Runyon v. State, No. 27596.

Docket NºNo. 27596.
Citation219 Ind. 352, 38 N.E.2d 235
Case DateDecember 29, 1941
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

219 Ind. 352
38 N.E.2d 235

RUNYON
v.
STATE.

No. 27596.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Dec. 29, 1941.


Appeal from Criminal Court, Marion County; Dewey E. Myers, judge.

Mary Runyon was convicted of the offense of leaving the scene of an accident in which the motor vehicle which she was driving was involved without giving the assistance or the information required by statute, and she appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

[38 N.E.2d 235]

James A. Collins, Frank A. Symmes, Charles W. Symmes, and Wray E. Fleming, all of Indianapolis, for appellant.

George N. Beamer, Atty. Gen., and Walter O. Lewis, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.


RICHMAN, Judge.

Appellant, waiving a jury, was convicted of violating § 2 of Ch. 190, Acts 1929, which provided that the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident causing death, personal injury or property damage

[38 N.E.2d 236]

‘shall immediately stop, render or offer to render assistance, and give to the injured person or to some person who is with such injured person or to the owner or person in charge and control of the damaged property, his name, residence address including street number, city or town, county and state, also the license number of said motor vehicle * * * and produce or offer for inspection, the certificate of registration therefor: Provided, That if such person is either killed or rendered unconscious and there is no other person to whom such person involved in the accident can report, then such person shall report such information to a police or peace officer, or in case no police or peace officer is in the vicinity of the place of such injury or accident, then he shall report such injury or accident to the nearest police station, peace officer or judicial officer.’

The indictment closely follows the language of the statute and negatives compliance with every duty enjoined thereby. It alleges that two persons, Noah Russell and Margaret Russell, were killed in the accident and that appellant failed to stop and give to them the assistance and information required, ‘nor to any person’ with them, nor to any other of the several officers mentioned in the proviso.

The overruling of motions to quash and in arrest of judgment, assigned as error, test the sufficiency of the indictment. The specific objections all go to the lack of certainty which is properly raised by the motion to quash.

Appellant asserts that the indictment charges three offenses and is therefore bad for duplicity. We are of the opinion that failure to stop, failure to render assistance and failure to give the information as to appellant's identity are parts of but one offense for which there can be but one punishment. Similar statutes have been so construed in People v. Huber, 1923, 64 Cal.App. 352, 354, 221 P. 695, 696,State v. Razey, 1929, 129 Kan. 328, 282 P. 755, 66 A.L.R. 1225, and Commonwealth v. Zeitler, 1922, 79 Pa.Super. 81.

Appellant makes the point that the word ‘immediately’ contained in the statute is omitted from the indictment. It charges however that she ‘did then and there unlawfully and feloniously fail to stop’ which was sufficient. The theory of the indictment is that she failed to stop at all which includes the charge that she failed immediately to stop.

A more substantial objection is that the indictment does not give the name of the person referred to in the phrase ‘nor to any person with the said Noah Russell and Margaret Russell.’ Only by implication from this phrase does the indictment disclose that anyone was with the two persons killed. The evidence shows, however, that Noah was the father of Margaret, whom he was carrying, and that his wife, carrying another small child, was walking with him when he was killed. Appellant insists that the wife's name should have been stated in the indictment so that it might be known with certainty to whom the aid and information should have been given.

In support of this position appellant relies upon Gardner v. State, 1853, 4 Ind. 632;McLaughlin v. State, 1873, 45 Ind. 338;Zook v. State, 1874, 47 Ind. 463;Burton v. State, 1881, 75 Ind. 477, and Walters v. State, 1910, 174 Ind. 545, 92 N.E. 537. The Gardner case held only that under the law in force prior to the adoption of the Code in 1852 it was not proper to describe a defendant by his initials only but that his Christian name must be stated. The Burton case on similar facts is rested on this case.

