaning intended." Syl., Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 172 S.E.2d 714 (W. Va. 1970).
The accidental death provision of the life insurance policy "provides a benefit for an insured employee's or an insured dependent's accidental death . . . which occurs as a result of an accidental injury." Policy, Ex. 1, Def.'s Mot. Summ J., ECF No. 16-1. The policy defines "accidental death by accidental injury" to mean "that the insured's death . . . results, directly and independently of all other causes, from an accidental injury which is unintended, unexpected, and unforeseen." Id. The policy also contains the following coverage exclusions:
ECF No. 16-1. Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to accidental death benefits under the policy for three reasons. First, a fatal motor vehicle collision while driving under the influence does not qualify as an "accidental injury" under the terms of the policy because it is not unexpected and unforeseen. Denial Ltr., ECF No. 21-5. Second, policy exclusion number two applies because Ms. Runion's death resulted from the commission of a felony—in this case, driving under the influence, causing death. Id. Third, policy exclusion number four appliesbecause Ms. Runion's death resulted from her abuse of drugs. Id. Because the Court finds that the policy exclusions bar Plaintiff's claim, a determination whether Ms. Runion's collision was an unforeseeable accident is unnecessary.2
Policy exclusion number two denies coverage where the insured's death is caused directly or indirectly by, resulting from, or where there is a contribution from, the insured's participation in a felony. The plain language of this exclusion is clear and unambiguous. It will therefore be interpreted according to its plain meaning. Cf. Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Scott, 330 F. Supp. 2d 661, 666 (E.D. Va. 2004) (). Defendant argues that this exclusion operates to bar Plaintiff's claim because Ms. Runion died as a result of her participation in a felony.
Under West Virginia law, a person who drives under the...
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