Runyon v. Wright

Citation322 S.C. 15,471 S.E.2d 160
Decision Date07 February 1996
Docket NumberNo. 24433,24433
PartiesWilliam L. RUNYON, Jr., Appellant, v. Karen WRIGHT, Darryl Wright, and David Schwacke, as Solicitor for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Respondents. . Heard
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

Francis T. Draine, Columbia, for respondents Karen and Darryl Wright.

BURNETT, Justice:

This appeal is from an order granting a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against appellant and his trial attorney. 1 We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant, who is an attorney licensed in South Carolina, was retained by respondents Karen and Darryl Wright for the purpose of perfecting a post-conviction relief action for Darryl following Darryl's conviction for drug related offenses. The Wrights also retained appellant to recover over $40,000 seized by authorities during or after Darryl's arrest.

Over a period of time, the Wrights paid appellant approximately $9,000. Not satisfied with appellant's work, however, the Wrights discharged appellant and sought a refund. When appellant refused to give the Wrights a refund, the Wrights filed a complaint with the South Carolina Bar Association's Resolution of Fee Disputes Board (the Board). After a hearing, the Board ordered appellant to refund $6,000. The Board's order was subsequently reduced to a judgment against appellant on April 21, 1993. 2 That same day, appellant brought this action pursuant to Rule 22, SCRCP, alleging that the $6,000 was illegal drug money and that the Solicitor had an interest in the money, even though the Solicitor had not filed any action against appellant, the Wrights, or the $6,000. Appellant also sought to recover costs and attorney's fees for bringing the action.

On June 2, 1993, after appellant informed the Solicitor that the $6,000 was allegedly illegal drug money, the Solicitor filed a forfeiture action against the money. However, the Solicitor voluntarily dismissed this action on March 18, 1994. Thereafter, appellant deposited the $6,000 with the circuit court and filed a motion for summary judgment seeking costs and attorney's fees for bringing the interpleader action. The Wrights, in turn, filed a motion for sanctions against appellant and his attorney. At the hearing on these motions, appellant asked for additional attorney's fees and asked the court not to disburse any monies to the Wrights until a malpractice action filed by the Wrights against appellant was resolved.

In its order, the circuit court found that appellant's claims in this matter were without merit and were brought in bad faith. Consequently, as a sanction, the court ordered appellant and his attorney to pay the Wrights $2,555. 3 In addition, the court ordered the $6,000 released to the Wrights, and ordered appellant to pay the outstanding interest accumulated on the $6,000. On appeal, appellant challenges the $2,555 sanction, arguing the circuit court erred in finding his claims in this matter were frivolous and brought in bad faith. 4

ISSUE

Did the circuit court err in granting the Wrights' motion for sanctions?

DISCUSSION

Rule 11(a), SCRCP, provides in part as follows:

The signature of an attorney or party [on a pleading, motion, or other paper] constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

. . . . .

If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

Under this Rule, a party and/or the party's attorney may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper, or for making frivolous arguments. See Link v. School District of Pickens County, 302 S.C. 1, 393 S.E.2d 176 (1990). The party and/or attorney may also be sanctioned for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper in bad faith (i.e., to cause unnecessary delay) whether or not there is good ground to support it. See Johnson v. Dailey, 318 S.C. 318, 457 S.E.2d 613 (1995). The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by the party or parties defending against the frivolous action or action brought in bad faith, a reasonable fine to be paid to the court, or a directive of a nonmonetary nature designed to deter the party or the party's attorney from bringing any future frivolous action or action in bad faith. Further, if appropriate under the facts of the case, the court may order a party and/or the party's attorney to pay a reasonable monetary penalty to the party or parties defending against the frivolous action or action brought in bad faith. Rule 11(a), SCRCP.

A court imposing sanctions under Rule 11 should, in its order, describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of the Rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. The imposition of sanctions,...

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29 cases
  • Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Estate of Thompson
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • November 2, 2016
    ...discretion may be found if the conclusions reached by the court are without reasonable factual support." (quoting Runyon v. Wright, 322 S.C. 15, 19, 471 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1996))).LAW/ANALYSIS I. PDHC's AppealPDHC contends the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss the Estate's motion for ......
  • State v. Corey D.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • March 6, 2000
    ...and may be found if the conclusions reached by the lower court are without reasonable factual support. Runyon v. Wright, 322 S.C. 15, 19, 471 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1996); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Sharpe, 242 S.C. 397, 402, 131 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1963). We note, [i]t is not always easy......
  • Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Estate of Thompson
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • November 2, 2016
    ...discretion may be found if the conclusions reached by the court are without reasonable factual support." (quoting Runyon v. Wright , 322 S.C. 15, 19, 471 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1996) )).LAW/ANALYSISI. PDHC's AppealPDHC contends the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss the Estate's motion for......
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    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • March 6, 1996
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