Runyan v. BD. OF EDUC. OF COVINGTON EXEMPTED VILLAGE
| Decision Date | 02 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. C-3-84-519.,C-3-84-519. |
| Citation | 614 F. Supp. 625 |
| Parties | Dwane I. RUNYAN, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the COVINGTON EXEMPTED VILLAGE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Stephen D. Martin, Worthington, Ohio, for plaintiff.
James P. Barnes, Columbus, Ohio, for defendant.
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant in 1980 as a non-tenured industrial arts instructor under a five-year limited contract. . Plaintiff was in the fourth year of his contract when he ceased his teaching duties at Covington Middle School and Covington High School on March 30, 1984. He now contends that Defendant deprived him of his property without affording him due process of law in connection with this termination of his teaching duties.
Plaintiff attests to difficulties with his hearing as of at least 1978. (Runyan deposition, p. 29). He lost his license as a school bus driver in 1982 due to these difficulties. By November, 1983, Plaintiff's personal physician, Dr. Miller, advised Plaintiff that the noise in his teaching environment was exacerbating his hearing loss and that this hearing loss permanently incapacitated Plaintiff from performing his teaching duties. (Runyan deposition, p. 34). Based on the recommendation of Dr. Miller, which was later confirmed by additional testing, Plaintiff submitted a disability retirement application to the State Teachers Retirement System (STRS) on or about December 27, 1983. (Doc. # 13, ¶ 6).
On or about March 20, 1984, Plaintiff and Larry G. Henry, Superintendent of the Covington Exempted School District, each received a copy of a letter from the STRS. (Doc. # 13, ¶ 7 and Ex. B). The letter stated that the STRS needed information as to Plaintiff's last day of teaching and last day of sick leave before it could complete the processing of Plaintiff's application for disability retirement. The letter further stated that Plaintiff had to terminate his teaching responsibilities as of March 30, 1984, in order for processing of the application to continue. There is no STRS policy which requires that an employee use all of his accumulated sick leave prior to receiving disability retirement benefits. (Zimmerman deposition, p. 53).
Plaintiff and Superintendent Henry met on March 20, 1984, to discuss the March 20 letter from the STRS. (Doc. # 13, ¶ 8). Plaintiff desired to terminate his teaching on March 30, 1984, as stipulated by the STRS, and communicated this desire to Superintendent Henry at the meeting. (Runyan deposition, p. 48). Plaintiff understood that the STRS' criterion for disability retirement was that he have a permanent injury or illness which prevented him from teaching. Id. Plaintiff also informed Superintendent Henry of his need to ascertain, for purposes of the letter from the STRS, the number of days of sick leave which he had accumulated. Superintendent Henry was unable to provide that information to Plaintiff during the course of the meeting.
Subsequent to his March 20th meeting with Superintendent Henry, Plaintiff learned from another employee of Defendant that he had accumulated 194½ days of sick leave. Plaintiff calculated that he would accumulate fifteen days of sick leave between March 30, 1984, the last day of his teaching, and the expiration of his accumulated days of sick leave. Plaintiff then responded to the letter which he had received from the STRS, informing them that his last day of teaching would be March 30, 1984, and that his last day of sick leave would be May 30, 1985. (Runyan deposition, p. 55; Doc. # 13; Ex. C).
Plaintiff and his pupils were switched out of the industrial arts shops and into classrooms for their regularly-scheduled meetings on March 20, 1984. This arrangement continued until Plaintiff's last day of teaching on March 30, 1984.
The STRS' response to Plaintiff's letter came in their letter of March 26, 1984, copies of which were again sent to Plaintiff and to Superintendent Henry. The STRS indicated that, on the basis of Plaintiff's plan to utilize his accumulated sick leave, and thus to draw his salary from Defendant through May of 1985, Plaintiff's application for disability retirement benefits would be considered in May, 1985, with insurance coverage to begin on June 1, 1985. (Doc. # 13; Ex. D).
On March 28, 1984, members of Defendant Board of Education met to discuss Plaintiff's desire to exhaust his accumulated sick leave prior to being placed on disability retirement by the STRS. Superintendent Henry outlined for members of Defendant the options which Defendant's legal counsel had outlined with respect to Plaintiff's proposed utilization of his accumulated sick leave. The first option was to allow Plaintiff to exhaust his sick leave as he requested. The second option was to place Plaintiff on an unpaid leave of absence due to medical reasons, as authorized by Section 3319.13 of the Ohio Revised Code. (Henry deposition, p. 17-20).
