Ruona v. New York Life Ins. Co.

Citation68 F. Supp. 923
Decision Date12 December 1946
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 153.
PartiesRUONA v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

Francis A. Bell, of Ishpeming, Mich., Bernard H. Davidson, of Negaunee, Mich., and James P. Clancey, of Ishpeming, Mich., for plaintiff.

Laurent K. Varnum and Travis, Merrick, Varnum & Riddering, all of Grand Rapids, Mich., and Eldredge & Eldredge, of Marquette, Mich., for defendant.

STARR, District Judge.

Plaintiff and her husband, Kusta A. Ruona, were residents of the city of Ishpeming, Michigan. He was about 73 years of age and for many years it had been his custom to take steam baths. At about two o'clock in the afternoon of November 6, 1942, he went to a privately-operated bath establishment in Ishpeming to take a steam bath. He had previously taken baths in this establishment, and it may reasonably be inferred that he was familiar with the equipment and facilities. It appears that he went into the private bath room assigned to him, in which there was an upper floor on which was located a cement bench for the bather's use. In front of the bench was a hot radiator and directly above this was a water faucet. The procedure was for the bather to open the faucet, and the water, spraying on the hot radiator, would create steam. The bather could control the amount of water sprayed on the radiator and thereby control the amount of steam and the resultant temperature of the bath room. At some time between three-thirty and four o'clock that afternoon the proprietor of the bath house became somewhat concerned because deceased had remained so long in the steam-bath room, and called his son from a nearby store. On entering the bath room they found deceased lying on the bench in an unconscious condition. There was a superficial abrasion on the left side of his forehead. The water faucet had apparently not been turned off, and the continued flow of water on the hot radiator had greatly increased the temperature of the room. On the advice of Dr. McCann, who was called and who examined him, the deceased was removed to a hospital, where he died the next day, November 7th. Later, an autopsy was performed by Dr. Tharinger, representing the defendant company, and by Dr. McCann. At the autopsy, specimen sections of tissue of the brain, pituitary gland, heart, lungs, kidneys, and other organs of deceased's body were removed, and these specimens were sent to Dr. Weller, physician and pathologist at the University of Michigan hospital, for examination.

At the time of his death plaintiff's husband held three insurance policies issued by defendant company in the aggregate face or principal amount of $4,000, in which plaintiff was designated as beneficiary. In each policy defendant agreed to pay the beneficiary the face of the policy upon receipt of due proof of the death of the insured; or to pay:

"Double the face of this policy upon receipt of due proof that the death of the insured resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental cause, and that such death occurred within sixty days after sustaining such injury."

The policies further provided:

"This double indemnity benefit will not apply if the insured's death resulted * * * from physical or mental infirmity; or directly or indirectly from illness or disease of any kind."

Plaintiff furnished due proof of her husband's death and demanded payment of double indemnity, which defendant refused. She later began the present suit in the circuit court for Marquette county, claiming that under the above-quoted provisions of the policies she was entitled to recover double indemnity in the amount of $8,000. On defendant's petition the suit was removed to this court. In its answer defendant admitted liability for $4,000, as the face or principal amount of the policies, but denied liability for double indemnity. The case was tried before the court sitting without a jury. In the course of the trial defendant stipulated and agreed that it was liable for single indemnity of $4,000 and that it was holding such sum for plaintiff, subject to withdrawal on her demand. Therefore, the only issue for determination is whether or not plaintiff is entitled to recover double indemnity.

The burden was on plaintiff to establish that her husband's death "resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental cause" and that his death did not result "from physical * * * infirmity; or directly or indirectly from illness or disease of any kind." New York Life Insurance Co. v. Gamer, Executrix, 303 U.S. 161, 58 S.Ct. 500, 82 L.Ed. 726, 114 A.L.R. 1218; Harrison v. New York Life Ins. Co., 6 Cir., 78 F.2d 421; Koycheff v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 305 Mich. 660, 9 N.W.2d 883. Dr. Weller, the pathologist who examined the tissue specimens removed at the autopsy, testified in part:

"Q. * * * What did the examination of the heart tissue show? * * * A. In the heart was found brown atrophy of the myocardium. Advanced coronary atherosclerosis. Heavy lymphocyte and plasma cell infiltration in the adventitia of some of the coronary arteries. One of the smaller coronary branches shows complete earlier obliteration. * * *

"These changes are such as are commonly found in the hearts of men the age of K. A. Ruona, which was stated to me to be 73. The changes in the coronary arteries are marked but are not unusual. The small coronary branch which was completely obliterated had suffered that change months or years before the death of the patient. * * *

"The lungs showed * * * intense well-marked acute passive congestion, acute edema, hemorrhage into the alveoli. * * *