In the Zook case prosecution was under a statute making it an offense for the proprietor of a pool room to permit a minor to play at any of the tables. The court held the indictment insufficient because it did not show that a game was played and also because it did ‘not name the person with whom the minor played, and a conviction on this indictment would not be a bar to another indictment charging that the minor played with a person named.’ We do not think this reasoning applies to the case at bar. If appellant had stopped and given the required information to any person who was with the person killed, she would not have been liable to a second prosecution. There might well be two or more offenses committed on the same day in the same pool room under the gaming statute but under the ‘hit and run’ statute only one offense is involved in any one accident. Conviction of that one offense would bar any further prosecution. The statutes involved in the McLaughlin case forbade sales of liquor to certain classes of purchasers. The indictment charged ‘generally that the defendant sold liquor to divers persons' but

[38...

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16 practice notes
  • State v. Dougherty, No. 40892.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • January 7, 1949
    ...S.W. 733; State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319, 296 S.W. 132; State v. Harris, 357 Mo. 1119, 212 S.W. (2d) 426, 427; Runyon v. State of Indiana, 219 Ind. 352, 38 N.E. (2d) 235, 237. However, the State contends that the words "to the injured party", as used in the statute, include the plural (parti......
  • Williams v. State, No. 1-880A220
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • January 27, 1981
    ...been held sufficient to connect a vehicle to a collision. Dalton v. State, (1952) 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509; Runyon v. State, (1941) 219 Ind. 352, 38 N.E.2d The evidence discloses that Williams, in a highly intoxicated condition, .37 percent chemical analysis, drove past the scene of the......
  • Armstrong v. State, No. 26S05-0606-CR-212.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • June 15, 2006
    ...of the parties so that they and police authorities may know with whom to deal in matters growing out of the accident." Runyon v. State, 219 Ind. 352, 38 N.E.2d 235, 237 (1941); see also Micinski v. State, 487 N.E.2d 150, 152-53 (Ind.1986) ("We now make explicit what was assumed in Runyon, t......
  • Armstrong v. State, No. 26A05-0401-CR-12.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • November 23, 2004
    ...of the parties so that they and police authorities may know with whom to deal in matters growing out of the accident. Runyon v. State, 219 Ind. 352, 357, 38 N.E.2d 235, 237 (1941). Limiting "accidents" to only those incidents where a person or vehicle is struck undercuts these purposes, as ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
16 cases
  • State v. Dougherty, No. 40892.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • January 7, 1949
    ...S.W. 733; State v. Tippett, 317 Mo. 319, 296 S.W. 132; State v. Harris, 357 Mo. 1119, 212 S.W. (2d) 426, 427; Runyon v. State of Indiana, 219 Ind. 352, 38 N.E. (2d) 235, 237. However, the State contends that the words "to the injured party", as used in the statute, include the plural (parti......
  • Williams v. State, No. 1-880A220
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • January 27, 1981
    ...been held sufficient to connect a vehicle to a collision. Dalton v. State, (1952) 230 Ind. 626, 105 N.E.2d 509; Runyon v. State, (1941) 219 Ind. 352, 38 N.E.2d The evidence discloses that Williams, in a highly intoxicated condition, .37 percent chemical analysis, drove past the scene of the......
  • Armstrong v. State, No. 26S05-0606-CR-212.
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • June 15, 2006
    ...of the parties so that they and police authorities may know with whom to deal in matters growing out of the accident." Runyon v. State, 219 Ind. 352, 38 N.E.2d 235, 237 (1941); see also Micinski v. State, 487 N.E.2d 150, 152-53 (Ind.1986) ("We now make explicit what was assumed in Runyon, t......
  • Armstrong v. State, No. 26A05-0401-CR-12.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • November 23, 2004
    ...of the parties so that they and police authorities may know with whom to deal in matters growing out of the accident. Runyon v. State, 219 Ind. 352, 357, 38 N.E.2d 235, 237 (1941). Limiting "accidents" to only those incidents where a person or vehicle is struck undercuts these purposes, as ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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