Ruoff v. Blasi

• Decision Date: 08 August 1936
• Docket Number: No. 207.,207.
• Parties: RUOFF v. BLASI.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

186 A. 581

RUOFF

v. BLASI.

No. 207.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Aug. 8, 1936.

Certiorari to Court of Common Pleas, Essex County.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Stanley Blasi, for the death of his son, opposed by F. Ruoff, employer. From a judgment of the court of common pleas reversing a judgment of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau dismissing petitioner's application to reopen a judgment, and remanding the cause to the bureau, the employer brings certiorari. Judgment affirmed.

Argued May term, 1936, before BROGAN, C. J., and CASE and PERSKIE, JJ.

Edwin Joseph O'Brien, of Newark (Merrit Lane, of Newark, of counsel), for prosecutor.

Bozza & Bozza, of Newark, for respondent.

PERSKIE, Justice.

This is a workmen's compensation case.

Petitioner (respondent) filed his petition with the bureau on December 10, 1931, alleging the death of his son as a result of an accident occurring July 24, 1931. It appears that the body of the employee became wedged between an elevator and an elevator wall when he was carrying materials from one part of the factory wherein he was working to another. The petition alleged that the employee's entire family, including parents and five infant brothers and sisters, were dependents. The wages were stated at $12 per week. The employer filed an answer claiming no dependency and that the weekly vage was $10. On March 1, 1932 the parvies, represented by counsel, appeared before the deputy commissioner. The following is a copy of the transcript of the testimony as to just what did in fact take place at the hearing:

"Mr. Baker: This settlement, your Honor, is on the basis of a lump sum of Seven Hundred and Fifty Dollars, counsel fee Two Hundred Dollars, Seventy Five Dollars of which will be payable by the respondent.

"We want to amend our answer in this case by consent of the attorney for the petitioner and by the permission of the Court. The respondent moves to amend their answer denying that the death of Toni Blasi was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Therefore, a compromise settlement has been entered into. The deceased is Toni Blasi and the father is Stanley Blasi, who signed the Petition, and under the terms of the settlement the respondent will pay the petitioner, Stanley Blasi, a lump sum of Seven Hundred and Fifty Dollars, and the counsel fee is to be Two Hundred Dollars, Seventy-five dollars of which will be payable by the respondent. This is to be a complete and final closeout for once and all time. The above settlement is in addition to the One Hundred and Fifty Dollars that has been paid for the funeral expenses of the deceased."

Stanley Blasi, the petitioner, a witness called on his" own behalf, being first duly sworn, testified as follows (the testimony of this witness was given through the interpreter, Manotti R. Langione):

"By Mr. Goas:

"Q. Mr. Blasi, you understand by the settlement that has just been made between the parties, you are to get Seven Hundred and Fifty Dollars in cash, out of which you have to pay One Hundred and Twenty Five Dollars towards your attorney fee. A. Yes.

"Q. The respondent will pay seventy five dollars towards the attorney fee. A. Yes. "Q. Do you understand that? A. Yes. "Q. Is it satisfactory? A. Yes. "By the Court:

"Q. This is a final settlment of your case. Do you understand that? A. Yes. "The Court: Settlement approved."

Accordingly, a determination and rule for judgment was entered (March 8, 1932) on the approved settlement. It is interesting to observe that on the mere statement of employer's counsel, and the testimony as aforesaid, the deputy commissioner says in his determination and rule for judgment: "* * * It was found that the Respondent, in the first place, by an amendment to the answer, denied that the injury arose by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment on the ground that the deceased was doing something that he was not supposed to do at the time and it was further found that the respondent denied that there was any partial dependency involved in the case in view of the fact that the small earnings of the deceased were all necessary for his own support." (Italics supplied.)

On November 1, 1932, petitioner gave notice to employer of an application to the bureau to reopen the judgment. The grounds are: (1) The petitioner consented to the compromise agreement on facts which were not true and in total ignorance of what his just rights were in the cause. (2) That the compromise upon which the rule and determination for judgment was entered is unreasonable and unconscionable. (3) That all the material and essential facts were not presented to the court in order to enable the court to decide whether the agreement by compromise was a fair and reasonable one. (4) That the compromise agreement and rule for judgment contain false, fictitious, and untrue statements, to the essential material facts in the case. (5) That the false, fictitious, and untrue statements were known to be such, or should have been known to be such, by the respondent by reason of statements taken and reduced to writing by their investigators from the members of the Blasi family and neighbors, and such statements were permitted to be entered in the compromise agreement for the purpose of causing the court to believe that the unconscionable and unreasonable award was a just one. (6) That representations made to petitioner causing him to labor under the misapprehension that the amount awarded was the maximum he could receive under the law.

The deputy commissioner, by letter dated November 10, 1932, denied the application on the grounds "that the settlement entered into March 1st, 1932 was a final close out and the petitioner was fully cognizant with all the facts." The exact opposite seems to be the fact. Thereafter, on December 1, 1932, petitioner appealed to the Essex county court of common pleas. On the argument of that appeal the charge of fraud was abandoned.

Judge Hartshorne, in disposing of the appeal, held inter alia:

"Since 'there was a mere agreement of compromise approved by the Bureau' and not 'a final adjudication on the merits,' the Bureau should have granted the application to hear the case on the merits. Federated Metals Corp. v. Boyko, 168 A. 672, 11 N.J.Misc. 807. While the above decision is one involving a petition for subsequent changed disability filed under section 21 (f) of the statute (P.L.1931, c. 279, pp. 704, 705 [N.J.St.Annual 1931, § * * 236—24]), the basis of the decision in the above regard is section 20 (b) of the statute, supra (Comp.St.Supp.1924, § * * 236—21 (b), which is applicable not only to such a petition, but to any proceeding by the parties terminating in a compromise, the words of the statute, 'no agreement' and its spirit, being all-inclusive."

"Nor is this appeal from the ordinarily discretionary refusal of the trial court to grant a new trial, for the simple reason that there never was a trial originally, the lack of such trial constituting the meritorious basis of this appeal. Furthermore, it might be difficult to bind minors, alleged to be dependents, by an agreement in which they did not participate in fact, "and could not participate in law."

"However, since under the compromise agreement now sought to be set aside, petitioner has received substantial monies and since the hearing on the merits which he asks may terminate either in his favor or against him, he should, to be consistent, tender the return of the monies received under the agreement which he now denounces, or, at the least, give security therefor."

Pursuant to that holding judgment was entered on June 4, 1934, reversing the judgment of the bureau dismissing petitioner's application to reopen the judgment and...