Runion v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 03 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-2540 |
| Parties | TERRIE L. RUNION, individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Ashleigh Runion, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on Count One of the complaint. ECF No. 20 (Defendant's motion); ECF No. 24 (Plaintiff's motion). Plaintiff, the administratrix of the estate of her deceased daughter, Ashleigh Runion ("Ms. Runion"), seeks a declaratory judgment that accidental death benefits are payable pursuant to a life insurance policy issued by Conseco Life Insurance Company. Defendant1 argues that the terms of its policy specifically exclude accidental death coverage for Ms. Runion's death and asks the Court to enter judgment in its favor. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiff's motion.
This case arises from an automobile collision that tragically resulted in the death of Ashleigh Runion and her 10-month-old son.2 The relevant facts surrounding the collision are uncontested.3 On the morning of July 4, 2010, Ms. Runion was operating a motor vehicle traveling southbound on U.S. Route 35 in Putnam County, West Virginia. Her son was in the front passenger seat without a child safety seat. Neither was wearing a seat belt. Witnesses observed Ms. Runion's vehicle cross the center line into the northbound lane, going against the flow of traffic. One northbound vehicle ran off the road to avoid a collision with Ms. Runion's vehicle. Ms. Runion's vehicle continued driving the wrong way in the northbound lane, towards an oncoming tractor trailer. In an apparent attempt to avoid collision, the tractor trailer began to move into the southbound lane. Ms. Runion's vehicle, however, then moved back to the proper lane and collided with the tractor trailer. She and her son were pronounced dead at the scene.
The Office of the Medical Examiner performed a post-mortem examination of Ms. Runion's body to determine the cause of death. See Ex. 1F, Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 20-3. The examination included a blood and urine toxicology analysis. Ex. 1B, Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 30-1. The medical examiner identified the immediate cause of death as "multiple injuries" due to a motor vehicle collision. Ex. 1F, ECF No. 20-3. He further noted on Ms. Runion's death certificate that another "significant condition contributing to death" was "operator impairment," specifically "oxycodone intoxication." Id. The toxicology report states that Ms.Runion's blood contained oxycodone in a concentration of 0.27 mg/L. Ex. 1B, ECF No. 30-1. The report identified a "therapeutic" concentration of oxycodone to be within the range 0.01 mg/L to 0.10 mg/L, and a level in excess of .10 mg/L is considered toxic. Id. The report noted that "[t]he narcotic analgesic oxycodone was present in the blood at a concentration that can cause toxicity in those who do not have tolerance to opiate medications." Id.
Approximately three months before her death, Ms. Runion purchased a life insurance policy issued by Defendant. Ex. 1A, Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 30-1. The policy provided coverage for accidental death and dismemberment with disability. After Ms. Runion's death, Plaintiff submitted a claim for accidental death benefits, which Defendant denied. Ex. 6, Pl.'s Mot. Summ J., ECF No. 24-6. Plaintiff thereafter filed this action, alleging that Defendant wrongfully denied Plaintiff's claim for accidental death benefits. Count One of the complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the insurance policy provides accidental death coverage for Ms. Runion's death. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11. In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts a claim that Defendant violated the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, W. Va. Code § 33-11-4. Compl. ¶¶ 12-16. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Count One of the complaint. With this background in mind, the Court now turns to the language of the policy, the parties' arguments, and the applicable legal standards.
To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court will not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter[.]" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,249 (1986). Instead, the Court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).
Although the Court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer some "concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor[.]" Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere "scintilla of evidence" in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The dispositive issue here is whether Ms. Runion's death qualifies as an accidental death under the terms of her life insurance policy, for which benefits are payable. It is a contract dispute. In a West Virginia action for declaratory judgment to determine the scope of coverage under a particular insurance policy, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case that the claim falls within the scope of coverage. Camden-Clark Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 682 S.E.2d 566, 574 (W. Va. 2009). Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the insurer to demonstrate that an exclusion applies. Id. . Where "the policy language involved is exclusionary, it will be strictly construed against the insurer in order that the purpose of providing indemnity not be defeated." Id. ). Although insurance contracts are construed liberally in favor of the insured,Syl., Thompson v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.E.2d 849 (W. Va. 1940), "[w]here the provisions of an insurance policy contract are clear and unambiguous they are not subject to judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be given to the plain meaning intended." Syl., Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 172 S.E.2d 714 (W. Va. 1970).
As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether the expert report attached to Defendant's motion for summary judgment may be considered by the Court. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Defendant offers the expert report of Alphonse Poklis, Ph.D. Ex. 2, Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 20-4. Plaintiff argues that this report should be excluded because it is not properly authenticated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and because it is unreliable. Plaintiff does not challenge Dr. Poklis's qualifications or ability to provide expert testimony.
The fact that the expert report was initially submitted without an authenticating affidavit does not mandate its exclusion. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(1) states that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact . . . as required by Rule 56(c), the court may give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact." In its response brief, Defendant offers a supplementary affidavit signed by Dr. Poklis, authenticating the report. The Court now accepts this affidavit. Therefore, because Defendant has properly supported its assertion of fact after being given the opportunity to do so, and because the expert report presented no unfair surprise or prejudice to Plaintiff, the Court will not reject Dr. Poklis's report on this ground.
Plaintiff next argues that Dr. Poklis's report should be excluded as unreliable because it is not based on sufficient facts, as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 702.4 In his report, Dr. Poklis states, "There is no indication in the material reviewed that Ms. Runion was ever prescribed oxycodone at any time within several years of her death!" ECF No. 25-2 at 2 (exclamation in original). Ms. Runion's prescription records, however, indicate that she received one prescription for oxycodone on August 15, 2009. Ex. 9, Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 24-9; Ex. 2, ECF No. 24-2. Plaintiff argues that this erroneous statement in the report demonstrates that it is unreliable as a whole and should be excluded from the Court's consideration. In response, Defendant claims that this particular prescription record was not produced in discovery and thus was unavailable to Dr. Poklis. The Court, however, need not venture into this discovery dispute to resolve this issue. Defendant submitted a rebuttal affidavit of Dr. Poklis, in which he stated that after becoming aware of this oxycodone prescription, his expert opinion is that "there is no way of knowing whether the Oxycodone Ashleigh Runion ingested in the hours before her death were from the prescription she was given on August 15, 2009, or whether she acquired the Oxycodone elsewhere." Ex. 7, Def.'s Resp., ECF No. 25-3, ¶ 6. His "opinions regarding Ashleigh Runion's severe impairment at the time of the accident," however, "remain unchanged." ECF No. 25-3 ¶ 12.
The Court...
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