Members of Defendant Board of Education met again on April 9, 1984, to discuss Plaintiff's plan to utilize his accumulated sick leave. They decided to pursue neither of the options previously outlined to them by Superintendent Henry. Rather, they looked to the collective bargaining agreement in effect between Defendant and the Covington Education Association, which represents the district's teachers.1 Under Art. VI, Section 3 of the collective bargaining agreement, employees with five or more years of service, at the time of their retirement "shall receive payment based on the employee's rate of pay at retirement ... for one-fourth of the employee's accrued but unused sick leave up to a maximum of forty (40) days."2 Defendant authorized Superintendent Henry and Treasurer Brinkman to convert Plaintiff's accumulated sick leave into severance pay in accordance with this provision. This authorization occurred during an executive session; Defendant took no formal action on the issue. (Henry deposition, p. 45).
On April 10, 1984, Superintendent Henry sent a letter to the STRS to inform them that March 30, 1984, had been Plaintiff's last day of sick leave as well as his last day of teaching. (Doc. # 13; Ex. D, F). On April 13, 1984, Superintendent Henry met with Plaintiff and presented him with two checks. The first represented an amount calculated as the difference between Plaintiff's paychecks to date and the amount which Plaintiff had actually earned on a per diem basis. The second check represented Plaintiff's severance pay and was equal to forty days of sick leave. (Doc. # 13; Ex. G). Plaintiff accepted both checks, but later returned them.
On the basis of Superintendent Henry's letter of April 10, the STRS sent a letter to both Plaintiff and the Superintendent on April 12, 1984. The letter stated that Plaintiff's disability retirement application would be considered on May 18, 1984, and that his health insurance would become effective on June 1, 1984. (Doc. # 13; Ex. H).
On April 23, 1984, Plaintiff filed with Treasurer Brinkman a document entitled "Written Demand, Pursuant to § 3319.16, Ohio Revised Code, For a Hearing Before a Referee." (Doc. # 13, Ex. I). Attached to said document was a sick leave affidavit completed by Plaintiff in which Plaintiff requested 200 days of sick leave beginning March 30, 1984, and ending May 13, 1985. (Doc. # 13, ¶ 16). It was a common practice for employees of Defendant to fill out a sick leave request after taking sick leave. (Runyan deposition, p. 19-20). The affidavit was Plaintiff's first such written request to utilize his accumulated sick leave. (Doc. # 13, ¶ 16).
Plaintiff's demand for a hearing was denied in a letter sent by Superintendent Henry to Plaintiff on April 25, 1984. Neither Defendant nor any of its agents or employees have approved the sick leave affidavit filed by Plaintiff on April 23, 1984. (Doc. # 13, ¶ 17).
On May 18, 1984, the STRS approved Plaintiff's application for disability retirement benefits, setting April 1, 1984, as the effective date for Plaintiff's receipt of benefits. (Runyan deposition, p. 66). The STRS made disability retirement benefit payments to Plaintiff until approximately June 29, 1984, when Plaintiff requested the STRS to discontinue his benefits and health coverage until resolution of the instant lawsuit. (Runyan deposition, p. 76).
The collective bargaining agreement governing Plaintiff and Defendant's relationship includes an internal grievance procedure with a right of appeal to the state courts. (Doc. # 13; Ex. L). Plaintiff has never filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement with respect to the dispute as to the proper disposition of his accumulated sick leave. (Doc. # 13, ¶ 21).
Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on June 6, 1984, seeking damages and equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Board of Education, Superintendent Henry and Treasurer Brinkman. (Doc. # 1). On July 10, 1984, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. # 7). Joint Stipulations of Fact were filed by the parties on August 15, 1984. (Doc. # 13). Plaintiff dismissed his claims against the individual Defendants on August 16, 1984. (Doc. # 16). Defendant Board of Education filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on August 21, 1984 (Doc. # 19), which said motion was superseded, in its entirety, by a similar motion filed by the Defendant on September 10, 1984 (Doc. # 23). In its order of September 13, 1984, this Court mooted Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. # 2). Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was conditionally sustained unless Plaintiff prepared and served within a prescribed time an Amended Complaint which fully complied with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. The Court chose not to rule upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at that time. (Doc. # 24). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 14, 1984 (Doc. # 28), and filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on October 4, 1984. (Doc. # 30).
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Hannan v. Chesapeake Union Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
...23, 516 N.E.2d 1261; and South Euclid Fraternal Order of Police v. D'Amico (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 46, 13 OBR 49, 468 N.E.2d 735. In Runyan, supra, the Second District Court of Appeals " * * * An employee earns sick leave, accumulates it, and may elect to use it only for the enumerated purpo......