Rupert v. Gunter

• Decision Date: 15 January 1982
• Docket Number: No. 4059-II
• Citation: Rupert v. Gunter, 640 P.2d 36, 31 Wn.App. 27 (Wash. App. 1982)
• Parties: Stephen F. RUPERT, Appellant, v. Daniel B. GUNTER and Laurie D. Gunter, husband and wife, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 27

31 Wn.App. 27

640 P.2d 36

Stephen F. RUPERT, Appellant, v. Daniel B. GUNTER and Laurie D. Gunter, husband and wife, Respondents.

No. 4059-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Jan. 15, 1982.

Richard Goodwin, Ingram, Zelasko & Goodwin, Aberdeen, for appellant.

Jack L. Burtch, Aberdeen, for respondents.

PETRICH, Judge.

Stephen F. Rupert sought an injunction against the defendants, Daniel B. and Laurie D. Gunter, asking that they stop hindering his full use and enjoyment of his easement across their property. The court granted him injunctive relief; however, the plaintiff appeals that part of the judgment allowing the defendants to construct a gate at the entrance to plaintiff's easement, not allowing him any money damages, and ordering each side to pay its own costs. The primary issue is whether the owner of a servient estate subjected to an access easement is forever precluded from imposing any physical restraints along the access road where the original grant was silent as to permitted restraints. We believe the servient owner is entitled to impose reasonable restraints on the right-of-way to avoid a greater burden on the servient owner's estate than that originally contemplated in the easement grant, so long as such restraints do not unreasonably interfere with the dominant owner's use, and, therefore, affirm the judgment below.

The defendants' property, consisting largely of open fields, was purchased on July 17, 1970, and is bisected by a lane running from the county road on the northeast side to the plaintiff's property on the southwest side. Fences border this lane for most of its length. No gates crossed the lane when defendants moved onto the property, but in 1976 they built a gate located approximately at the lane's midpoint where there is a turnoff to defendant's house. The gate's avowed purpose was to prevent the general public from entering and speeding down the lane. Plaintiff purchased his property on June 2, 1978, and the statutory warranty deed contained an express easement, 16 feet in width, which followed the course of the lane over defendants' property.

Due to its weight and awkwardness, the aforementioned gate was difficult to open and close. When defendants placed the gate across the lane, it created a great inconvenience for plaintiff. Defendants also harassed plaintiff in other ways. Occasionally they obstructed his free use of the lane by placing various objects on the lane or by standing in the middle of it. They dug holes in its surface. They yelled and used profane language toward plaintiff's friends who attempted to use the easement. And they made certain threats to plaintiff thereby attempting to curtail his use of the lane. Not suprisingly, plaintiff brought an action against defendants seeking injunctive relief.

Defendants subsequently served plaintiff with interrogatories that inquired, inter alia, regarding any expert witness expected to be called at trial. Not until two days prior to trial did the plaintiff inform defendants of his general intent to call an appraiser to the stand. And not until 4 p. m., the day before the trial, did plaintiff specifically make arrangements with Bill Michalak to give expert testimony as an appraiser. Plaintiff can point to no evidence indicating that he had informed defendants of his intention to call Michalak as a witness. At trial, defendants objected when plaintiff called Michalak to the stand, and the trial court struck his testimony because plaintiff had not complied with CR 26(e)(1).

The court's judgment enjoined defendants from harassing plaintiff in any way and also forbade defendants from placing a gate across the easement. However, it gave defendants the option of constructing a lightweight aluminum gate, one easy to open and shut, at the entrance of the easement on the county road. The court stated that this gate would control the public's use of the lane, and that its cost would be borne by defendants. The judgment also ordered each party to pay their own costs.

From this judgment, plaintiff appeals in part. At issue is whether the court abused its discretion in fashioning its equitable remedy.

We point out initially that a suit for an injunction is an equitable proceeding with considerable inherent discretion vested in the trial court. Tradewell Stores, Inc. v. T. B. & M., Inc., 7 Wash.App. 424, 500 P.2d 1290 (1972). The trial court is vested with a broad discretionary power to shape and fashion injunctive relief to fit particular facts, circumstances, and equities of the case before it. 43A C.J.S., Injunctions § 235, at 512 (1978). Appellate courts are required to give great weight to the trial court's exercise of discretion in equitable cases; only if that discretion is abused will we interfere with the judgment.

Turning, then, to plaintiff's first contention, we inquire whether the court abused its discretion in allowing defendants to construct a gate across the easement's entrance. Whether or not the owner of land, over which an easement exists, may erect and maintain fences, bars, or gates across or along an easement way, depends upon the intention of the parties connected with the original creation of the easement, as shown by the circumstances of the case; the nature and situation of the property subject to the easement; and the manner in which the way has been used and occupied. Evich v. Kovacevich, 33 Wash.2d 151, 204 P.2d 839 (1949). Similarly, if the easement is ambiguous or even silent on some points, the rules of construction call for examination of the situation of the property, the parties, and surrounding circumstances. Seattle v. Nazarenus, 60 Wash.2d 657, 374 P.2d 1014 (1962...