Runyan v. United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners

• Citation: 554 F. Supp. 859
• Decision Date: 30 December 1982
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 82-K-503.
• Parties: Keith R. RUNYAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, a labor organization; Carpenters District Council of Denver and Vicinity, a labor organization; Carpenters Drywall Acoustical Lather and Specialties, Local Union 1391, a labor organization; Bernard S. Martinez, individually and in his capacity as Financial Secretary and Business Representative —pro-tem, Carpenters Drywall Acoustical Lather and Specialties, Local Union 1391; August C. Schultehenrich, individually and in his capacity as President and member of the Executive Committee, Carpenters Drywall Acoustical Lather and Specialties, Local Union 1391, and Other as Yet Unnamed Co-Conspirators, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

554 F. Supp. 859

Keith R. RUNYAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, a labor organization; Carpenters District Council of Denver and Vicinity, a labor organization; Carpenters Drywall Acoustical Lather and Specialties, Local Union 1391, a labor organization; Bernard S. Martinez, individually and in his capacity as Financial Secretary and Business Representative —pro-tem, Carpenters Drywall Acoustical Lather and Specialties, Local Union 1391; August C. Schultehenrich, individually and in his capacity as President and member of the Executive Committee, Carpenters Drywall Acoustical Lather and Specialties, Local Union 1391, and Other as Yet Unnamed Co-Conspirators, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 82-K-503.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

December 30, 1982.

Bruce Anderson, Nelson & Harding, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.

John W. McKendree, McKendree & Lubin, Denver, Colo., for United Broth. and Dist. Council.

Walter C. Brauer, III, Brauer, Simons & Buescher, P.C., Denver, Colo., for Local 1391.

Gerard C. Boyle, Englewood, Colo., for Schultehenrich and Martinez.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KANE, District Judge.

Plaintiff was suspended from his elected position as Financial Secretary and Business Representative of Local 1391. He brings this civil action charging violations of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Sections 101(a)(2) and 102¹ of Title I, and § 609 of Title VI, The Landrum Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Jurisdiction is invoked under Title 29 U.S.C. §§ 412 and 529, Title 29 U.C.C. § 185, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. Defendants United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO and Carpenters District Council of Denver and Vicinity move for summary judgment; defendants Local 1391, Martinez and Schultehenrich move for dismissal. The issues have been extensively briefed and the matter is now ripe for my determination.

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that prior to April 13, 1981 he was a member in good standing of Local 1391 and the International within the meaning of Section 3 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LRMDA), 29 U.S.C. § 402, and was the duly elected Financial Secretary and Business Representative of Local 1391. On April 13, 1981 at the direction of the International president, William Konyha, plaintiff was suspended from his position with the Union pending completion of a financial audit of the books and records of 1391 and an investigation into allegations of mismanagement, misappropriation, overpayments, improper disbursements and unauthorized signatures. Plaintiff's credentials as representative to the Carpenters District Council of Denver and Vicinity were revoked April 14, 1981. Plaintiff additionally alleges that he has been barred from participation in union activities.

Plaintiff remains on suspended status and alleges that defendants have refused and failed to advise him of the results of the audits and any investigation despite a statement of a union representative that he would be advised, and have refused or failed to bring any formal or written charges. As a basis for his claims, plaintiff states that he and defendants had been "at odds" over certain matters affecting the union before the date of his suspension. Not only did defendant Martinez "covet" plaintiff's position, but Martinez was appointed to the position after Runyan's suspension. Plaintiff maintains that the allegations of misappropriation of union funds which resulted in his suspension were wilfully and maliciously instituted by defendants with reckless and wanton indifference to the rights of plaintiff and seek to punish plaintiff for exercising his rights under the U.S. Constitution and the union constitution and to "coerce him to cease and desist from acting in opposition to certain District and International policies." (Pg. 4, Amended Complaint) Plaintiff also charges retaliation based on defendants' refusal and failure to bring charges as required under the union laws and constitution and asserts that these acts also were maliciously and wilfully done. Plaintiff maintains that defendants' actions constitute "discipline" within the meaning of § 609.

Plaintiff's first and second claims for relief are based on the LMRDA, the third claim alleges a violation of Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and the fourth claim is based on the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Plaintiff's fifth and sixth claims ask this court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over allegations of tortious interference with contract and defamation. Defendants seek summary judgment and dismissal as to all claims.

THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING & DISCLOSURE ACT CLAIMS

Defendants United Brotherhood and District Council move for summary judgment on plaintiff's LMRDA claims because (1) plaintiff's suspension was based on reasons unrelated to the exercise of Title I rights and (2) even if the suspension did arguably derive from the exercise of such rights, no claim is stated since his membership rights were unaffected. Defendants Local, Martinez and Schultehenrich aver the same arguments in support of their motion to dismiss these claims.

The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was the product of congressional concern with wide-spread abuses of power by union leadership. Title I of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 is the "Bill of Rights of Membership of Labor Organizations." Sections 101(a)(1) and (2), §§ 411(a)(1) and (2), guarantee equal voting rights, and rights of speech and assembly to "every member of a labor organization."

Section 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529, provides: It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this chapter.

Defendants argue that plaintiff's suspension was not effected because of the exercise of his Title I rights, but was implemented solely because of legitimate concern over possible financial improprieties. Voluminous affidavits and documentation are supplied in support of this argument. Plaintiff rebuts this position by arguing that he has asserted sufficient evidence to show that his suspension from the elected office and from participation in union affairs was in retaliation for the exercise of his LMRDA rights.

Defendants cite numerous cases in support of their argument: Schonfeld v. Penza, 477 F.2d 899 (2nd Cir.1973); Martire v. Laborers Local 1058, 410 F.2d 32 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903, 90 S.Ct. 216, 24 L.Ed.2d 179 (1969); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir.1973) en banc cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960, 94 S.Ct. 1490, 39 L.Ed.2d 575 (1974); and, Kinney v. Electrical Workers, 669 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir.1982). Plaintiff argues the opposite position and cites the following precedent in support: Grand Lodge of International Assoc. of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.1964) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920, 85 S.Ct. 274, 13 L.Ed.2d 334 (1964); George v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers International Union, 255 F.Supp. 239 (E.D.Wis.1966); DeCampli v. Greeley, 239 F.Supp. 746 (D.N.J.1968); Retail Clerks Union Local 648 v. Retail Clerks International Ass'n, 299 F.Supp. 1012 (D.C.D.C.1969); Lamb v. Miller, 660 F.2d 792 (D.C.Cir.1981); Maciera v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8 (1st Cir.1981); Witt v. Myers, 343 F.Supp. 873 (W.D.Mich.1971); Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2nd Cir.1963); Wood v. Dennis, supra; Miller v. Holden, 535 F.2d 912 (5th Cir.1976); Cooke v. Organe Belt District Council of Painters, 529 F.2d 815 (9th Cir.1976); and Bradford v. Textile Workers, Local 1093, 563 F.2d 1138, 96 LRRM 2690 (4th Cir.1977). Because of the obvious split of authority, the Supreme Court considered this issue recently in Finnegan v. Leu, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982).²

The Finnegan case involved the discharge of appointed union business agents.³ Like the instant action, suit was instituted under the Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 534, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals both held that the Act did not protect the business agents from discharge, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court looked to the language of the various sections 101(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1) and (2), and 29 U.S.C. § 529 and concluded

it is readily apparent, both from the language of these provisions and from the legislative history of Title I, that it was rank and file union members—not union officers, or employees, as such— whom Congress sought to protect. 102 S.Ct. at 1871.

As in the present action, petitioners in Finnegan argued that discharge from a position as a union employee or official constituted "discipline" under § 609. The Court rejected this argument and said:

We conclude that the term `discipline,' as used in § 609, refers only to retaliatory actions that affect a union member's rights or status as a member of the union. Section 609 speaks in terms of disciplining `members'; and the three disciplinary sanctions specifically enumerated—fine, suspension and expulsion—are all punitive actions taken against union members as members. In contrast, discharge from union employment does not impinge upon the incidents of union membership, and affects union members only to the extent that they happen also to be union employees. (citations omitted) We discern nothing in § 609, or its legislative history, to support petitioners' claim that Congress intended to establish a system of job security or tenure for appointed union employees. Id.

Plaintiff here contends that he has been suspended from his position as Financial Secretary and Business Representative and has been banned from...