Runyan v. United Broth. of Carpenters, Civ. A. No. 82-K-503.

Citation566 F. Supp. 600
Decision Date15 June 1983
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 82-K-503.
PartiesKeith R. RUNYAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS, etc., et al., Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bruce Anderson, Nelson & Harding, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.

Clay R. Smith, McKendree & Lubin, Denver, Colo., for the Brotherhood.

Walter C. Brauer, III, Brauer, Simons & Buescher, Denver, Colo., for Local 1391.

Gerald C. Boyle, Englewood, Colo., for Martinez and Schultehenrich.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KANE, District Judge.

After plaintiff was suspended from his appointed position with Local 1391, this action was instituted. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order of December 30, 1982, 554 F.Supp. 859, all claims of the complaint and the amended complaint were dismissed. Plaintiff was granted

15 days within which to file a second amended complaint alleging with specificity any claims he may have regarding a violation of his Title I rights as a member (not an official or employee) of the union and any claims going toward his charge that he has been barred from all union activities.

A second amended complaint, filed January 20, 1983, alleges claims based on the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, §§ 101(a)(1), (2), (5), 102 and 609, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1), (2), (5), 412 and 529 and pendent claims for defamation, tortious interference with contract, breach of employment contract, breach of union contract and civil conspiracy. Local 1391 has filed an answer and cross-claim, a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. Defendants Martinez and Schultehenrich filed a motion to dismiss which was converted to a motion for summary judgment by order of February 2, 1983. Defendants United Brotherhood and the District Council have filed motions for summary judgment directed to the second amended complaint and the cross-claim. All motions are ripe for determination.

DEFENDANT LOCAL 1391'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Local 1391 moves to dismiss the second amended complaint because it was untimely filed. It also moves for dismissal of the third claim because all elements of the tort of interference with contract are not present. Both motions are denied.

My Memorandum Opinion and Order of December 30, 1982 directed that

plaintiff shall have 15 days from the date of this order within which to file a second amended complaint ...

An order of January 5, 1983 issued pursuant to the Memorandum Opinion and Order also stated

that plaintiff has 15 days to amend as ordered or the civil action will be dismissed without further hearing or order.

Plaintiff's second amended complaint was filed on January 20, 1983 — within 15 days after the January 5th order. Plaintiff's possible confusion about the date from which to calculate the running of his 15 days is understandable. Local 1391 is not prejudiced, beyond the filing of the complaint itself, by the plaintiff's use of the January 5th date rather than the December 30th date. The motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.

The third claim in the second amended complaint says in part:

34. Defendants International, District Council Bernard S. Martinez and August Schultehenrich, with full knowledge of this April, 1977 Employment Agreement, or with knowledge of facts which should have lead them to inquire as to the existence of this Employment Agreement, intentionally and maliciously interfered with, and prevented the continued performance by Plaintiff of, the Employment Agreement, by wrongfully procuring the suspension of Plaintiff from his position as Financial Secretary and Business Representative.

The wording shows that it is not directed to defendant Local 1391. Local 1391's motion to dismiss this claim is denied. Plaintiff's request for attorneys fees and costs for preparation of its response necessitated by the filing of this motion is denied. Such matters may be considered post-trial if appropriate.

THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants Martinez and Schultehenrich moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), F.R. Civ.P. Because this motion relied on matters outside of the pleadings, it was converted to a motion for summary judgment under F.R.Civ.P. 56. Donovan v. Gingerbread House, 536 F.Supp. 627 (D.Colo.1982) (Kane, J.) Defendants United Brotherhood, District Council and defendants Martinez and Schultehenrich seek dismissal of plaintiff's first claim for relief based on their lack of knowledge that any action would be taken against plaintiff prior to the April 13, 1981 meeting when he was suspended; that plaintiff has failed to allege that Martinez and Schultehenrich took any action against plaintiff purporting to abridge his membership rights; and the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his internal union remedies before filing this action. All defendants assert that the second through sixth claims for relief must be dismissed because there is no separate and independent jurisdiction to sustain them and pendent jurisdiction should not be extended to these claims because they do not arise from a common nucleus of operative facts with the first claim. Defendants maintain that the factual bases of the state claims are irrelevant to the federal claim and will only serve to complicate the trial and confuse the jury if permitted to remain in this case. If the motions directed to these pendent claims are denied, defendants United Brotherhood and District Council request a more definite statement concerning plaintiff's defamation claim.

THE MEMBERSHIP RIGHTS ISSUE

My Memorandum Opinion and Order of December 30 made it clear that, based on Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982), Title I of the Landrum-Griffin Act, Sections 101(a) and 102, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. protects plaintiff from any infringement of his rights as a member of the union, but will not protect infringement of any rights arising from his position as Financial Secretary and Business Representative for the union. My order limited plaintiff in the filing of his second amended complaint "to any direct impingement of his rights as a member qua member." In his second amended complaint, plaintiff has alleged that because of his vocal disagreements with defendants on various policies associated with the union, he was suspended from his position with the union and prohibited from discussing actions taken against him with other union members. Plaintiff alleges further that he was excluded from participating in all union affairs, including the right to attend membership meetings. (See affidavit of plaintiff of November 19, 1982).

A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P. may be granted only when there is no dispute as to any genuine issue of material fact. It is not a substitute trial. Commercial Iron and Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39, 41 (10th Cir.1973). All defendants dispute plaintiff's contentions that he was excluded from exercising his membership rights in the union. These disputations give rise to a genuine issue of material fact that precludes the entry of summary judgment. These issues must await consideration by the trier of fact. The converted motion for summary judgment on this ground is denied.

THE PENDENT JURISDICTION QUESTION

Plaintiff's second through sixth claims for relief in the second amended complaint seek recovery on state law claims under exercise of this court's pendent jurisdiction. All defendants seek summary judgment on these pendent claims.

The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction was first announced by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824). The rule as established is

when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved.

The doctrine permits the district court to decide all questions that the case presents. In the landmark case of United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that the power to entertain pendent claims exists when the state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." The doctrine is implemented in the interest of judicial economy and permits consideration of all claims that would be expected to be tried in a single proceeding. The doctrine is one of discretion and not of right. 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. Needless decisions of state law should be avoided. In addition to the consideration of judicial economy, a court in determining whether pendent jurisdiction should be exercised, should also consider convenience and fairness to the litigants. A court should refuse to extend its jurisdiction if difficult questions of state law would be involved or if the exercise would complicate the trial to a jury. Id.

Defendants contend that they would be prejudiced if these pendent claims are permitted to remain a part of this action and assert that exercise of pendent jurisdiction over these claims would be improper. Plaintiff counters that his second through sixth claims arise out of the "common nucleus of operative facts," will not complicate a trial of this case and this court's exercise of pendent jurisdiction over these claims is appropriate.

As outlined earlier, plaintiff's federal claim for relief, his first claim, alleges a violation of his Title I rights and charges that defendants, by their actions of April 13, 1981, suspended plaintiff from his office with the union, denied him all participation in union activities, and barred him from discussing his situation with other union members. The second claim for relief alleges that at meetings subsequent to plaintiff's suspension, defendants referred to plaintiff as a "thief" and "crook" and alleged that he mishandled union funds. All statements made in...

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