"The kidneys showed acute passive congestion, cloudy swelling. * * *

"The pathological diagnosis based upon the microscopical examination was acute circulatory failure. * * *

"The arterial changes in the heart are those frequently found in men of this age and would have some effect in lowering the efficiency of the circulation. * * *

"My opinion based on the examination of the tissues alone would be expressed in the statement that death was due to acute circulatory failure. * * *

"The changes in the brain are such as might be associated with a state of unconsciousness but the changes in the brain did not indicate concussion from physical trauma. * * *

"The changes in the brain indicated acute circulatory failure with marked edema and fully compatible with circulatory failure, associated with elevated body temperature. * * * "My opinion is that circulatory failure was induced in a susceptible individual as a result of the heat exhaustion and that the contusion (on the forehead), if present, was produced when he fell after he became unconscious. * * *

"My opinion would be that the fall was the result of his becoming unconscious and not his unconsciousness the result of his fall.

"Q. * * * What would cause him to become unconscious? A. The changes in the brain resulting from hyperthermia, increased body temperature. * * *

"In view of the known sequence of events, it seems proper to conclude that in this instance, heat exhaustion precipitated circulatory failure in a patient who was especially vulnerable because of his narrowed or obliterated coronary arteries. An unusual exertion might have had the same effect. * * *

"I would say that age and previous bodily infirmities made him more vulnerable to heat exhaustion than would otherwise have been the case. * * *

"Q. Doctor, it might be fairly stated I think that in the case of Mr. Ruona, exposure to heat in all probability would not have resulted in his death had it not been for the diseased condition of his arteries? Is that true? A. I think that is true. * * *

"My opinion is that he died when he did because of exposure to the heat of the steam bath."

Dr. McCann, the personal physician of the deceased, who had examined and treated him prior to his death, and who attended him at the hospital and assisted in the autopsy, testified in part:

"I originally saw him (deceased) on September 16, 1941. * * *

"The last time I saw him was October 12 (1942), and his condition was good at that time. * * *

"I treated him only for a mild secondary anemia. * * *

"Q. * * * Can you say with reasonable certainty what caused his death? A. * * * The primary cause was heat stroke, and the contributing cause was circulatory failure. * * *

"The extreme heat precipitated the circulatory failure. * * *

"The coronary arteriosclerosis, of course, was an aging process that you would expect to find in a man of the age of 73. * * *

"Q. * * * From your examination of him did he in your opinion show any symptoms of arteriosclerosis? A. * * * Of course, he had some arteriosclerotic changes; * * * but no more so than another man his age would have. * * *

"Q. * * * In giving your diagnosis you used the word `heat stroke,' do you mean the same thing by `heat stroke' that Dr. Weller means by `heat exhaustion'? A. They produce the same pathological results, but their subjective symptoms are somewhat different. * * *

"Sunstroke and heat stroke are the same; they are synonymous. * * *

"Q. * ** Dr. Weller recognizes that * * * this diseased condition of his heart was a contributing cause of his death; would you agree to that? * * * A. Yes. * * *

"I think the heat precipitated the condition, that the condition of his heart precipitated the circulatory failure because of the heat stroke. * * *

"In this instance a man of 73 years of age, he has an aging process of arteriosclerosis, and heart changes due to the aging process. That factor could be a contributory one to his circulatory failure. * * *

"The Court: * * * The words `heat stroke,' `heat prostration,' `heat exhaustion' have all been used; I ask you, are those terms used synonymously in the medical profession? A. * * * No, the end result is the same, but the clinical...

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  • Callahan v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.
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    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 8, 1947
    ...263, 131 S.W. (2d) 887; Caldwell v. Travelers, 305 Mo. 619, 267 S.W. 907; Winton v. Metropolitan Life, 124 S.W. (2d) 712; Ruona v. New York Life, 68 F. Supp. 923; Landress v. Phoenix Mutual, 291 U.S. 491; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 91 Ohio St. 155; Baliki v. Central Greyhound Li......
  • Callahan v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 8, 1947
    ... ... 263, 131 S.W.2d 887; Caldwell v ... Travelers, 305 Mo. 619, 267 S.W. 907; Winton v ... Metropolitan Life, 124 S.W.2d 712; Ruona v. New York ... Life, 68 F.Supp. 923; Landress v. Phoenix ... Mutual, 291 U.S. 491; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v ... Johnson, 91 Ohio St ... ...
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    ...acts preceding the death in view of the circumstances of this particular case should be considered accidental. Ruona v. New York Life Insurance Company (W.D.Mich.), 68 F.Supp. 923. Several elements of accident and the relationship among them are considered in the case of Ashley v. Agricultu......

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